A failure waiting to happen.

• Author: Kojro, Chester A.
• Position: Letters - Letter to the Editor

The story "Future Combat Systems Technologies Not Keeping Pace With Expectations," (October 2004, p. 45-46) paints an exceptionally clear picture of the FCS program.

As Sandra Erwin explains the phases, 2008 might see the NLOS-cannon, some missile launchers and robot ground sensors, 2010 may see new communication and unmanned surveillance aircraft, 2012 might see fully autonomous ground robots, 2014 might see the battle command network retro-fitted ("spiraled") into the existing Abrams/Bradley/Stryker fleet. Only then perhaps will the FCS manned combat vehicles begin arriving, technology and/or miracles permitting.

I contend that the program's fatal flaws are either unrecognized or else being ignored by Army acquisition officials, so please allow me to point them out. Leading the program with the NLOS-Cannon six years before any other variant only guarantees that either the NLOS-cannon will be incompatible, or else the fleet's design is prematurely locked in. An incompatible cannon system ensures lifecycle problems since it will match neither FCS nor the existing M109 family of self-propelled howitzers. Even more disastrous would be a premature design lock-in, as the technology to build the family does not even exist.

Regarding survivability at less than 20 tons, this program is a dead end. The highly touted Stryker is too big and heavy for C-130 transport, yet its basic armor protection is only against heavy machine guns, perhaps 14.5 mm. Heretofore obsolete 20 mm auto-cannons will suddenly become effective killing systems, while larger systems such as 40 mm will completely dominate the battlefield. Brig. Gen. Charles Cartwright reportedly states that "active protection" is a relatively mature technology, even though the U.S. Army...