Religious expression and the penal institution: the role of damages in RLUIPA enforcement.

AuthorBredehoft, Joseph E.
PositionReligious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000

Sisney v. Reisch

  1. INTRODUCTION

    The First Amendment protects, among other things, the free exercise of religion. In order to further protect religious exercise by institutionalized persons, (2) Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). (3) RLUIPA "allows institutionalized persons to exercise their religion to the extent that it does not undermine the security, discipline, and order of their institutions." (4) Given the variety of religions practiced by institutionalized persons, no one single fact pattern emerges as the "typical" RLUIPA case. Sometimes, for example, institutionalized persons seek recognition of their religion by the prison and request group worship accommodation. (5) In other cases, offenders sue under RLUIPA because the prison does not provide them food that accommodates their religious dietary restrictions. (6) While these examples indicate that injunctive relief could force prisons to allow offenders to practice their religion more freely, the law is unsettled as to whether the prisoners can receive compensatory damages as well: "[t]o put it mildly, there is a division of authority on this question." (7)

    This Summary focuses on RLUIPA's institutionalized persons provision and whether, under its remedial provision, an inmate plaintiff can receive compensatory damages. First, this Summary looks at key decisions dealing with the availability of compensatory damages in individual and official capacity claims under RLUIPA. The second component of the Summary analyzes a recent Eighth Circuit decision on the issue of damages as it relates to RLUIPA. This Summary then evaluates the case law on this issue, discussing the policy reasons for and against allowing compensatory damages. Lastly, the discussion concludes that the Eighth Circuit should prohibit institutionalized persons from obtaining compensatory relief.

  2. LEGAL BACKGROUND

    1. Case Law and Legislation Before RLUIPA

      In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, (8) the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause "does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability'" that incidentally burdens religious conduct. (9) The Supreme Court did, however, recognize that Congress could shield religious exercise through legislative action. (10) In response to Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). (11) RFRA prohibited the government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion, even if the burden resulted from a rule of general applicability. (12) The only exception to this prohibition occurred when the government demonstrated that the burden furthered a compelling governmental interest (13) and was the least restrictive means to accomplish that interest. (14) Although the Supreme Court recognized the legislature's right to shield religious exercise, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court struck down RFRA as applied to states and their subdivisions as beyond Congress's remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment. (15) RFRA, passed pursuant to Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, (16) "notably lacked a Commerce Clause underpinning or a Spending Clause limitation to recipients of federal funds." (17)

      Congress responded to the Supreme Court's ruling by passing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). (18) In an attempt to avoid the same fate as occurred with RFRA, Congress invoked federal authority under both the Spending and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution in passing RLUIPA. (19)

    2. The Provisions of RLUIPA

      RLUIPA prohibits the government (20) from "impos[ing] a substantial burden" on the religious exercise of institutionalized persons. (21) Substantial burdens include:

      significantly inhibit[ing] or constrain[ing] conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet of a person's individual religious beliefs; ... meaningfully curtail[ing] a person's ability to express adherence to his or her faith; or ... den[ying] a person reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities ... fundamental to a person's religion. (22) In the event an offender believes a substantial burden on his or her religious rights exists, the offender may "assert a violation of [RLUIPA] as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government." (23) The government has not violated RLUIPA if it proves the burden is the least restrictive means to further a compelling government interest. (24)

      To determine if prison officials use the least restrictive means to further a compelling government interest, the court looks at the facts and context of each situation. (25) Courts acknowledge that prisons have compelling interests in maintaining institutional security and disciplining offenders; (26) nevertheless, prison officials "'must do more than offer conclusory statements and post hoc rationalizations'" for security concerns to qualify as a compelling interest. (27) Prison officials have to provide "'some basis' for their stated concerns that the prisoner's requested accommodation will result in the adverse consequences predicted." (28) Additionally, prison officials must exhibit "'some evidence' that their decision represents the least restrictive means necessary to preserve the compelling interest." (29) At a minimum, this requires prison officials to consider alternative courses of action. (30)

    3. Compensatory Damages Under RLUIPA

      As stated in Part II.B., if the government violates RLUIPA by imposing a substantial burden on the religious exercise of an institutionalized person without narrowly tailoring its action to further a compelling interest, that person may "obtain appropriate relief" against the government. (31) Courts have not reached one unified interpretation of RLUIPA's remedial provision, but do examine the provision through similar analytical frameworks. Generally courts address three questions to determine whether RLUIPA allows compensatory damages where the state unjustifiably inhibited an institutionalized person's exercise of religion. (32) First, does RLUIPA authorize compensatory damages, as well as equitable relief? If the answer to the first question is yes, only then do courts proceed to the next two issues: whether RLUIPA authorizes monetary compensatory damages in individual capacity suits and whether the Eleventh Amendment bars official capacity suits under RLUIPA.

      1. Access to Damages Under RLUIPA

        The Eleventh Circuit, in Smith v. Allen, (33) addressed the issue of whether plaintiff inmate Smith (34) could obtain monetary relief if he established that the defendants, members of the Religious Activities Review Committee of the Alabama Department of Corrections, violated RLUIPA. (35) In analyzing Smith's claim, the court addressed whether RLUIPA permitted a plaintiff to recover monetary damages at all. (36) The court determined the answer turned on what RLUIPA meant by "appropriate relief." (37) Surveying the case law on the issue, the court noted that some district courts held that the phrase "appropriate relief" limited a plaintiff's remedy to injunctive and declaratory relief, (38) while other district courts held that monetary damages fall within the category of "appropriate relief." (39) Further, some district courts presumed that RLUIPA permits monetary relief without specifically deciding the question. (40)

        The Allen court used the Supreme Court's standard in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools (41) as the initial foundation for its analysis. (42) The Eleventh Circuit interpreted Franklin as standing for the proposition that "where Congress had not given any guidance or clear indication of its purpose with respect to remedies, federal courts should presume the availability of all appropriate remedies." (43) The Supreme Court's ruling in Franklin thus creates a presumption in favor of the availability of both injunctive and monetary relief. (44) In light of the Franklin decision, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that absent a contrary intent, "appropriate relief" encompasses both monetary and injunctive relief; therefore, plaintiffs under RLUIPA can recover damages. (45)

        The Allen decision examined the availability of monetary damages under RLUIPA in greater depth than any other court of appeals decision. In most cases, the plaintiff prayed for compensatory damages, but the courts reached their holding without addressing the issue of whether RLUIPA even permitted compensatory damages. (46) For example, the Third Circuit in Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch (47) remanded to the district court the plaintiff religious organization's RLUIPA claim for the court to enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and to determine the amount of the plaintiff's compensatory damages. (48) As such, the Third Circuit allowed the plaintiff to obtain compensatory damages without discussing its reason for doing so. (49)

      2. Distinction Between Individual Capacity and Official Capacity Suits

        Under RLUIPA, the way a plaintiff pleads a case directly impacts a court's analysis of the claim. In an individual capacity suit, a plaintiff seeks damages directly from the agent of the government. (50) In other words, the plaintiff alleges that government officials should be personally liable for their actions during the course of their duties. (51) Also in an individual capacity suit, the government official may have the option of asserting personal immunity defenses, such as qualified immunity. (52)

        In an official capacity suit, on the other hand, the plaintiff seeks damages from the governmental body itself. (53) Official capacity claims "require proof that a policy or custom of the [governmental body] violated the plaintiff's rights." (54) In official capacity suits, the government may have the...

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