Fact, Theory, and Democratic Theory

• Author: David C. Paris
• Published date: 01 June 1987
• Date: 01 June 1987
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/106591298704000202
• Subject Matter: Articles

FACT,

THEORY,

AND

DEMOCRATIC

THEORY

DAVID

C.

PARIS

Hamilton

College

NE

of the

persistent

problems

in

contemporary

democratic

theory

~

has

been

to

specify

the

proper

relationship(s)

of

democratic

ideals

to

actual

political

practices.

This

problem

is

often

expressed

in

the

form

of

a

dilemma

between

the

demands

of

democratic

ideals

and

empiri-

cal

constraints

on

their

realization.

For

example,

Margolis

argues

that, &dquo;It

may

not

be

possible

to

develop

a

theory

of liberal

democracy

which

is

com-

patible

with

both

the

empirically

demonstrated

capabilities

of

the

citizenry

and

the

theoretically

demonstrated

necessity

of

preserving

liberal

values&dquo;

(1979:

93).

There

seems

to

be

an

inevitable

trade-off

between

making

democratic

theory

realistic

or

practical,

on

the

one

hand,

and

fulfilling

democratic

ideals,

on

the

other.

If

we

allow

empirical

research

to

constrain

our

ideals

by

leading

us

to

underestimate

what

is

possible,

then

we

may

undercut

those

ideals

and

fail

to

use

them

to

guide

us

in

improving

the

political

system.

If

we

insulate

our

ideals

from

empirical

evidence

and

anal-

ysis,

then

we

may

be

merely

building

elegant

but

wholly

unrealistic

and

useless

analytical

systems.

This

problem

is

not

unique

to

democratic

theory.

Any

ideals

or

ideolo-

gies

simultaneously

express

the

way

someone

thinks the

world

does

work,

should

work,

and

even

might

work

if

social

and

political

behavior

and

in-

stitutions

were

changed.

The

problem

arises

when

the

world

does

not

con-

form

to

these

expectations.

In

the

face

of

discrepancies

between

ideals

and

reality,

one

might

cling

to

the

former

believing

that

the

contrary

evidence

is

merely

an

aberration

or

a

misinterpretation.

Or,

more

aggressively,

it

might

be

demanded

that

the

world

itself

be

changed

to

conform

more

closely

to

the

ideal

pattern.

On

the

other

hand,

the

collision

of

ideals

and

facts

may

prompt

an

adjustment

in

what

one

believes

can

and

should

be

done.

This

latter

strategy

is

often

what

is

anticipated

by

the

injunction

to

be &dquo;realis-

tic&dquo;

in

political

and

moral

affairs,

i.e.,

to

temper

or

modify

our

moral

ex-

pectations

on

the

basis

of

a

clear

view

of

empirical

evidence

and

practical

possibility.

The

appeal

to

realism

is

thus

not

unique

to

arguments

in

democratic

theory

but

may

be

used

for

or

against

relatively

narrow

poli-

cies

or

the

broadest

world

views.’

1

The

power

of

the

appeal

to

realism

in

political

argument

derives

from

at

least

two

sources,

one

evidentiary,

the

other

practical.

Realism

means

both

recognizing

relevant

empirical

considerations

and

responding

to

them

in

a

practical

way.

First,

empirical

evidence

can

advance

or

undercut

a

Received:

October

3,

1985

Revision

Received:

April

7,

1986

Accepted

for

Publication:

April

28,

1986

1

For

example,

it

is

often

argued

that

Marxists

have

an

unrealistic

view

of

human

nature

and

the

possibilities

of

technology

and

social

organization.

216

political

argument

or

theory,

or

even

occasionally

adjudicate

between

two

competing

arguments

or

theories.

For

example,

the

psychological

research

presented

in

the

Brown

vs.

Board

case

-

however

sound

or

unsound

it

ac-

tually

was -

did

help

to

undercut

the

claim

that

separate

but

equal

schools

could

be

maintained.

One

need

not

be

an

ethical

relativist

to

believe

that

there

is

a

greater

possibility

of

reaching

some

agreement

on

empirical

matters

than

on

vague

or

contested

normative

claims.

It

is

tempting

to

seek

just

that

piece

of

evidence

which

defeats

or

clinches

an

argument.

Second,

if

political

arguments

or

theories

are

to

be

more

than

mere

abstractions

or

analytic

exercises,

then

empirical

information

is

valuable

in

suggesting

how

the

argument

or

theory

may

be

applied

to

practical

concerns.

This

infor-

mation

is

not

only

valuable

as

a

means

of

getting

theory

to

guide

practice

but

also

as

a

means

of

probing

the

practical

limits

of

theoretical

schemes.

Theories

or

arguments

must

not

only

speak

to

the

world;

they

must

in

some

sense

answer

to

it.

The

clash

between

ideals

and

empirical

evidence

arises

in

democratic

theory

as

a

result

of

the

consideration

of

the

actual

political

practices

of

modern

Western

democracies.

Revisions

of

democratic

theory

undertaken

by

Schumpeter,

Dahl,

Truman,

and

others

(Holden

1973:

chs.

5-6;

Mar-

golis

1979:

95-124)

have

attempted

to

alleviate

the

apparent

tensions

be-

tween

some

(ill-defined) &dquo;classical

ideal&dquo;

of

democratic

politics

and

actual

political

practices.

Although

there

is

no

single

revisionist

theory

-

or

for

that

matter

any one

&dquo;classical&dquo;

or

participatory

theory2

-

there

remains

a

consensus

among

democratic

theorists

that

democratic

ideals

must

come

to

terms

with

the

findings

of

empirical

research

into

political

practices.

A

realistic

democratic

theory

requires

a

clearer

view

of

how

central

democratic

ideals

can

be

maintained

in

large-scale,

complex

societies,

e.g.,

through

elections

and

interest

groups,

without

unrealistic

demands

on

citizen

com-

petence

and

participation

(Kelso

1978:

13ff.).

The

power

of

this

appeal

to

realism

was

especially

apparent

in

debates

between

pluralists

and

participa-

tory

democrats.

The

charge

that

revised

theory

in

its

various

forms

had

compromised

democratic

ideals

was

countered

by

the

charge

that

participa-

tory

democrats’

theories

were

unrealistic.

Although

some

consessions

could

be

made

to

calls

for

increases

in

participation

and

greater

material

equal-

ity

(Dahl

1970),

participatory

democracy

was

dismissed

as

unrealistic, &dquo;an

impossible

ideal,

a

Quixotic

dream&dquo;

(Pennock

1979:

468).3

3

The

purpose

of

this

essay

is

to

examine

the

methodological

issue

of

what

constitutes

a

&dquo;realistic&dquo;

approach

to

democratic

theory,

i.e.,

to

ask

how

democratic

ideals

can

come

to

terms

with

the

facts

of

political

life.

This

is

a

methodological

issue

because

it

involves

ascertaining

what

evidence

is

relevant

to

a

(realistic)

democratic

theory,

how

it

is

obtained,

and

above

all

how

it

is

evaluated

and

used.

This

issue

will

be

examined

by

pointing

2

Pateman

(1970)

argues

that

the

"classical

ideal"

of

the

citizen

criticized

in

revised

democratic

theories

is

either

a

strawman

or

a

myth.

This

may

be

true;

however,

there

is

some

reason-

able

notion

of

the

(ideal)

democratic

citizen

which

seems

hardly

applicable

to

contem-

porary

societies.

See

Margolis

(1979:

ch.

1)

and

Mansbridge

(1982:

chs.

1, 2).

3

Indeed,

some

have

argued

that

it

may

even

be

dangerous

(Huntington

1975).