F Probable Cause and Automobile Exception

• Library: Illinois Decisions on Search and Seizure (2017 Ed.)

F. Probable Cause and Automobile Exception

Florida v. Harris, ___U.S.___, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013) (A K-9 Officer pulled over the defendant's truck because it had an expired license plate. On approaching the driver's side window, the officer noticed that the defendant was "visibly nervous," unable to sit still, shaking, and breathing rapidly. The officer also noticed an open can of beer in the truck's cup holder. The officer then asked the defendant for permission to search the truck, which the defendant refused. The officer then retrieved his trained drug-sniffing dog from his patrol vehicle, and walked him around the defendant's truck for a "free air sniff." The dog subsequently alerted at the driver's side door handle, and began signaling, through a distinctive set of behaviors, that he smelled drugs. Based principally on the dog's alert, the officer concluded that he had probable cause to search the truck. Although his search did not turn up any of the drugs that the dog was trained to detect, he did find ingredients for making methamphetamine. The defendant was then placed under arrest and, after receiving proper Miranda warnings, admitted to routinely cooking methamphetamine at his house. The defendant was charged with possessing pseudoephedrine for use in manufacturing methamphetamine. While out on bail, the defendant was pulled over by the same K-9 officer for a broken brake light. The officer, again, had his dog perform a "free air sniff" around the vehicle and the dog, again, alerted at the driver's side door handle. The officer then performed another search of the vehicle but did not find any items of interest. The defendant subsequently moved to suppress the evidence found in his truck on the grounds that the dog's alert had not given the officer probable cause for the search. At the suppression hearing the officer testified about both his, and his dog's, training in drug detection. Specifically, in 2004 the officer had, with another dog, completed a 160 hour course in narcotics detection, while his dog, with a different handler, had completed a similar 120 hour course. That same year, the dog had received a one-year certification from a private company that specialized in testing and certifying K-9 dogs. Furthermore, in 2005 the officer and his dog had completed a 40 hour refresher course and they continued to do four hours of training a week to maintain their skills. The State introduced training logs that showed the dog always found hidden drugs and performed "satisfactorily" on each day of training. On cross examination, the officer conceded that the certification, which Florida law did not require, had expired the year before he pulled the defendant over. Furthermore, he admitted that he did not keep complete records of the dog's performance in traffic stops and other field work, but only maintained records of alerts that resulted in arrests. The trial court held that the officer had probable cause to search the defendant's truck. An intermediate state appellate court later affirmed the ruling. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held that the officer lacked probable cause to search the defendant's vehicle under the Fourth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court explained that the State needed to produce a wider array of evidence to demonstrate a dog's reliability. Per the Florida Supreme Court, "[T]he State must present . . . the dog's training records, an explanation of the meaning of the particular training and certification, field performance records (including any unverified alerts), and evidence concerning the experience and training of the officer handling the dog, as well as any other objective evidence known to the officer about the dog's reliability." According to this court, the data could help to expose such problems as a handler's tendency to cause to alert and a dog's inability to distinguish between residual odors and actual drugs. Accordingly, an officer who did not keep full records of his dog's field performance could never have the requisite cause to conclude that the dog is a reliable indicator of drugs. HELD: The training records established the reliability of the police officer's dog in detecting drugs and, as such, the officer had probable cause to search the defendant's vehicle. Probable cause is met when the facts available to the officer would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime is present. The test for probable cause is not reducible to precise definition or quantification and all that is required is the kind of "fair probability" on which "reasonable and prudent people act." The Court has rejected rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-things-considered approach. Probable cause is, "a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Furthermore, probable cause is not evaluated in hindsight, based on what a search does or does not turn up. As such, evidence of a dog's satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself provide sufficient reason to trust his alert. If a bona fide organization has certified a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence offered) that the dog's alert provides probable cause to search. The same is true, even in the absence of formal certification, if the dog has recently and successfully completed a training program that evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs. If the State has produced proof from controlled settings that a dog performs reliably in detecting drugs, and the defendant has not contested that showing, then the reviewing court should find probable cause. If the defendant disputes the reliability of the dog overall or of a particular alert, then the court should weigh the competing evidence. The reviewing court should not prescribe, as the Florida Supreme Court did, an inflexible set of evidentiary requirements).

Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (HELD: Probable cause existed where officers pulled over speeding car with three occupants and in which defendant was the front-seat passenger, observed a large wad of money in the glove compartment when driver opened the glove compartment to produce vehicle registration, obtained consent to search vehicle for weapons or narcotics and discovered five plastic bags of cocaine behind the vehicle armrest. Here, it was reasonable to believe that any of the occupants of the vehicle had knowledge of and control over the cocaine; therefore, there was probable cause to believe that defendant alone was in criminal possession of the narcotics seized. "We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine. Thus a reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe [defendant] committed the crime of possession").

Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam) (An officer pulled the defendant over for having illegally tinted windows and for speeding. While inspecting the defendant's driver's license, the officer recognized the defendant's name as a potential drug dealer. When the defendant could not produce his registration and insurance, the officer noticed a rusty roofing hatchet. The defendant was arrested for driving without registration and insurance information, speeding, having illegally tinted windows, and for carrying a weapon (the hatchet). Another officer arrived and put the defendant in a squad car while the arresting officer conducted an inventory of the car (as was the policy of the local police department). He found drugs and drug paraphernalia, for which the defendant was charged. Defendant argued his arrest was pretextual and, as such, invalid and the Arkansas trial and Supreme Court agreed. HELD: The case of Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) declared that the subjective motivation of officers is irrelevant, and that a traffic stop as a pretext to a drug search is not immediately invalid).

Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999) (per curiam) (where law enforcement officers developed probable cause to believe defendant would be returning to state with a load of drugs in his car and waited 13 hours for defendant to arrive at the scene of search, which constituted ample time to procure a search warrant, the bright-line rule established by the Fourth Amendment automobile exception does not require "a separate finding of exigency" and, as such, the police may search an automobile in such circumstances without a warrant).

Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999) (holding automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies to seizure of vehicle in a public place for purposes of civil forfeiture. The exception applies not only to circumstances where police have probable cause to believe that there is evidence in the automobile but also where they have probable cause to believe the automobile itself is subject to seizure).

Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (HELD: Where a police officer, after a stop of car for equipment violation, saw a hypodermic syringe in driver's shirt pocket, and driver admitted he used syringe to inject illegal drugs, officer had probable cause to search car for drugs. The officer's search of vehicle included search of purse situated on back seat, which the defendant-passenger claimed belonged to her. During a search of the purse, officer found identification with defendant's true name, which was different than name defendant used immediately after stop. In the purse was a pouch, which defendant claimed did not belong to her, which officer now opened, and discovered evidence of illicit drug activity. Here, probable cause and automobile exception supported the search of...