Ethical and Strategic Issues in Decarbonization Policy

• Jurisdiction: United States,Federal
• Citation: Vol. 39 No. 4
• Publication year: 2023

Ethical and Strategic Issues in Decarbonization Policy

Roger E. Meiners

Andrew P. Morriss

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ETHICAL AND STRATEGIC ISSUES IN DECARBONIZATION POLICY

Roger E. Meiners^* & Andrew P. Morriss^**

Abstract

Policies that force non-fossil fuel energy result in increased reliance on the rapid development and deployment of batteries and other technologies to meet decarbonization goals set by the United States and other industrialized economies. This Article focuses on batteries, noting that key minerals come from corrupt or hostile countries. Many key finished products come from China, thereby making the U.S. and the European Union reliant on an autocratic regime. Using cobalt as an example, the Article considers its production and the U.S.'s unwillingness to shoulder its share of the environmental burden of mineral extraction or refining. Further, the U.S. is increasingly reliant on China for inputs with no good substitutes, raising questions about the desirability of such economic integration. Efforts to spur decarbonization more effectively are warranted and may be nudged along by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.

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CONTENTS

Introduction................................................................................971

I. U.S. Decarbonization Policy................................................973

II. Ethical Issues in Existing Decarbonization Policy........979

III. Strategic Issues in Existing Decarbonization Policy ... 994

Conclusion: We Need an Alternate Strategy.....................1001

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Introduction

The Russian invasion of Ukraine revealed European nations' dangerous dependence on Russian supplies of natural gas. When Russia reduced supplies of natural gas sold to European countries,¹ the price spiked to historic levels, inflicting economic damage on their economies and peoples as well as on the broader world economy.² European countries switched to natural gas in lieu of coal to reduce carbon emissions but tied themselves to Russian gas by building pipelines to Russia instead of increasing domestic exploration or building liquefied natural gas terminals.³ When natural gas became suddenly scarce, countries fired up retired coal plants⁴ and kept

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scheduled-to-close nuclear plants operating longer than planned.⁵ It was not difficult to foresee that this could happen.⁶

The impact of Europe's reliance on Russia for natural gas supplies raises the question: Is the United States setting itself up for similar problems, risking economic and environmental damage, by relying on a single autocratic regime (China) for key supplies for electric vehicles (EVs) and other components needed to decarbonize energy and by relying on a deeply corrupt autocracy (the Democratic Republic of congo (DRc)) for some of the raw materials for those components? We review the forced move to EVs and other parts of the U.S.'s carbon emission reduction strategy, then consider the reliance on just a few countries, particularly china and the DRc, for the minerals critical to carry out this strategy. We raise concerns that the U.S. could become trapped in an economically and environmentally costly problem, like the one faced by Europe today regarding natural gas supplies, if trade relations with these nations deteriorate.⁷ In addition, we identify ethical issues in acquiring minerals necessary to achieve decarbonization objectives under present policy. As Europe discovered, reliance on an autocratic supplier for important components of energy supply is a recipe for energy insecurity.⁸

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I. U.S. Decarbonization Policy

Greenhouse gases (GHGs) were not a concern when the U.S. enacted the Clean Air Act of 1970.⁹ Since the risk of GHGs were not yet known, the Act focused on six criteria air pollutants: ozone, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, lead, sulfur dioxide (SO₂), and nitrogen dioxide.¹⁰ Levels of these criteria air pollutants have fallen since 1980.¹¹ Carbon monoxide, SO₂, and lead levels are trivial fractions of what existed forty years ago; nitrogen dioxide levels have fallen by two-thirds, ground-level ozone levels by 29%, and particulate matter levels by about one-third since 1990.¹²

When concern began to rise about GHG emissions and their link to climate change,¹³ using existing air pollution legislation to address the problem proved challenging.¹⁴ While GHGs have been in decline in the U.S. since 2005, the country needs to make more progress to meet the Biden Administration's ambitious goals to reduce GHGs.¹⁵ In the

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U.S., 79% of GHG emissions are carbon dioxide (CO₂); while three-quarters of the sources of GHGs are split rather evenly across transportation, electric power, and industry, the remainder come from agriculture and commercial and residential buildings.¹⁶

U.S. policy favors reductions in GHGs. But these policies only consisted of a series of ad hoc approaches with little formal regulatory action before 2010.¹⁷ Although the largest decline in GHGs in the U.S. had occurred in electric power generation, it was not expressly a response to federal mandates; CO₂ emissions from electric power generation declined about 40% from 2007 to 2021 due to the shift from coal to natural gas and renewables.¹⁸ Public pressure to reduce emissions, combined with the huge increase in natural gas production from fracking, resulted in the decline in CO₂.¹⁹ Further declines must come largely from other sources. Even if electrical output produced no GHGs, other human GHG sources have not been addressed as

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successfully.²⁰ The ad hoc nature of the American response is one reason its GHG regulation policy puts such heavy weight on the policy levers available without new legislation. As a result, there is great emphasis on electrification of transportation and increasing the proportion of electricity generated by renewables. Both require rapid expansion of battery storage, a part of the energy system where many of the problems we describe are concentrated.²¹ other industrialized nations have adopted similar policy responses to the U.S. and face the same issue of battery storage expansion.²²

European nations have instituted multiple targets to reduce GHGs as part of their national policies. The United Kingdom will ban new natural gas heating units for homes starting in 2035 and will subsidize the installation of heat pumps instead.²³ The UK also seeks to end the sale of new internal combustion passenger cars by 2030.²⁴ Canada plans the same by 2035²⁵ and France by 2040.²⁶ While there is not yet

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an equivalent national mandate in the U.S., some states have declared that all new cars must be electric after a specified date.²⁷ Similarly, there are state-level mandates regarding appliances and heating.²⁸

The Biden Administration is targeting a 50%-52% reduction of GHGs from 2005 levels by 2030.²⁹ But some of the Administration's strategy rests on relatively vague components, such as "wider use of heat pumps" with few specifics on implementation.³⁰ These vague components will ultimately have to come through regulatory action or federal legislation, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's decision in West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, restricting the Agency's ability to take "major" regulatory actions without explicit congressional authorization.³¹ Even the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA),³² which calls for 950 million solar

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panels,³³ 120,000 wind turbines,³⁴ and 2,300 grid-scale battery plants,³⁵ relies primarily on mandating nearly $400 billion in federal spending over a decade for specific "clean energy" technology rather than mandatory regulations.³⁶

Like the decades-out European commitments to carbon reduction, the targets set by the IRA rely on ambitious targets, requiring massive increases in production and installation of new technologies in less than a decade.³⁷ Academics and environmental groups have promoted potentially more effective CO₂ emission reduction strategies, such as a tax on carbon emissions. Economists generally favor such a tax as it stimulates incentives to develop new technologies to reduce emissions without specific mandates about the kind of technology to be used.³⁸ Yet, such taxes have not found favor in Congress, and there seems to

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be little prospect that any such tax will be adopted in time to affect current decarbonization goals.³⁹

These details aside, GHG emissions have been declining in the U.S., Europe, and Japan.⁴⁰ Despite individual country emission declines, global GHG emissions continue to rise. They rose about 10% in the last decade.⁴¹ In China, CO₂ emissions rose almost 40% from 2009 to 2019.⁴² In India, which has a much smaller economy than China, CO₂ emissions rose 56% in the same time frame.⁴³ In both countries, which together have more than one-third of the world's population, as well as in many other developing countries, coal use has been rapidly rising as the primary source of electricity.⁴⁴ Given the rise in coal-based electricity production, which these nations see as necessary for economic output (income) and personal comfort to increase, global GHG emissions are likely to continue to rise regardless of further

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emission reductions in the U.S. and the European Union.⁴⁵ We will return to this issue later but now turn to the main points of this Article—the ethical and strategic issues arising from energy decarbonization policy in the U.S.

II. Ethical Issues in Existing Decarbonization Policy

Economists and engineers think about the efficiency issues involved in energy. Engineers, of course, help invent, design, and produce new technologies—some working better than others, while some are defeated by costs rather than a lack of technical excellence. As previously noted, economists often favor carbon taxes as a potentially efficient way to force GHG emissions to fall. Economists do so from a belief that providing incentives and allowing the economic chips to fall where they...