Establishing Principled Interpretation Standards in Iowa's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Jurisprudence
| Author | Elisabeth A. Archer |
| Position | J.D. Candidate, The University of Iowa College of Law, 2015; B.A., Luther College, 2011 |
| Pages | 323-360 |
323
Establishing Principled Interpretation
Standards in Iowa’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Jurisprudence
Elisabeth A. Archer
ABSTRACT: In 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court decided State v. Bruegger,
dramatically changing the court’s cruel and unusual punishment precedent
under article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. Prior to Bruegger, the
court interpreted article I, section 17 in lockstep with federal Eighth
Amendment interpretation, deeming the two provisions identical in scope,
import, and purpose. However, Bruegger inexplicably altered this precedent
by applying article I, section 17 more stringently than the Eighth Amendment.
Defendants in Iowa began seeking heightened protection under the Iowa
Constitution—protection Bruegger’s new interpretation seemingly afforded.
When the Iowa Supreme Court decided State v. Null and State v. Pearson
on August 16, 2013, and State v. Lyle on July 18, 2014, it solidified
Bruegger’s standardless interpretation and again failed to enunciate a
principled basis for interpreting article I, section 17 independent of the Eighth
Amendment. These recent cases do not explain what in the Iowa Constitution
justifies the new interpretation, or how the new interpretation will be applied
to future cases. By evaluating the problems resulting from Null, Pearson,
and Lyle, demonstrating several bases supporting adherence to federal
interpretation, and suggesting alternative methods of interpretation, this Note
demonstrates why the Iowa Supreme Court should reject Null, Pearson, and
Lyle’s standardless interpretation and adopt a principled basis for
independent interpretation of article I, section 17 in the future.
J.D. Candidate, The University of Iowa College of Law, 2015; B.A., Lut her College, 2011.
I would like to thank all who chipped in through out the writing process, especially the writers and
editors of Volumes 99 and 100 of the Iowa Law Review for their tremendous dedication and skill. A
special thank you to my parents, Roger and Lisa Archer, and my brother Chri stian, because without
their support, this Note would not have been possible.
324 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:323
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 325
II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................... 329
A. THE BIRTH OF PROHIBITIONS AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT .......................................................................... 329
1. The Ratification of the Eighth Amendment ............... 329
2. Barron v. Baltimore: The United States Supreme Court’s
Refusal to Apply the Bill of Rights to Restrict State
Action ............................................................................. 330
3. The Ratification of Article I, Section 17 ...................... 331
4. Robinson v. California: The United States Supreme
Court’s Decision to Apply the Eighth Amendment to
Restrict State Action ...................................................... 333
B. THE IOWA SUPREME COURT’S CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
PRECEDENT UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 17 .............................. 334
1. Adherence to Federal Interpretation: The Pre-Bruegger
Era ................................................................................. 334
2. First Deviation from Federal Interpretation: State v.
Bruegger ........................................................................... 335
3. Realignment with Federal Interpretation: State v.
Oliver ............................................................................... 336
III. THE IOWA SUPREME COURT’S STANDARDLESS NEW
INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 17................................ 337
A. THE IOWA SUPREME COURT’S SECOND DEVIATION FROM FEDERAL
INTERPRETATION .................................................................... 338
1. State v. Null: The Application of Federal Interpretation
“Under” the Iowa Constitution .................................... 338
2. State v. Pearson: The Solidification of Null’s New Strand
of Interpretation............................................................ 340
3. State v. Lyle: The Expansion of Null and Pearson’s
Standardless Interpretation .......................................... 342
B. JUDICIAL FEDERALISM DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE IOWA SUPREME
COURT’S NEW INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 17 ...... 344
1. Failure to Accept Interpretive Responsibility
Contravened Judicial Federalism ................................. 345
2. Failure to Uphold the Integrity of the Iowa Constitution
Contravened Judicial Federalism ................................. 346
C. STANDARDLESS INTERPRETATION CREATES UNCERTAINTY ........ 347
1. Creates Uncertainty for the Iowa Legislature in
Propagating Future Sentencing Laws .......................... 347
2. Creates Uncertainty for Judges, Lawyers, and Citizens in
Future Litigation ........................................................... 350
2014] IOWA’S CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT JURISPRUDENCE 325
IV. THE IOWA SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT PRINCIPLED
STANDARDS FOR INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 17 ..... 352
A. THE TEXTUAL BASIS FOR ADHERING TO FEDERAL
INTERPRETATION .................................................................... 352
1. Article I, Section 17 of the Iowa Constitution is
Materially Identical to the Eighth Amendment .......... 352
2. Survey of Eighth Amendment Counterparts in State
Constitutions ................................................................. 353
a. States Adhering to Federal Interpretation Due to Textual
Similarities ................................................................ 354
b. States Adhering to Federal Interpretation Despite Textual
Differences ................................................................. 355
B. PRINCIPLED INTERPRETATION STANDARDS FOR DEVIATING FROM
FEDERAL INTERPRETATION WHEN THE NEED ARISES ................. 356
1. State v. Gunwall: The “Principled Basis” Six-Factor
Test ................................................................................. 357
2. State v. Jorgensen: The “Sound Reasons” and “Legal
Deficiency” Tests ........................................................... 358
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 359
I. INTRODUCTION
With increasing concerns about limited budgets, declining judicial
resources, and overcrowded dockets, one would not expect the state’s highest
court to openly invite criminal defendants to challenge their sentences, but
that is exactly what the Iowa Supreme Court has done.1 Instead of following
federal interpretation under the Eighth Amendment—as it had in past
decisions—or using principled standards to diverge from that interpretation,
in State v. Null, State v. Pearson, and State v. Lyle,2 the Iowa Supreme Court
engaged in a standardless method of decision-making that does not align with
federal precedent.3 As a result, 425 juvenile inmates in Iowa may now have
Cady, Chief Justice, Iowa Supreme Court, 2011 State of the Judiciary 1–2 (Jan. 12, 2011), available at
www.iowacourts.gov/wfdata/files/StateofJudiciary/StateoftheJudiciary2011.pdf (remarking on how
“deep cuts in . . . resources are beginning to cause damage to our system of justice”).
2. While recognizing that the Iowa Supreme Court’s deviation from Eighth Amendment
precedent began with State v. Bruegger, this Note focuses primarily on the standardless
interpretation and decision-making that followed in State v. Null and State v. Pearson and was most
recently expanded in State v. Lyle. When mentioned collectively, this Note will hereinafter refer
to State v. Null, State v. Pearson, and State v. Lyle as the Null triad.
3. State v. Lyle, No. 11-1339, slip op. at 3 (Iowa July 18, 2014); State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d
41, 70 (Iowa 2013); Pearson, 836 N.W.2d at 96 (majority opinion).
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