Expecting the Unexpected: Disaster Risks and Conflict

• Author: Muhammet A. Bas,Elena V. McLean
• Published date: 01 June 2021
• Date: 01 June 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920911204
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920911204

Political Research Quarterly

2021, Vol. 74(2) 421 –433

© 2020 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912920911204

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Article

Do natural disasters have a pacifying effect on interna-

tional relations, or fuel discord and violence? Despite

decades of theoretical and empirical work, scholars have

failed to reach a consensus on the nature of the relation-

ship between disasters and conflict. A number of studies

suggest that natural disasters may have a pacifying effect:

when disasters strike, they may reduce the likelihood of

conflict by serving as a focal point for cooperation in the

aftermath of an environmental shock and reducing the

relevance of other potential sources of conflict (Kelman

and Koukis 2000; Quarantelli and Dynes 1976). In addi-

tion, natural disasters and climate-related scarcities can

damage the capacity to engage in conflict (Salehyan and

Hendrix 2014). This effect could be due to direct disaster

damage to military capabilities, as well as subsequent

reductions in military spending. Governments’ military

expenditures could decline because disasters reduce eco-

nomic resources and productivity in affected regions

where industrial and transportation infrastructure experi-

enced disaster-related damage and, consequently, govern-

ment revenues (Noy 2009; Raddatz 2007).

At the same time, there is an equally large amount of

research indicating that environmental shocks may have

the opposite effect. Disasters, especially sudden and

severe, appear to increase the likelihood and intensity of

conflict. They reduce economic resources available to

affected states and slow down economic growth. Shortages

of scarce resources and hence deprivations in affected

countries can then trigger violence as affected populations

seek to get access to territories with resources that could

make up for the disaster-related losses (Brancati 2007;

Gleditsch 1998; Homer-Dixon 1994, 2001; Kahl 1998;

Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004; Nel and Righarts

2008; Reuveny 2002). In this case, environmental shocks

alter the relative size of fighting costs and expected bene-

fits of fighting: costly conflict becomes a more attractive

option if a population struck by a natural disaster faces the

trade-off between peaceful starvation and fighting to gain

new territory, which may induce risk-acceptant behavior

by the affected state. Similarly, exogenous shocks to

resources could lower the opportunity cost of conflict and

make conflict a more preferred course of action (Chassang

and i Miquel 2009).

In addition, some scholars disagree with the assess-

ment that natural disasters are linked to conflict and report

nonfindings in their investigations of the relationship

911204PRQXXX10.1177/1065912920911204Political Research QuarterlyBas and McLean

research-article2020

1NYU Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

2University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, USA

Corresponding Author:

Elena V. McLean, Department of Political Science, University at

Buffalo, The State University of New York, 507 Park Hall, Buffalo, NY

14260, USA.

Email: elenamcl@buffalo.edu

Expecting the Unexpected: Disaster

Risks and Conflict

Muhammet A. Bas1 and Elena V. McLean2

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between disaster risks and interstate conflict. We argue that in disaster-prone

areas actors’ rational expectations about the likelihood and magnitude of potential future disasters can make conflict

more likely. The relationship emerges when future disasters are viewed as shocks that are expected to shift the

relative power balance among states. If large enough, such expected shifts can generate commitment problems and

cause conflict even before any disasters take place. Our approach represents a shift of focus from previous research,

which investigates the effect of actual disasters and ignores rational expectations regarding future events. We use a

simple game-theoretic model to highlight the commitment problem caused by disaster risks. We then discuss and

apply an empirical strategy enabling us to disentangle effects of disaster proneness from effects of actual disaster

events. Our results indicate that greater disaster risks are indeed associated with a higher likelihood of interstate

conflict.

Keywords

natural disasters, disaster risks, interstate conflict, commitment problems