Executive Approval Dynamics in Presidential and Parliamentary Democratic Regimes

• Published date: 01 March 2025
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00104140241237481
• Author: Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo,Gregory J. Love,Jonathan Hartlyn,Ryan E. Carlin,Timothy Hellwig,Matthew M. Singer
• Date: 01 March 2025

Article

Comparative Political Studies

2025, Vol. 58(3) 526–561

© The Author(s) 2024

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DOI: 10.1177/00104140241237481

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Executive Approval

Dynamics in Presidential

and Parliamentary

Democratic Regimes

Cecilia Mart´

ınez-Gallardo

1

, Gregory J. Love

2

,

Jonathan Hartlyn

1

, Ryan E. Carlin

3

,

Timothy Hellwig

4

, and Matthew M. Singer

5



Abstract

Does the type of democratic regime matter for public evaluations of leaders?

We argue two characteristics intrinsic to presidential and parliamentary

regimes lead to divergent patterns of executive approval. For presidents,

direct elections foster more personal leader-voter linkages; for prime min-

isters, dependence on the legislature for survival contributes to more in-

stitutionalized party systems. These two mechanisms should generate higher

approval at the outset of a term—larger honeymoons—for presidents than

for prime ministers, but also more rapid decline. Analyses of data from

40 countries produce evidence consistent with these constitutionally-based

distinctions. Yet we uncover important within-regime differences. Within

presidential systems, approval patterns vary along with paths to power—

f‌irst-election versus re-election, and elected versus unelected. Within

1

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA

2

University of Mississippi, University, MS, USA

3

Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA, USA

4

University at Buffalo, SUNY, Buffalo, NY, USA

5

University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA

Corresponding Author:

Cecilia Mart´

ınez-Gallardo, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at

Chapel Hill, 361 Hamilton Hall, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA.

Email: cmg@email.unc.edu

Data Availability Statement included at the end of the article

parliamentarism, honeymoons are greater for prime ministers overseeing

single-party majoritarian governments. Study f‌indings advance long-standing

debates about the relative merits of presidential and parliamentary systems—

particularly the tradeoff between democratic responsiveness and stability.

Keywords

executive approval, presidentialism, parliamentarism, honeymoon, macro

public opinion, political parties

Does democratic regime type shape citizens’evaluations of political exec-

utives? In his famous article regarding the “perils of presidentialism,”Linz

(1990) expressed concern that the “plebiscitarian”nature of presidential

elections can ultimately put democratic stability at risk. The image or “aura”

presidential candidates cultivate during electoral campaigns, he argued, can

lead voters to over-estimate the winners’ability to accomplish their goals once

in off‌ice and, inevitably, to become disappointed when they fail. The potential

disconnect between the public’s expectations and the reality of governing is

further magnif‌ied by the winner-take-all nature of majoritarian elections

which tempts presidents to conf‌late victory—however narrow—with a

mandate to represent “the people as a whole”(Linz, 1990, pp. 60–61).

Parliamentary systems, Linz posited, are different. Expectations for prime

ministers tend to be modest given the nature of their ascent to power and

institutional position. Most obviously, they lack an independent popular

mandate. Despite the rise of personalized politics in many parliamentary

countries (Rahat & Kenig, 2018), prime ministers are typically members of

parliament, selected to head the government as agents of their political party,

and dependent on legislative majorities to stay in power. Moreover, as heads

of government, prime ministers lack the symbolic premium of representing the

state. These institutional and symbolic constraints limit parties’incentives to

cultivate direct links between prime ministerial candidates and voters, tem-

pering popular expectations of government performance.

One implication of these arguments is that popular evaluations of presi-

dents should differ from those of prime ministers. But the massive literature

comparing presidential and parliamentary regimes largely ignores this im-

plication despite its potential importance for politics in praxis. Executive

popularity is a key source of political power. Honeymoons grant presidents

and prime ministers the political cover to introduce major, and often costly,

reforms (e.g., K¨

onig & Wenzelburger, 2017;Stokes, 2001). Highly popular

presidents more easily afford the often steep “cost of ruling”(Nannestad &

Paldam, 2002;Wlezien, 2017), fare better in inter-branch bargaining (Becher

& Christiansen, 2015;Mart´

ınez-Gallardo, 2014), and pass their agendas more

Mart´

ınez-Gallardo et al. 527

eff‌iciently (Calvo, 2007;Cheibub et al., 2004;Raile et al., 2011). Falling

approval may trigger cabinet shuff‌les (Kam & Indriðason 2005;Mart´

ınez-

Gallardo, 2014) and even risk the survival of presidents and prime ministers

(Laver & Shepsle, 1998;P´

erez-Liñ´

an, 2007). But leaders can also leverage

their public standing to extend their stay in off‌ice (Corrales, 2016;Schleiter &

Tavits, 2016). And by forestalling corrective policies, extreme leader pop-

ularity may even precipitate f‌inancial crises (Herrera et al., 2020). In short,

approval dynamics condition what prime ministers and presidents can ach-

ieve–overall and relative to each other.

Against this backdrop, we argue that two intrinsic characteristics can

lead to divergent patterns of executive approval across regime types. First,

echoing Linz (1990,1994), we expect the incentives to conduct per-

sonalized electoral campaigns –which are greater under presidentialism –

will encourage bandwagoning, cultivate higher expectations, and thus

produce more robust post-election honeymoons for presidents than for

prime ministers. Second, we expect the (in)dependence of executive and

legislative tenure to shape executive support. In presidential systems,

separation of survival reduces party system institutionalization and

hampers the formation of strong partisan bonds. Where parties are less

stable, we expect both larger honeymoons and more volatile leader sup-

port. By contrast, more durable partisan bonds developed in p arliamentary

systems should limit public bandwagoning and stabilize prime ministers’

approval throughout their tenure.

We test our expectations using time series data on executive popularity for

271 leaders in 40 countries: 19 parliamentary and 21 presidential. Results

show that presidents, on average, enjoy greater honeymoons than prime

ministers but incur higher costs of ruling and greater volatility in public

support. As expected, these differences ref‌lect, to some extent, how incentives

to focus electoral campaigns more on individuals than on parties boost initial

expectations for incoming leaders. While f‌irst-time executives in both regimes

generally enjoy a post-election honeymoon, the phenomenon is more pro-

nounced under presidentialism. Under parliamentarism, honeymoons are

most substantial for f‌irst-time prime ministers who oversee single-party

majorities. By contrast, reelected presidents and prime ministers do not en-

joy signif‌icant honeymoons, suggesting personalism has one-off effects.

In line with our expectations, regime differences in approval ratings also

ref‌lect distinct patterns of party system institutionalization. The volatile nature

of party competition characteristic of presidentialism is associated with more

volatile approval ratings throughout the electoral cycle. Accounting for

electoral volatility—our indicator of party system institutionalization—

reveals patterns of approval that more closely approximate each other

across the two regimes. Ancillary tests of these mechanisms within parlia-

mentary and presidential regimes bolster these claims.

528 Comparative Political Studies 58(3)