Evaluating and Improving Structural Reform in Police Departments

• Date: 01 May 2017
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12297
• Author: Rachel A. Harmon
• Published date: 01 May 2017

POLICY ESSAY

POLICE CONSENT DECREES

Evaluating and Improving Structural Reform

in Police Departments

Rachel A. Harmon

University of Virginia Law School

In 1994, out of frustration with then-existing legal remedies for constitutional violations

by the police, Congress, through the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement

Act, granted the U.S. Department of Justice the authority to sue police departments

for reform to prevent police misconduct. As the Rodney King case and its aftermath

suggested, even when the exclusionary rule, criminal prosecutions, and private lawsuits for

damages were successful, they did not seem to induce meaningful organizational change.

The then-new remedy, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 14141, enables the Department of Justiceto

investigate and file suit against any police department that engages in a pattern or practice

of constitutional violations to force reforms that could be expected to prevent further

violations.

Section 14141, as it is often known, was quickly hailed as a game-changing tool in

police reform. Many considered it the most important advance in the legal regulation

of the police in a generation (Armacost, 2004: 457; Livingston, 1999: 820; Stuntz,

2001: 538, n. 134). One can see why. Even as police maintain public order and safety,

they can also unnecessarily or unfairly impose harm on the public and violate the law

by depriving individuals of their legal rights. If Section 14141 litigation forces reform

that reduces constitutional violations, increases accountability, and strengthens public

confidence in a department, it might considerably improve policing. Moreover, the effects

need not be limited to the departments sued. Section 14141 litigation has the potential to

influence policy and practices in other departments, both by raising the expected costs of

continuing to engage in widespread constitutional violations and by articulating reforms

that departments can adopt to prevent them (Harmon, 2009).

Despite its promise, some commentators have raised concerns about the intrusiveness

and expense of Department of Justice intervention under Section 14141 (Childress, 2016;

Direct correspondence to Rachel A. Harmon, University of Virginia Law School, 580 Massie Rd., Charlottesville,

VA 22903-1789 (e-mail: rharmon@virginia.edu).

DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12297 C2017 American Society of Criminology 617

Criminology & Public Policy rVolume 16 rIssue 2