Expanding exclusionary rule exceptions and contracting Fourth Amendment protection.

• Author: Jackson, Heather A.
• Position: Supreme Court Review - Case Note

1. INTRODUCTION

   In Arizona v. Evans,(1) the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply where an unlawful search is the result of a clerical error by a court employee.(2) The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule did not fulfill its requisite deterrent purposes in a case where a police officer acted in good faith in response to a non-existent misdemeanor warrant appearing on the police computer.(3) Thus, the Court ruled that evidence seized in violation of Isaac Evans' Fourth Amendment rights could be admitted and used against Evans in a criminal proceeding.(4) According to the Court, the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to deter future Fourth Amendment violations by police officers.(5) Because the rule is not a specific remedy to cure Fourth Amendment violations, it is only applicable when the deterrent purposes are most efficaciously served.(6)

   This Note argues that the illegally seized evidence should have been excluded even though the violation was caused by a court employee.(7) First, this Note asserts that the Court distorted the precedent of United States v. Leon,(8) the common law foundation for the good faith exception, by ignoring the centrality of the warrant process in that case. Second, this Note asserts that, contrary to the majority's indication, the role of the exclusionary rule is much greater than mere deterrence.(9) Finally, this Note argues that even if the main goal of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, that goal would be better served by applying the rule to all state law enforcement personnel, not only to arresting officers. Therefore, the Court incorrectly held that the introduction of evidence against a criminal defendant, seized without a warrant or probable cause due to clerical error, was constitutionally permissible.

2. BACKGROUND

   1. Basic Principles of the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule

      The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.(10) While the language of the Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and seizures, it does not provide a mechanism for prevention or a remedy, should they occur.(11) The exclusionary rule provides a means for enforcing the Fourth Amendment by "command[ing] that where evidence has been obtained in violation of the search and seizure protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, the illegally obtained evidence can not be used at the trial of a defendant."(12)

      The Supreme Court first announced the exclusionary rule in 1886, in Boyd v. United States.(13) Boyd involved a quasi-criminal forfeiture proceeding.(14) In Boyd, the Court concluded that compelling a defendant to produce private papers was equivalent to an unlawful search and seizure and therefore unconstitutional.(15) Justice Bradley authored the opinion which linked the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.(16) Compelling the production of private papers essentially required the defendant to provide self-incriminating testimony, a clear Fifth Amendment violation.(17) Thus, the Court noted that because police often engage in unreasonable searches or seizures in order to compel the defendant to give self-incriminating testimony, the admission of this evidence in court violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. (18)

      In 1914, in Weeks v. United States,(19) the Supreme Court first applied the exclusionary rule to criminal proceedings in federal courts. In Weeks, the Court held that a trial court could not use private documents, such as letters, which were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as evidence in criminal proceedings.(20) The Court reasoned that it could not admit illegally obtained evidence without effectively condoning unconstitutional behavior, thereby compromising the integrity of the judiciary.(21) The Court did not mention deterrence as a goal supporting the exclusionary rule, but rather noted privacy interests,(22) the limitation of governmental power,(23) and the import of judicial integrity.(24)

      In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,(25) the Supreme Court held that the Constitution mandated the exclusionary rule as a remedy of a Fourth Amendment violation in state proceedings.(26) The Mapp Court examined the foundation of the precedent of Wolf, which came to the opposite conclusion,(27) and ultimately ruled that the exclusionary rule was an essential element of the guarantee of privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment, and was therefore required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.(28)

      The Mapp Court specified three purposes served by the exclusionary rule: constitutional privilege,(29) judicial integrity,(30) and deterrence.(31) First, the Court stated that the exclusionary rule was a constitutionally required privilege and that the Fourth Amendment barred the use of illegally obtained evidence.(32) Second, the Court acknowledged that by admitting illegally obtained evidence, judges would extend Fourth Amendment violations to the courtroom.(33) Such a judicially sanctioned admission of illegal evidence would undermine public regard for the integrity of the judiciary.(34) Finally, by eliminating any incentive for the police to violate the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule would deter future police misconduct.(35)

   2. Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule

      Since Mapp,(36) the Supreme Court has repeatedly carved out exceptions to the exclusionary rule, systematically ignoring all but the deterrence rationale for the rule.(37) Presently, there exist the following exceptions: the impeachment exception, the independent source exception, the inevitable discovery exception, the good faith exception, the harmless error exception, and the rule of attenuation.(38)

   1. The Impeachment Exception

      In Walder v. United States,(39) the Court established the "impeachment exception," allowing the Government to offer illegally seized evidence on cross examination of a criminal defendant to impeach the defendant who has perjured herself on direct.(40) The trial judge in Walder admitted evidence procured in violation of the Fourth Amendment to prove that a defendant, who testified that she had never possessed, purchased, or sold any narcotic drugs, was lying.(41) The Walder Court held that to disallow evidence in such a case would be a "perversion of the Fourth Amendment."(42) In other decisions, the Court has held that a criminal defendant, while possessing a Constitutional right to testify in her own defense, does not have a right to commit perjury, and evidence procured in violation of the Constitution is nonetheless admissible for impeachment purposes.(43)

      James v. Illinois(44) limited the impeachment exception to the testimony of the criminal defendant. When a defense witness other than the defendant perjures herself on the stand, the Government cannot impeach with evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.(45)

   2. The Independent Source Exception

      In Wong Sun v. United States,(46) the Court established the "independent source" exception to the exclusionary rule. This exception inquires whether the evidence was discovered through an exploitation of the Fourth Amendment violation or through an independent source "sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."(47) If the evidence is not obtained directly from the violation, it is freed from the initial taint of the violation.(48) Theoretically, this exception prevents the government from benefitting from misconduct, but avoids forcing the government into a worse position than had no misconduct occurred.(49)

      The Court extended the independent source exception in United States v. Segura,(50) which allowed the admission of evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Police officers had requested a warrant to enter a home, but did not wait for the warrant.(51) The state argued that had the police waited, they would have received the warrant and seized the evidence legally.(52) The Court found that this "potential" warrant provided them with an "independent source" for admitting the evidence.(53)

   3. The Inevitable Discovery Exception

      In 1984, the Court established the "inevitable discovery" exception in Nix v. Williams.(54) The "inevitable discovery" rule permits the admission of illegally seized evidence that would have inevitably been discovered through lawful means.(55) In enunciating this exception, the Court used a balancing test, weighing the deterrence goals of the exclusionary rule against the judicial interest in having the maximum amount of probative evidence available.(56) The Court concluded that the exclusion of illegal evidence that was inevitably discovered undermined the deterrent rationale of the exclusionary rule.(57) In such a situation, societal interest in judicial truth-finding outweighs any potential deterrent effects.(58)

   4. The Good Faith Exception(59)

      The "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule was established in 1984 in United States u. Leon.(60) Leon held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not bar use, in the prosecution's case in chief, of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant later determined to be invalid.(61) In Leon, the police relied in good faith on a warrant and arrested the defendant.(62) Although issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, an appellate court ultimately invalidated the warrant.(63) Justice White, writing for the Court, stressed that the exclusionary rule should be applied flexibly in order to prevent public disrespect for the law.(64) Additionally, the purpose of the rule is to deter illegal acts specifically of the police; excluding evidence obtained by a police officer's good faith search which is illegal due to a judge's mistake would serve no such deterrent purposes.(65) Suppression would be appropriate, however, when the officer has no reasonable ground for believing that the warrant was legally issued.(66)

      The Leon Court...