Erosion of Civilian Control in Democracies: A Comprehensive Framework for Comparative Analysis

• Author: Polina Beliakova
• Published date: 01 July 2021
• Date: 01 July 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0010414021989757
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414021989757

Comparative Political Studies

2021, Vol. 54(8) 1393 –1423

© The Author(s) 2021

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0010414021989757

journals.sagepub.com/home/cps

Article

Erosion of Civilian

Control in Democracies:

A Comprehensive

Framework for

Comparative Analysis

Polina Beliakova1

Abstract

Civilian control of the military is a fundamental attribute of democracy.

While democracies are less coup-prone, studies treating civilian control as

a dependent variable mostly focus on coups. In this paper, I argue that the

factors predicting coups in autocracies, weaken civilian control of the military

in democracies in different ways. To capture this difference, I advance a

new comprehensive framework that includes the erosion of civilian control

by competition, insubordination, and deference. I test the argument under

conditions of an intrastate conflict—a conducive environment for the

erosion of civilian control. A large-N analysis confirms that while intrastate

conflict does not lead to coups in democracies, it increases the military’s

involvement in government, pointing to alternative forms of erosion taking

place. Further case study—Russia’s First Chechen War—demonstrates

the causal logic behind the new framework, contributing to the nuanced

comparative analysis of civil-military relations across regimes.

Keywords

Military and Politics, Quality of Democracy, Conflict Processes, Russia/

Former Soviet Union

1Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Polina Beliakova, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 160 Packard Ave,

Medford, MA 02155, USA.

Email: polina.beliakova@tufts.edu

989757CPSXXX10.1177/0010414021989757Comparative Political StudiesBeliakova

research-article2021

1394 Comparative Political Studies 54(8)

Introduction

Civilian control of the military is a fundamental attribute of democratic gov-

ernance and a crucial step in democratization (Barany, 2012; Cottey et al.,

2002; Croissant et al., 2010; Feaver, 2003; Pion-Berlin & Martinez, 2017). It

differs from civilian control in autocratic regimes in several essential respects.

First, the actors that control the military in democracies—be it the executive,

the legislature, or both—acquire legitimacy through public participation in

elections (Feaver, 2003, p. 5). Second, in addition to preventing coups and

assuring subordination, democratic civilian control requires civilian domi-

nance in policymaking (Cottey et al., 2002; Cohn, 2011; Feaver, 1996), rely-

ing on civilian expertise in national security and foreign policy (Trinkunas,

2005). While civilian dominance in policymaking is optional for autocracies,

in democracies, it is a requirement.

Despite civilian control of the military being a definitive feature of democ-

racies, existing research on the erosion of civilian control predominantly

focuses on coups (Brooks, 2019; Eschenauer-Engler & Kamerling, 2019) to

which democratic regimes are less prone (Bermeo, 2016; Cohn, 2011;

Lindberg & Clark, 2008; Pilster & Böhmelt, 2012; Powell, 2012; Thyne &

Powell, 2016). Therefore, while democracies face lower coup risks, we still

do not know whether the factors that increase the likelihood of military take-

overs in autocracies—such as intrastate use of the military (Bell & Sudduth,

2017; Piplani & Talmadge, 2016; Svolik, 2012), economic recessions (Collier

& Hoeffler, 2005; Londregan & Poole, 1990; Luttwak, 1969), the military’s

dissatisfaction with civilian authorities (Nordlinger, 1977), military networks

built through professional education (Böhmelt et al., 2019)—weaken civilian

control in democratic regimes beyond coups.

I address this puzzle and argue that factors that predict military takeovers

in autocracies weaken civilian control in democracies in forms other than a

coup. To capture this effect, I advance a new comprehensive framework that

includes the forms of civilian control’s erosion particularly relevant to demo-

cratic regimes—the military’s political competition against the government,

civilian deference to the military in policymaking, and the military’s insubor-

dination. Relying on this comprehensive framework to conceptualize my

dependent variable, I use quantitative and qualitative data analysis to esti-

mate how intrastate conflict affects civilian control in democratic and democ-

ratizing states. This study’s findings indicate that intrastate conflict, while not

likely to result in a coup in democracies, leads to erosion of civilian control

in forms of competition, deference, and insubordination. These findings

highlight the analytical utility of the new comprehensive framework and its

applicability for comparative analysis across regimes.