Experiences May Vary: NATO and Cultural Interoperability in Afghanistan

• Author: Bastian Giegerich,Stéfanie von Hlatky
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X19875490
• Published date: 01 July 2020
• Date: 01 July 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article
Armed Forces & Society
2020, Vol. 46(3) 495-516
Experiences May Vary:
ª The Author(s) 2019
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NATO and Cultural
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X19875490
journals.sagepub.com/home/afs
Interoperability
in Afghanistan
Bastian Giegerich1 and St ´efanie von Hlatky2
Abstract
This article examines the coherence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s
(NATO) coordinated military strategy during the war in Afghanistan. We argue that
much of this coherence can be lost when decision makers adopt multinational
strategic guidance that is then interpreted by different national contingents oper-
ationally. Different strategic and military cultures across troop-contributing coun-
tries may account for observed variation in operational outcomes, but better
theoretical tools are needed to examine this phenomenon. Our aim is to further
scholars’ understanding of how cultural variables can affect mission outcomes. This
assumed effect of strategic and military cultures is explored empirically with refer-
ence to the Canadian and German Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan,
which formed part of the NATO-led ISAF operation.
Keywords
military culture, military effectiveness, NATO, civil–military relations, civil wars
1 IISS, London, United Kingdom
2 Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada
Corresponding Author:
St´efanie von Hlatky, Queen’s University, Mackintosh-Corry Hall, Room C-406, Kingston, Ontario,
Canada K7L 3N6.
Email: svh@queensu.ca

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Armed Forces & Society 46(3)
During the initial phase of the war in Afghanistan, the United States decided against
the participation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to avoid
coordination challenges (Stein & Lang, 2007). While the need for improved coor-
dination has been addressed in the literature, this article examines why NATO
allies struggle to implement alliance guidelines coherently, resulting in unforeseen
mission outcomes. To investigate the gap between NATO’s strategic directives
and how these are then carried out on the ground, a challenging exercise from a
theoretical standpoint, we contend that multinational operations are heavily influ-
enced by cultural factors located at the national level (NATO, 2008). Comparing
Canadian-led and the German-led provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), we
explore how different strategic and military cultures across troop-contributing
nations may account for the observed variation in operational outcomes, rendering
alliance coordination more complex and unpredictable. Indeed, NATO’s instruc-
tions about PRTs were interpreted according to each ally’s political and military
specificities, leading to two versions of the PRT: a military-centric PRT for
Canada and a more balanced PRT for Germany, interesting findings from the point
of view of theory development. The article proceeds as follows: The first section
reviews the literature on strategic culture and military culture that relates to allied
cooperation.1 In the second section, we draw some theoretical links between cul-
tural factors and allied actions in wartime; the third section summarizes the case
study analysis and is followed by the conclusion.
Culture and Multinational Operations
Cultural approaches have not been central to theory-building in security studies
and even less so in alliance theory.2 Scholars have acknowledged both the value
and challenges inherent to such approaches, noting that “culture as a descriptive and
analytical term, is both nebulous and part of the realist world, at once frustratingly
malleable and actually quite useful” (Black, 2011, p. 43). While previous studies on
the cultural dimension of multinational operations focus on differences in language,
religion, and ideology between states that are often on opposite sides of the fight, this
article examines culture by studying a relatively homogenous group of states: NATO
allies. Our main objective is to generate hypotheses on the variation in operational
outcomes witnessed across nationally run PRTs in Afghanistan by focusing on two
explanatory variables: strategic culture and military culture. While strategic culture
furthers our understanding of how NATO’s common objectives are interpreted by
political decision makers in allied capitals, military culture informs how political
directives are executed by military commanders and their troops.
Strategic Culture and Political Objectives
Strategic culture informs political choices on the use of force through the lens of a
society’s historical experience. The concept was popularized in the 1970s when

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Giegerich and von Hlatky
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Snyder (1977), studying the differences between Soviet and U.S. nuclear strategies,
defined it as “the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of
habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired”
(p. 8). The introduction of a cultural perspective was meant to challenge assumptions
about rational behavior and utility maximization. The concept of strategic culture
was refined in three waves. For the first generation, culture was simply the context in
which national policy choices were formed. Gray (1999) argued that “everything a
security community does, if not a manifestation of strategic culture, is at least an
example of behavior effected by culturally shaped, or encultured, people, organiza-
tions, procedures and weapons” (p. 52). A second generation of scholars studied the
differences between declared national policy and the underlying motives and aims
pursued by the policy elite (Klein, 1988). The third generation promoted a positivist
agenda, with Johnston (1995) arguing that strategic culture was a “limited, ranked
set of grand strategic preferences over actions that are consistent across the objects
of analysis and persistent across time” (p. 38). In this article, we view culture as
context rather than a set of deterministic preferences. We acknowledge that there are
culturally defined expectations regarding the use of force and argue that strategic
culture interacts with military culture in the process of interpreting alliance direc-
tives, which may account for variations in operational outcomes.
Military Culture and the Battlefield
The culture of the military is based on different assumptions and values than those of
civilians working in other government departments (Kier, 1995). Military culture
has practical implications because it “sets the framework of what military doctrine is
allowed to exist, and how the existing doctrine is to be interpreted and implemented”
(Zapfe, 2016, p. 252). Decisions to use force bear the imprint of military culture, as
commanders are tasked to implement political objectives, often with little civilian
oversight on the ground (Farrell, 1998). Inevitably, strategic culture interacts with
military culture in the process of translating strategic goals into military operations.
However, and as Legro (1996) notes, organizational military culture “may or may
not relate to wider societal culture or to the beliefs held within a different military
organization” (p. 123).
Drawing from this preliminary theoretical discussion, we can identify measures
of both strategic and military cultures to guide the empirical analysis. For strategic
culture, each case will assess the significance of political attitudes and values toward
the military and toward the use of force, prevailing societal norms about foreign and
defense policy based on historical experiences and public opinion. For military
culture, it will be important to examine the organizational culture, doctrine, and
standard operating procedures, what the armed forces view as their strength in an
allied context, and whether or not there are influential military leaders who are
pushing for change.

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Armed Forces & Society 46(3)
Cultural Differences and PRT Operations
NATO started taking over responsibility for the PRTs when its mandate was
expanded beyond Kabul in August 2003. PRTs were meant to extend government
authority outside Kabul, as well as the influence of NGOs and international orga-
nizations, while also supporting reconstruction efforts and information sharing (U.S.
Institute for Peace, 2003). NATO intended the PRTs to contribute to development
and stability goals while also providing security.
Despite common NATO directives, we argue that the PRT experience varied
considerably from one ally to the next and that this poses an interesting theory-
building challenge. As a first step, governments embark on commitments in the
context of collective decision-making at the alliance level. These decisions are the
product of political and military advice and are then further refined at the national
level, as bureaucracies (both civilian and military) determine how these commit-
ments will be implemented. If national strategic culture influences how decision
makers define their country’s operational engagement, then we should focus on
evidence linked to the civil–military balance in command arrangements, preferences
on the use of force, as defined in the rules of engagement, and the justification for
engagement. The second step entails implementing this plan of action in the context
of realities on the ground, the management of available capabilities, and coordina-
tion among actors who contribute to mission tasks, including soldiers, diplomats,
and development officers. If national military culture influences the conduct of
military operations, then we should find that the observed behavior on operations
is shaped by...