Essentially Aggregative Harm, Restraint, and Collectivization

• Published date: 01 February 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00905917231185187
• Author: Elizabeth Kahn
• Date: 01 February 2024
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/00905917231185187

Political Theory

2024, Vol. 52(1) 34 –59

© The Author(s) 2023

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DOI: 10.1177/00905917231185187

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Article

Essentially Aggregative

Harm, Restraint, and

Collectivization

Elizabeth Kahn1

Abstract

Some of the most pressing contemporary social problems result from the

amalgamation of a mass of actions that are not intentionally coordinated.

Although these essentially aggregative harms are foreseeable, it is unclear

what moral duties individuals have with regards to them. This paper offers a

new analysis of these problems and uses a nonideal contractualist approach

to argue in favour of two kinds of duties for individuals. Collectivization duties

that require individuals to act responsively with a view to ensuring that

there are effective governance agents that reliably, fairly, and efficiently

prevent these outcomes in the long-term and duties of restraint that require

individuals to avoid action of a kind that is likely to come together with

other actions to cause serious EAH in the immediate future when restraint

with regards to actions of this kind could help prevent the outcome from

occurring.

Keywords

new harms, responsibility, climate change, structural injustice, coordination

duties, collectivization duties, imperceptible difference problem

1Associate Professor in Political Theory, School of Government and International Affairs,

University of Durham, Durham, UK

Corresponding Author:

Dr Elizabeth Kahn, Associate Professor in Political Theory, School of Government and

International Affairs, University of Durham, Al Qasimi Building, Elvet Hill Road, Durham, DH1

3TU, UK.

Email: elizabeth.kahn@durham.ac.uk

1185187PTXXXX10.1177/00905917231185187Political TheoryKahn

research-article2023

Kahn 35

1. Introduction

Many pressing social problems result from the amalgamation of a mass of

actions that are not intentionally coordinated (Lichtenberg 2010; Scheffler

1995).1 Although these essentially aggregative harms (EAHs) are foresee-

able and humanly caused, it is unclear what duties individuals have with

regards to them.

This essay argues that there are two kinds of ex-ante, pro-tanto duties.

When these problems pose a risk of significant harm, individuals primarily

have collectivization duties with regards to them. Drawing on Collins’ (2013,

2019) concept of collectivization, I propose that individuals have duties to act

responsively with a view to ensuring that in the long-term there are effective

governing agents that reliably, fairly, and efficiently prevent these outcomes

from emerging. In addition, where significant EAHs are imminent, and col-

lectivization is likely to take too long to address them—and in the meantime,

significant damage is likely to be done—individuals have a duty of restraint.

This duty of restraint builds on the recommendations of Nefsky (2017) in her

analysis of collective impact cases and moral reason. I argue that together

these two duties (collectivization and restraint) outline how a conscientious

individual should respond to cases of significant EAH in the real world.

My analysis contributes to the existing literature in four ways. Firstly, my

definition of essentially aggregative harm brings together a range of cases

typically discussed separately and analysed differently in distinct debates in

moral philosophy and political theory. I recognise them as sharing common

structure and being amenable to a common solution. Examples of EAH

include climate change, gentrification, excessive financial risk, microaggres-

sions, transnational labour injustices, global poverty, gender-based issues in

medical implant design, battery chicken farming, pollution, engineering

faults, and systemic vulnerability to homelessness. These cases have previ-

ously been analysed as collective harms (Nefsky 2011, 2015), imperceptible

difference cases (Kagan 2011), structural injustices (Young 2011), perfect

moral storms (Gardiner 2006), problems of many hands (van de Poel et al.

2012), and moral aggregation problems (Hutchison 2019).

Secondly, the approach I take to assessing candidate duties is innovative

and distinct. I adopt an explicitly contractualist framework (inspired by Forst

2012; Scanlon 2000) and use a nonideal approach to assess duties that con-

sider how likely levels of compliance affect what individuals should do.

1. My definition of essentially aggregative harm is different to Lichtenberg’s

(2010) but in keeping with Kahn (2014), as will become clear in section two.