The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey.

AuthorKARAOSMANOGLU, ALI L.

"Turkey's cultural environment has influenced its quest for security through alliances, its circumspect foreign policy and the persistent efforts of successive governments to embrace the West."

Like any social behavior, modern Turkey's foreign and security policy is manifested in a historical and cultural context. The legacy of history is discernible in its relations with neighboring countries as well as its Western allies. Turkey's cultural environment has influenced its quest for security through alliances, its circumspect foreign policy and the persistent efforts of successive governments to embrace the West. The most elusive clues to understanding Turkish foreign and security policy are themselves best viewed in this cultural context. The evolution of Turkey's security culture and the role of its military are of special interest. The former has often been overlooked, and the latter has often been overemphasized. Therefore, these two interrelated factors deserve renewed attention and clarification while the limits of military interference in the policymaking process require further elucidation.

As Adda B. Bozeman argues, "each society is moved by the circumstances of its existence to develop its own approach to foreign relations. This means that diplomacy, and for that matter every other social institution, is bound to incorporate the traditions and values peculiar to the civilization in which it is practiced."(1) Similarly, in the words of Colin S. Gray, "cultures comprise the persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a unique historical experience."(2) National security culture is not static; indeed, it "can change over time, as new experience is absorbed, coded and culturally translated."(3) In other words, it changes gradually as society responds to challenges from within and without. Some aspects of Turkey's security culture have persisted across historical periods and across different internal and external contexts. In some respects, however, this security culture has evolved across consecutive periods into the post-Cold War era. The purpose of this essay is to seek answers to the following questions: What has changed and what has persisted in Turkey's national security culture? What has the role of the military been in that evolutionary process?

Essentially, I suggest three arguments. First, Turkey has historically displayed a relatively consistent security culture of realpolitik which has evolved across the centuries from a dominant offensive character into a dominant defensive one. Second, since the 18th century, the process of Westernization has left its imprint on the national security culture. It has greatly motivated Turkey's Western-oriented policies and introduced liberal and internationalist elements into foreign policy. At the same time, it has given rise to an identity problem that has, in turn, complicated the understanding of Turkey's foreign and security policy behavior. Third, although the military continues to play a significant part in foreign and security policymaking, its role has limits and has diminished gradually. Contrary to the general view, Turkey's security culture is not completely influenced by the military. The civilian elites have also played an important part in its formation. Civilian participation tends to be increasingly significant in the post-Cold War era. That said, this article will mainly focus on the role of the military in foreign and security policy It will deal with the domestic political and institutional aspects of the problem to the extent that they concern foreign and security policymaking.

THE REALPOLITIK CULTURE

During the Ottoman Empire, its security culture evolved from an offensive realpolitik to a defensive one. The latter continues to affect foreign policymaking in modern Turkey Long before the Peace of Westphalia, the Ottoman state had played an important role in Europe's international affairs. Its continuous relations with European powers made the concept of balance of power an indispensable component of its diplomatic-strategic behavior. The Ottomans were engaged in a long struggle with the Hapsburgs that was essentially a contest for world supremacy. In 1525, when King Francis I of France sought Ottoman support against Vienna, the Turks availed themselves of this opportunity to increase their pressure on Central Europe and to open a new front against the Hapsburgs in the Mediterranean. Ottoman support for France and the Protestants in matters of trade, and encouragement of the English, the Dutch and other anti-Hapsburg parties--notably the Moors and the Jews of Spain--heavily influenced its foreign and security policies. The newly rising monarchies of France, England, the Low Countries and the Protestant princes of Germany all thus benefited from the Ottoman realpolitik, which provided "an element of balance against the dominance of the Emperor and the Pope in Europe."(4) By promoting political decentralization in Europe, this contributed to the advent of the Westphalian system.

The Ottoman policy until the end of the 17th century can be defined as "offensive realpolitik,"(5) the objective of which was to maximize power by acquiring territory, population and wealth. After the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699, the military balance between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers began to change at the expense of the Ottomans. Following that date, Ottoman realpolitik began to acquire a defensive character. This emphasized balance-of-power diplomacy--not to expand influence but to slow down retreat to the East. Major European powers facilitated implementation of this policy by striving to avoid creating a power gap in the Near East through an abrupt collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was reduced to a secondary power and became increasingly dependent on Western European powers in its struggle against the military imperialism of Austria and Russia.(6) From this time until 1952, when Turkey joined NATO, military and diplomatic isolation subjected Turkey to bargaining between the great powers over the Empire's territory. So the fear of loss of territory and the fear of abandonment became a major aspect of Turkish security culture in the Empire, and the same fears were strengthened by the Treaty of Sevres, which provided for the partition of the Ottoman territories among the European Powers after the First World War. Inherited by the Republic, these fears continue to haunt some of the elite and public opinion.

Turkey's past experience with Greece and Russia has greatly influenced its present approach to security matters. After gaining independence in the 1820s, Greece pursued an irredentist Panhellenic policy, known as the "Megali Idea," which aimed at unifying all Greeks and resurrecting the Byzantine Empire. This policy led the Greeks to make incessant territorial claims on the Ottoman Empire. The Greek territorial expansion continued until the failure of the Greek invasion of Anatolia between 1919 and 1922. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the Balkans were affected by the politics of irredentism on the one hand, and by extreme applications of nationalism on the other. As a result, the establishment of nation-states in the Balkans resulted in territorial losses on the part of the Ottoman Empire. It also caused massive relocations of peoples, and an extreme use of force became common practice between different ethnic communities. Implications of this Balkan version of nationalism has left its mark on present Turkish-Greek relations, creating a mutual distrust between the two nations and complicating the settlement of the Aegean and Cyprus disputes. Other Balkan nationalities--as well as the Armenians, Arabs and Kurds in the early 20th century--followed the Greek example, speeding up the territorial contraction of the Empire. The Turkish Republic is still threatened by ethnic separatism and irredentism. Syria's territorial claims over the province of Hatay and the PKK's separatist terrorist actions are, to a considerable extent, the legacy of the 19th century's nationalism.

The hostility between Turks and Russians has a long history. At the zenith of its power, the Ottoman Empire extended into southern Russia, Ukraine and the

Caucasus. Russia's emergence as a great power in the 18th century brought about a significant change in the European balance of power to the disadvantage of the Ottoman Empire. For two centuries, successive Tsars expanded their territory at the expense of an enfeebled Turkey. This violent history, punctuated by 13 wars between Russia and Turkey, created a bellicose atmosphere of traditional enmity between the two nations. In the eyes of the average Turk, Russia remains a traditional enemy. This image somewhat softened after the Bolshevik Revolution and during the Turkish War of Independence. Both countries were then struggling against the intervention of Western powers. This temporary convergence of interests, however, did not last long. Republican Turkish leaders had...

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