Application of the Florida Civil Rights Act to extraterritorial "employees" in Sinclair v. De Jay Corp. gives a "parochial" statute potentially limitless application.

• Author: Wilson, Courtney B.

The Florida Human Rights Act, passed in 1977, and its amendment by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA),(1) substantially mirror Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(2) and its 1991 amendments.(3) While Title VII provides remedies for employment discrimination throughout the United States, the FCRA ordinarily has been utilized as an alternative remedy only in instances in which the plaintiff/employee and defendant/employer are both "Floridians." However, this apparent implied territorial limitation was tested in the recent 11th Circuit case of Sinclair v. De Jay Corporation, 170 F. 3d 1045 (11th Cir. 1999).

Unfortunately, the court rejected the opportunity to engage in a comprehensive interpretation of the appropriate geographic reach of the FCRA, declining to examine the FCRA's comprehensive statutory scheme or its legislative purpose; nor did the court look to interpretations of other Florida statutes with potential extraterritorial applications or analogize to parallel issues in the application of Title VII to multinational businesses. Instead, the 11th Circuit focused only on isolated definitional language within this state statute, and engaged in a simplistic "plain meaning" analysis.(4) Though the limited holding of Sinclair may seem justifiable standing alone, its "plain language" standard for interpreting the FCRA leaves open a Pandora's box of litigation over the application of the FCRA to persons(5) and conduct with little or no nexus to Florida.

The Florida Civil. Rights Act

The FCRA was passed in 1992. The statute was closely modeled after Title VII and Florida courts have consistently held that decisions interpreting Title VII are persuasive authority for a similar construction of the FCRA.(6) However, there are differences in administrative prerequisites (for example, under the FCRA, aggrieved persons can opt for an adversary administrative hearing rather than filing suit) and differing limitations on available relief that can create substantial incentives for potential plaintiffs to pursue an FCRA claim as an alternative or in addition to a Title VII claim.(7)

On its face, the most significant difference between the state and federal statutes is the presumed territorial limitation of the FCRA. However, while Title VII contains specific provisions addressing the issue of its application abroad,(8) no provision of the FCRA specifically addresses the statute's geographic scope. Nevertheless, the FCRA's express purpose is to secure freedom from discrimination "for all individuals within the state," and thus it cannot be gainsaid that the statute is limited, in some fashion, to claims having a nexus with Florida.

Sinclair v. De Jay Corporation

The defendant/employer, De Jay, was a foreign (non-Florida) corporation and apparently maintained its principal place of business in Tennessee. However, De Jay also operated a small office in Florida where the plaintiff, Sinclair, was employed. Sinclair was apparently a resident and "citizen" of Florida, as the case was in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.(9) (Sinclair asserted no Title VII or other federal claims.)

Sinclair alleged that she was sexually harassed by a De Jay supervisor and, despite her complaints, De Jay management failed to "remedy the situation."(10) Id. at 1045-46. Sinclair also made allegations of retaliation and religious discrimination. Id. at 1046. Before addressing the merits, De Jay moved for summary judgment on the grounds that it was not an "employer"(11) subject to the provisions of the FCRA. The parties acknowledged that though De Jay employed more than 15 employees nationwide, it did not employ the required minimum of 15 employees within the State of Florida. Thus, the issue was purely a legal one, requiring the court to construe the proper territorial scope of the FCRA.

District Court Limited FCRA to Florida "Employers"

The district court granted De Jay's motion for summary judgment, holding that a defendant must employ at least 15 employees within the state of Florida to qualify as a statutory employer under the FCRA.(12) The district court began its analysis of the issue by examining the stated purpose of the FCRA. Because the statute provides that the FCRA's general purposes are to protect "individuals within the state," the district court opined that "[t]he statute's text makes clear that the legislature's concern...