Explaining Party Formation and Nonformation in Russia

• Author: MICHAEL McFAUL
• Published date: 01 December 2001
• Date: 01 December 2001
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0010414001034010003
• Published By: Sage Publications, Inc.
• Subject Matter: Articles

COMPARA
McFaul / P TIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / December 2001
ARTY FORMATION & NONFORMATION IN RUSSIA
A decade after the collapse of communism, Russia still lacks a robust party system. Most institu-
tions of the state are immune from party influence. However parties play a central role in the
lower house of parliament, the State Duma. Why? Why have parties been successful in organiz-
ing and influencing the work of the State Duma but enjoyed only very limited success else-
where? This article argues that parties in Russia are weak in general because the most powerful
politicians in Russia have made choices to make them weak. Cultural, historical, and socioeco-
nomic factors play a role in impeding party emergence, but individual decisions—especially
decisions about institutional design—are the more proximate and more salient causes of poor
party development. The privileged position of parties in the State Duma also resulted from indi-
vidual choices, but those choices had unintended consequences that did not represent the prefer-
ences of the most powerful.
EXPLAINING PARTY FORMATION
AND NONFORMATION IN RUSSIA
Actors, Institutions, and Chance
MICHAEL MCFAUL
Stanford University
Apartysystemisanessentialattributeofademocraticpolicy.Ifthere
are no parties, there is no democracy (Lipset, 2000). Despite the erosion
of party influence in old democracies and the difficulties of establishing new
parties in new democracies, theorists still agree that parties and a party sys-
tem are necessary evils for the functioning of representative government. In
liberal democracies, parties perform several tasks. During elections, they
provide voters with distinct choices, be they ideological, social, or ethnic.
After elections, parties then represent the interests of their constituents in the
formulation (and sometimes implementation) of state policy. The degree of
party penetration of state institutions need not correlate directly with a given
party’s power over policy outcomes. Empowered by expertise or connections
AUTHOR’S NOTE: The author would like to thank Robert Moser, Katherine Stoner-Weiss, and
two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and Elina Treyger for research assistance in the
preparation of this article.
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, Vol. 34 No. 10, December 2001 1159-1187
© 2001 Sage Publications
1159

---

1160
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / December 2001
to key decision makers, small parties can have inordinate influence over pol-
icy debates, whereas large parties may suffer the opposite: no expertise, no
personal networks, and therefore little influence over policy. Yet some degree
of representation within the state is usually necessary for a party to influence
policy outcomes.
The crux of party power comes first from participation in elections and
then from winning representation within the state. In consolidated democra-
cies, parties are the most important part of the representative structure, aggre-
gating societal interests and then representing those interests within the state.
In fact, the degree of party control over the structuring of electoral choices
and the subsequent party penetration of significant state bodies serve as good
proxy measures for party development. Successful parties and developed
party systems must be able to influence the vote and then win representation
within the state to influence policy making.
By this set of criteria, party development in Russia has a long way to go.
Parties do influence electoral choices in some elections, but not in all. In elec-
tions in which parties play a central role, they do not enjoy a monopoly in
structuring the vote. Consequently, parties have only limited representation
within the state and even less influence on the state’s actions. The one oasis of
party development has been the State Duma, the lower house of parliament.
Parties have played a central role in parliamentary elections, have won seats
in this legislative organ, and have been able to translate their electoral suc-
cesses into parliamentary power by organizing the internal operation of the
Duma in ways that privilege parties. But in every other part of the Russian
government—the presidential administration, the federal government, the
Federation Council, regional heads of administration, and regional parliaments—
parties have played a marginal role in structuring votes and an even lesser role
in penetrating or influencing these other governmental entities.
Why have parties been successful in organizing and influencing the work
of the State Duma but enjoyed only very limited success elsewhere? Why has
party success within the Duma not stimulated party development elsewhere?
Is Russia’s current weak party system a temporary outcome or a permanent
feature of Russian politics?
This article argues that parties in Russia are weak because the most power-
ful politicians in Russia have made choices to make them weak. Cultural, his-
torical, and socioeconomic factors play a role in impeding party emergence,
but individual decisions—especially decisions about institutional design—
are the more proximate and more salient causes of poor party development.
At the same time, the privileged position of parties in the State Duma also
resulted from individual choices about institutional design. But these conse-
quential design choices had unintended consequences that did not represent

---

McFaul / PARTY FORMATION & NONFORMATION IN RUSSIA
1161
the preferences of the most powerful. As a result, antiparty forces may over-
run even this bastion of party power. Both the 1999 parliamentary election
and the 2000 presidential election suggest that such an assault may occur
soon.
To demonstrate the centrality of individual choices about institutional
design in the making and unmaking of Russia’s party system, this article pro-
ceeds in a somewhat unorthodox fashion by pushing the causal chain back
one step in each section. The first section provides a rough measure of Rus-
sian party development by focusing on the electoral and representative roles
of parties in Russia. An attempt is then made to quantify the degree of party
penetration into Russia’s main political institutions, which are filled through
popular election. The second section explains the results described in the first
section. After exploring the many structural constraints on party develop-
ment, the importance of institutional design for both stimulating and stunting
party development is highlighted. The third section then pushes the causal
arrow back one step further to explain the origins of the institutions described
in the second section. The argument is made that almost all of the institutional
arrangements for choosing elected leaders reflect the preferences of Russia’s
most powerful actors, those who have not needed parties to remain in power.
The one exception is the electoral law for the State Duma, that is, the one
institution that has encouraged party consolidation. In several respects, this
law was an accident of history—an accident that is likely to be “corrected” in
the future. The final section offers conclusions.
MEASURING PARTY DEVELOPMENT IN RUSSIA
There are many different ways to measure party development. Some like
to count members. Some like to measure partisanship among voters. Others
like to trace party influence over policy outcomes. Each of these approaches
has strengths and weaknesses. The first two approaches can be quantified but
provide only proxy measures for party development and party influence. The
party with the largest membership does not always enjoy the greatest elec-
toral success or highest level of influence over policy outcomes. Conversely,
low or declining levels of partisanship do not necessarily translate into a loss
of party dominance at the polls or in policy making. The third measure—
party influence over outcomes—is most interesting but is also the most diffi-
cult to trace (Laver & Budge, 1992).
A fourth approach for calibrating party development—measuring the
electoral success and subsequent degree of party representation within state
bodies—is used here. In the causal chain between party organization, party

---

1162
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / December 2001
identification in society, electoral success and/or representation in the state,
and ultimately influence over policy outcomes, this measure assesses the
penultimate step.1 Although many other variables intervene to dilute or
enhance the influence of parties over policies after elections have occurred,
some degree of success at the polls and, subsequently, some degree of repre-
sentation within the state are necessary conditions for policy influence in
most countries. Analysts of party development also have asserted that the
“party-in-government” often precedes the development of extra-parliamentary
organizations or the “party-in-the-electorate,” suggesting that the party-in-
government is a good place to start for tracing party development in a young
democracy such as Russia (Key, 1964). This stage in the chain also can be
quantified much more easily than either the earlier stages in the causal chain
or the final stage.
THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE
Without question, the most powerful position in the Russian political sys-
tem is the office of president (Shevtsova, 1999). To date, parties have played a
marginal role in structuring presidential votes and have enjoyed no success in
gaining party representation within the president’s office or the presidential
administration. Party leaders have participated in presidential elections. In
the...