Extradition law - criminal defendants extradited outside of treaties lack standing to assert rule of specialty - United States v. Valencia-Trujillo.

• Author: Cafarelli, Amie

International law does not impose a duty on nations to extradite criminals, but the United States, along with most other countries, has imposed such an obligation through individually-negotiated bilateral treaties. (1) In an effort to maintain cooperation and good faith between the parties of extradition treaties, courts began recognizing the "rule of specialty," which prohibits the requesting state from prosecuting criminal defendants for charges not contained in the request for extradition. (2) In United States v. Valencia-Trujillo, (3) the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a criminal defendant extradited from Colombia to the United States could assert the rule of specialty to enforce assurances made by the U.S. government in order to secure extradition. (4) The court held that the defendant lacked standing to assert the rule because he was not extradited pursuant to a treaty. (5)

In 2002, a U.S. grand jury indicted Colombian citizen Joaquin Mario Valencia-Trujillo for running an international, multi-million dollar drug smuggling and money laundering enterprise. (6) The American Embassy sent a diplomatic note to Colombia that requested Valencia-Trujillo's extradition. (7) The note invoked applicable provisions of the Constitution of Colombia, Colombia's Criminal Procedure Code, and principles of international law. (8) Colombia authorized Valencia-Trujillo's extradition for the charges set forth in the indictment, but expressly limited this authorization to acts committed after December 17, 199). (9)

Before trial, Valencia-Trujillo filed a motion to enforce the rule of specialty, requesting that all references to events occurring before December (17), 1997 be excluded from the government's evidence and redacted from the indictment. (10) The court granted the motion in part, redacting the first twenty-six predicate acts of the continuing criminal enterprise charge and taking certain measures to prevent the jury from improperly considering evidence pre- December 1997. (11) The district court refused, however, to remove allegations of pre-December 1997 conduct regarding the conspiracy charges, reasoning that the duration of a conspiracy is not an essential element of the crime, unlike a continuing criminal enterprise charge. (12) The jury convicted Valencia-Trujillo on all four counts of the indictment and sentenced him to (480) months imprisonment. (13) Valencia-Trujillo appealed his conviction, alleging that the district court violated the rule of specialty by prosecuting him for offenses beyond those authorized by Colombia in his extradition documents. (14) The Eleventh Circuit held that Valencia-Trujillo did not have standing to assert the rule of specialty because he was not extradited under the U.S.-Colombia Treaty. (15)

If an extradition treaty exists between the United States and a surrendering state, a criminal defendant is customarily extradited in accordance with the conditions set forth in the treaty. (16) If a treaty is unavailable or impractical, however, the United States has used alternate methods of informal rendition to secure the surrender of foreign fugitives. (17) Additionally, nations may extradite outside of an existing treaty by expressly waiving the treaty's formalities. (18) Courts consider the method used to bring the criminal defendant to the United States in determining whether the individual has standing to assert the rule of specialty. (19)

The rule of specialty, addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time in United States v. Rauscher, (20) provides that a criminal defendant extradited from one country to another may only be tried for the offenses for which he was surrendered. (21) The same day that it handed down Rauscher, the Supreme Court held, in Ker v. Illinois, (22) that criminal defendants brought to the United States outside of formal extradition proceedings were not entitled to the protections of an existing extradition treaty. (23) Based on these two early Supreme Court cases, courts have agreed that the rule of specialty applies to extraditions pursuant to treaties, but its application to extraditions outside of, or in the absence of, existing treaties has varied among the circuit courts. (24) To reconcile the holdings of Rauscher and Ker, the circuit courts have carved out a number of exceptions for when the rule of specialty will not apply despite the existence of a valid extradition treaty. (25) These exceptions include situations where the defendant was brought to the United States by abduction, where the defendant was deported under immigration laws, and where the defendant or surrendering country executed a waiver of treaty rights. (26)

At the other end of the spectrum, a number of courts have held or recognized that the rule of specialty applies to extraditions where no treaty is available or invoked. (27) The Eleventh Circuit, however, had not specifically determined whether the rule of specialty applies to a defendant extradited outside a treaty. (28) In two related cases involving a defendant extradited in the absence of a valid treaty with Colombia, the court applied the rule of specialty and noted that the principle of specialty is based on international comity. (29) In these cases, however, the court assumed standing. (30)

In United States v. Valencia-Trujillo, the Eleventh Circuit held that the rule of specialty applies only to extraditions pursuant to a treaty. (31) The court reasoned that the Supreme Court conceived the rule of specialty in this context in Rauscher, where the Court held that all extradition treaties contain an agreement, explicit or implied, that the extradited defendant will not be prosecuted for any offense other than the one for which he was surrendered. (32) The Eleventh Circuit also relied on its holding in Puentes, which likened an extradition treaty to a contract, with the rule of specialty as a provision of that contract, granting certain rights to extradited defendants derived from the surrendering nation. (33) Only treaties, and not executive agreements, become the "law of the land" under the U.S. Constitution and thus, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, courts may only enforce extradition treaties. (34)

The court concluded that Valencia-Trujillo lacked standing to assert the rule of specialty because he had not been extradited under the U.S.-Colombia treaty of (1979). (35) Noting the similarities between the procedures and laws invoked in Valencia-Trujillo's extradition and those contained in the (1979) treaty, the court ultimately relied on the fact that the extradition request "conspicuously" lacked any reference to the treaty. (36) The court distinguished this case from the Gallo-Chamorro decisions, where the court merely assumed, without establishing as fact, that the defendant was extradited from Colombia pursuant to a treaty. (37) The court held that Valencia-Trujillo could not rely on the court's assumption in Gallo-Chamorro to establish that he was extradited under the treaty. (38) The Eleventh Circuit concluded that criminal defendants extradited outside of, or in the absence of, a treaty with the United States lack standing to assert the rule of specialty. (39)

The Eleventh Circuit reasoned with blinders when it reached its conclusion that Valencia-Trujillo was not extradited pursuant to the U.S.-Colombia extradition treaty by relying solely on the fact that the request for extradition did not explicitly name the treaty. (40) The court failed to give any weight to the fact that the laws invoked in the extradition request were the very laws that authorize extradition by treaty and are required by the treaty itself. (41) There appears to be no reason the United States would seek extradition outside of the treaty, considering all of the charges against Valencia-Trujillo were contained in the treaty and the procedures initiated by the United States followed those in the treaty. (42) Additionally, Valencia-Trujillo's extradition is distinguishable from other cases in which defendants were extradited outside of a treaty because he was neither deported nor abducted, nor did he or Colombia waive any of his rights. (43) To the contrary, Colombia specifically conditioned Valencia-Trujillo's extradition on the promise that the United States would not bring any charges not contained in the extradition agreement, which is the very definition of specialty. (44)

Despite Colombia's attempt to limit Valencia-Trujillo's prosecution to the charges contained in the request for extradition, the court refused to grant Valencia-Trujillo, as a private person, the right to enforce those limitations. (45) Although the court noted that international...