Estimating Incremental Margins for Diversion Analysis

AuthorSeth B. Sacher and John D. Simpson
PositionThe authors are economists on the staff of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
Pages527-556
ESTIMATING INCREMENTAL MARGINS FOR
DIVERSION ANALYSIS
S
ETH
B. S
ACHER
J
OHN
D. S
IMPSON
*
Over the past 20 years, as part of the merger review process, antitrust agen-
cies have increasingly turned to economic tools such as diversion and pricing
pressure analyses to help determine which mergers to investigate, and then to
further identify which mergers to challenge. A key input in these analyses is
an estimate of the profit margin that the merging firms earn on incremental
sales (“incremental margin”).
1
All else being equal, the higher the merging
firms’ pre-merger incremental margins, the likelier the analysis will be to pre-
dict significant price increases post-merger.
Obtaining and compiling the information required to estimate incremental
margins can be difficult in practice. Thus, antitrust economists often use
proxies based on measures found in aggregate accounting data, such as the
difference between price and the cost of goods sold (the gross margin) or the
difference between price and average variable costs.
2
However, as noted by
economists in other contexts, such proxies sometimes provide a poor measure
of a firm’s market power and a poor measure of performance in an industry.
3
* The authors are economists on the staff of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. This article
reflects the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission or any individual Commissioner. Malcolm Coate, Arthur Del Buono, Jeffrey
Fischer, Daniel Greenfield, Kevin Hearle, Subbu Ramanarayanan, Paolo Ramezzana, David
Schmidt, Aileen Thompson, and Nathan Wilson provided helpful comments and suggestions.
Remaining errors are the authors’.
1
Incremental profits are the net change in profits associated with the specific change in out-
put over the time period relevant to the matter being considered. The incremental profit margin
(“incremental margin”) is the profit margin on these units of output; it is measured as the average
difference between price and incremental cost over this change in output. See U.S. Dep’t of
Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §§ 2.21, 4.1.3, 6.1 (2010) [herein-
after Merger Guidelines].
2
The cost of goods sold comprises all direct and indirect manufacturing costs required to
produce a good. Variable costs are those costs that vary with output.
3
See, e.g., Franklin M. Fisher, On the Misuse of the Profit-Sales Ratio to Infer Monopoly
Power, 18 RAND J. E
CON
. 384 (1987). There is a vast economic literature relating various
measures of industry performance, such as rates of return or price-cost margins, to economic
527
528
A
NTITRUST
L
AW
J
OURNAL
[Vol. 83
In this article, we offer our views on how best to estimate incremental margins
given the shortcomings of measures based on aggregate accounting data.
I. USE OF INCREMENTAL MARGINS IN ANALYSIS OF MARKET
DEFINITION AND COMPETITIVE EFFECTS
A. D
IFFERENT
I
NCREMENTAL
M
ARGINS
M
EASURE
D
IFFERENT
T
HINGS
A discussion of diversion analysis, an economic tool commonly used in
antitrust analysis and described in the Merger Guidelines,
4
illustrates the im-
portance of accurate estimation of incremental margins. Consider two firms
(A and B) selling differentiated products, competing on prices as under Ber-
trand competition, facing linear demand, and having marginal costs that are
constant with respect to output. This setup is illustrated in Figure 1.
Firm A initially sells Q
0A
units of its product at price P
0A
and earns profit of
P
0A
-MC on these Q
0A
units. If Firm A increases price to P
1A
, it earns a higher
profit on those units it continues to sell (shown as Rectangle A), but it loses
the profit it previously earned on those units it no longer sells (shown as
Rectangle B). Assuming firms set prices to maximize profit, Firm A earns
less profit on any price other than the one it actually charges, i.e., at price P
0A
.
Therefore, a stand-alone Firm A finds it unprofitable to increase price, as the
amount of profit it stands to lose from a price increase (as represented by area
B) exceeds the amount of profit it stands to gain from doing so (as represented
by area A). If Firm A were to merge with Firm B, Firm A’s calculation
regarding the impact of a price increase on profitability changes because some
of the lost sales at Firm A would be recovered by Firm B (i.e., Firm B’s
demand curve shifts from D
0
to D
1
), and Firm B would earn profits on these
sales (shown as Rectangle C). Now, a given price increase is profitable for
the merged firm if the sum of areas A and C exceeds area B.
structure. For critical reviews of this literature, see Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market
Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J.L. & E
CON
. 1 (1973); Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Stud-
ies of Structure and Performance, in 2 H
ANDBOOK OF
I
NDUSTRIAL
O
RGANIZATION
960 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989); Michael Salinger, Richard E. Caves & Sam Peltzman,
The Concentration-Margins Relationship Reconsidered, 1990 B
ROOKINGS
P
APERS ON
E
CON
. A
C-
TIVITY
: M
ICROECONOMICS
287.
4
Merger Guidelines, supra note 1, § 6.1 (“A merger between firms selling differentiated
products may diminish competition by enabling the merged firm to profit by unilaterally raising
the price of one or both products above the pre-merger level. Some of the sales lost due to the
price rise will merely be diverted to the product of the merger partner and, depending on relative
margins, capturing such sales loss through merger may make the price increase profitable even
though it would not have been profitable prior to the merger.”).

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