F-35 vs. A-10 flyoff poses more questions.

• Author: Venable, John
• Position: Commentary

In the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act--a 1,500-plus-page document that authorizes appropriations for the Departments of Defense and Energy --only one section concerns the life of the A-10. Yet it is sufficient to reinvigorate an argument that began in Congress several years ago.

The section in question prohibits the Air Force from retiring any A-10 aircraft or making a substantial change to that jet's weapons system manning levels until two separate events take place. The first is the completion of the initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E] for the F-35. That process was already mandated and funded, but the IOT&E start date has likely slipped until 2018.

The second directive requires the Air Force to conduct a comparison, a fly-off, that pits the capabilities of the F-35 A against the A-10C across the latter's current three-fold mission set: close-air support [CAS), combat search and rescue (CSAR), and forward air control-airborne [FAC-A).

The NDAA leaves much about the fly-off unknown. How will it be framed? How will it be funded? And what will the results tell us that we don't already know?

The A-10 weapons system has been the cornerstone of the Air Force's commitment to support the Army since it was introduced in the 1970s. The jet was designed to provide close-air support in the high-threat environment associated with the 1980s and 1990s. Its impressive capacity for ordnance, 30 mm cannon, loiter time and high-visibility cockpit make it a natural for delivering aerial firepower in close proximity to ground troops.

The A-l0's redundant flight controls, titanium armor and engines give it unmatched survivability in a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile environment. It would have thrived in the threat environment associated with a European scenario before the fall of the Iron Curtain. But, just like every other fourth or four-plus generation fighter, it would not likely survive a single mission flown against the anti-access/area denial threats of today. That is where the F-35 was designed to operate.

The Lightning II's stealth design allows it to operate within the threat rings of the two most advanced surface-to-air missile threats in the world today, the Russian S-300 and S-400. Its air-to-surface ordnance capacity in a stealth mode is limited, but cockpit visibility is good, and the jet's situational awareness aids are unmatched. When the threat allows services to compromise stealth and reconfigure the F-35, its...