Extreme Candidates as the Beneficent Spoiler? Range Effect in the Plurality Voting System

• Published date: 01 June 2019
• Author: Fang-Yu Chen,Austin Horng-En Wang
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912918781049
• Date: 01 June 2019
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918781049

Political Research Quarterly

2019, Vol. 72(2) 278 –292

© 2018 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912918781049

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Article

Introduction

The emergence of radical wing candidates in electoral

races has become a global phenomenon in recent times.1

For example, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the

United Kingdom, National Front (FN) in France, and the

China Unification Promotion Party in Taiwan all evi-

denced the extension of existing ideological spectrums in

each country (for review, see Kitschelt and McCann

1995; Mair 2007). This study investigates the effects of

extreme candidates’ appearance in electoral contests,

especially regarding how they influence supporters of the

mainstream parties.

Traditional theories of voting behavior suggest that

people vote for candidates who are closer to themselves

on the ideological spectrum. According to the spatial

models, the entrance of extreme left- or right-wing can-

didates into electoral races does nothing more than split

the vote from their moderate counterparts. For instance,

many people still blame Ralph Nader as the spoiler can-

didate who caused Al Gore’s defeat to George W. Bush

in the 2000 U.S. presidential election (Herron and

Lewis 2007).

However, mainstream parties’ reactions vary consider-

ably to the entrance of extreme candidates. Some main-

stream parties diverge from the median point to prevent

the entry of a new party (Palfrey 1984). After all, it is

easier for mainstream parties to appease and to absorb

newcomers, for example, by including candidates with

diverse backgrounds in the party list or providing more

credible promises. On the contrary, other mainstream par-

ties do not necessarily try to block those radical competi-

tors on the same side of the political spectrum. Are these

radical wing candidates harmful or beneficial to the

mainstream parties, especially to those on the same side?

Studies of cognitive psychology indicate that individ-

uals’ preference is context-dependent, primarily influ-

enced by the range of options (Parducci 1965). When the

stimuli—a new option—becomes available, individuals

will reaccess the end values first, and accordingly evalu-

ate the stimuli as well as the existing options. The range

effect has been found in various fields such as psycho-

physics (Laberge and Brown 1986) and marketing

(Simonson and Tversky 1992).

781049PRQXXX10.1177/1065912918781049Political Research QuarterlyWang and Chen

research-article2018

1University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA

2Michigan State University, East Lansing, USA

Corresponding Author:

Austin Horng-En Wang, Department of Political Science, University

of Nevada, Las Vegas, 4505 S. Maryland Pkwy., Las Vegas, NV 89154,

USA.

Email: ahw15@duke.edu

Extreme Candidates as the

Beneficent Spoiler? Range Effect

in the Plurality Voting System

Austin Horng-En Wang1 and Fang-Yu Chen2

Abstract

How does the entrance of radical candidates influence election results? Conventional wisdom suggests that extreme

candidates merely split the votes. Based on the range effect theory in cognitive psychology, we hypothesize that the

entrance of an extreme candidate reframes the endpoints of the ideological spectrum among available candidates,

which makes the moderate one on the same side to be perceived by the voters as even more moderate. Through

two survey experiments in the United States and Taiwan, we provide empirical support for range effect in the vote

choice in the plurality system. The results imply that a mainstream party can, even without changing its own manifesto,

benefit from the entrance of its radical counterpart; it explains why the mainstream party may choose cooperation

strategically. Our findings also challenge the assumption in regression models that the perceived ideological positions

of candidates are independent of each other.

Keywords

extreme candidate, range effect, extremeness aversion, survey experiment, Taiwan politics