Examining the Development of Judicial Independence

• Author: Rebecca Reid,Kirk A. Randazzo,Douglas M. Gibler
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912916656277
• Published date: 01 September 2016
• Date: 01 September 2016
• Subject Matter: Articles

Political Research Quarterly

2016, Vol. 69(3) 583 –593

© 2016 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912916656277

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Article

Most individuals would agree that the ability of courts

to provide legal checks against other branches of gov-

ernment without undue political influence is important;

this judicial independence offers protections for minor-

ity rights and checks against abuses of power by the

political branches of government. Indeed, it may be one

necessary component for the development of democ-

racy (for example, see Becker 1987; Haynie 1997;

Helmke 2002; Herron and Randazzo 2003; Hirschl

2001; Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002; Larkins

1996; Melone 1996; Smithey and Ishiyama 2000;

Widner 2001) and for the protection of democracy

against autocratic reversals (Gibler and Randazzo 2011).

Nevertheless, despite this importance, we actually know

little about how judicial independence emerges and

develops within the state.

Judicial independence may serve as a type of insur-

ance for ruling regimes that expect turnover. In this

framework, the courts guarantee protection for at-risk

leaders who fear political reprisals following leadership

turnover (Finkel 2005, 2008; Ginsburg 2003). However,

while intuitively appealing initially, recent arguments

suggest that the theory may have only limited utility

beyond democratic states (see Rebolledo and Rosenbluth

2009) and that political competition, its primary causal

mechanism, may sometimes counteract the development

of judicial independence. As Popova (2010) argues,

intense political competition may not make the courts

referees; instead the courts themselves become spoils for

incumbents to merely rubber stamp their policies.

We argue that part of the explanation for these mixed

results involves the inadequacy of insurance theory as a

complete explanation either theoretically or empirically

across different political environments. Previous studies

have also limited themselves either to specific cases or

limited time spans. Together, this combination has greatly

hampered the generalizability of arguments about the

development of judicial independence within the state.

In this paper, we argue that the development of judicial

independence is a multidimensional phenomenon condi-

tioned by regime type, the level of political competition

within the regime, and the potential for inter-group trust

across society as a whole. We evaluate our argument by

providing the first large-N statistical test of the predictors

of judicial independence using a sample of approximately

145 countries spanning over forty years. We find that

judicial independence is more likely in democracies when

the risk of political losses is greatest: when competition is

656277PRQXXX10.1177/1065912916656277Political Research QuarterlyRandazzo et al.

research-article2016

1University of South Carolina, Columbia, USA

2University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, USA

3University of Texas at El Paso, USA

Corresponding Author:

Kirk A. Randazzo, University of South Carolina, 324 Gambrell Hall,

Columbia, SC 29208, USA.

Email: Randazzo@mailbox.sc.edu

Examining the Development of Judicial

Independence

Kirk A. Randazzo1, Douglas M. Gibler2, and Rebecca Reid3

Abstract

Scholars who examine judicial independence offer various theories regarding its development. Some argue that it

serves as a type of insurance for regimes who believe their majority status is in jeopardy. Other scholars argue

that insurance theory does not offer an adequate explanation until states democratize. We argue that part of the

explanation for these mixed results involves the inadequacy of insurance theory as a complete explanation. Our

paper develops a multidimensional theory that focuses on the interplay of constraints on ruling elites derived from

levels of political competition within the government, the potential for social competition within the state, and regime

type. We test our argument using a dataset of approximately 145 countries over forty years, and our results support

the argument that development of judicial independence is related to the political landscape encountered by the

executive. Ethnic fractionalization in the state, political competition, and regime type each has a conditional effect on

the observation of judicial independence.

Keywords

judicial independence, rule of law, comparative institutions