Equality, Self-Government and Democracy: a Critique of Dahl's Political Equality

• Published date: 01 September 1988
• Date: 01 September 1988
• DOI: 10.1177/106591298804100304
• Author: Augustus Dizerega
• Subject Matter: Articles

EQUALITY, SELF-GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY: A
CRITIQUE OF DAHL’S POLITICAL EQUALITY
AUGUSTUS DIZEREGA
University of Puget Sound
EMOCRACY
and equality are necessarily linked in political the-
D
ory. What is problematic is the nature of this linkage. Many critics
of contemporary liberal democratic practice are concerned that
inequalities in political resources among citizens threaten the very
democratic character of these states. They believe that formal equality
among citizens is not enough to maintain any meaningful conception of
popular rule when substantive inequalities of political resources are too
great. Some of these critics argue that substantive equality in political
resources among citizens is an ideal standard by which to guide reform
and measure the extent to which a polity is fully democratic. While ini-
tially appealing, such an egalitarian standard and its resulting strategy for
reform is fundamentally mistaken.
I shall argue that substantive democratic egalitarianism fails to appreci-
ate the very complex and in some ways essential roles which substantive
political inequalities play in a democratic polity. The relationship of equal-
ity to democracy is a complicated one. It is most adequately compre-
hended when we think of democracy as a system of community
self-government seeking laws and practices beneficial to the community
as a whole.
In examining the adequacy of the egalitarian standard I shall focus
upon Robert Dahl’s discussions of this issue. Other political theorists and
philosophers are also concerned with this matter, but almost uniquely,
Dahl’s life work has been concerned with the practical and theoretical
issues confronting contemporary democracies or, in his words, poly-
archies. Accordingly, I will use his arguments for substantive equality as
a good example of egalitarian democratic theorizing. If my discussion
does not cover every argument for egalitarian democracy, it neverthe-
less covers enough to demonstrate that certain significant inequalities in
political resources are also important elements for a viable democracy.
Substantive equality will therefore be shown to be a radically inappropri-
ate standard with which to evaluate political democracy.
Received: November 3, 1986
First Revision Received: March 4, 1987
Second Revision Received: July 15, 1987
Third Revision Received: October 9, 1987
Accepted for Publication: October 14, 1987
NOTE: Many people have assisted me in preparing this paper. I would especially like to
thank Claire Abrams, Mary Fennerman, Nelson Polsby, Sven Steinmo, and Aaron
Wildavsky.

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448
THE NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL IN DAHL’S WORK
To many it might seem odd that I classify Dahl as a theorist of egalitar-
ian democracy. After all, throughout the sixties and early seventies he
was frequently criticized as an advocate of &dquo;democratic elitism.&dquo;
Nevertheless, as I shall demonstrate, Dahl has defined democracy in terms
of substantive equality in political resources at least since 1956. Indeed,
as we
shall see, within his theoretical framework the value of democrac-
tic procedures grows out of their ability to enable a polity to more closely
approach conditions of substantive equality.
Dahl’s earlier critics rarely discussed his theoretical model of
democracy. Instead they attacked his empirical findings, and then often
extrapolated from these findings to what they imagined Dahl’s theoreti-
cal framework to be (Price 1962; Morris 1972; Anton 1963; Walker 1966;
Pateman 1970). When Dahl’s theoretical framework was attacked, it
generally was for his use of the term &dquo;power&dquo; (Bachrach and Baratz 1962,
1970; Bachrach 1967). Here, again, their focus was upon whether Dahl’s
operationalization of the term was adequate for empirical research. Very
little attention was devoted to his conception of democracy itself.
Dahl himself has drawn attention to this shortcoming among his
critics. For example, in responding to Walker’s criticisms, Dahl observed
that Walker &dquo;ought not to confuse attempts at empirical description and
explanation with efforts at prescribing how these systems ought to oper-
ate in order to attain desirable or ideal ends&dquo; (Dahl 1966: 298). In a note
in the same response, Dahl observed that (p. 302n) &dquo;if Professor Walker
interprets as normative theory what I ... wholly or primarily intended
to be empirical theory, others have reversed the process by interpreting
my ventures in normative theorizing as if I were describing the Ameri-
can political system.&dquo;
Dahl emphatically separates &dquo;normative&dquo; and &dquo;empirical&dquo; theory, but
not because he believes normative theory to be unimportant. Instead, he
uses normative theory as a severe standard by which to judge existing
and prospective political systems. In his Preface to Democratic Theory
Dahl described his normative model of democracy as so demanding that
&dquo;no human organization -
certainly none with more than a handful of
people - has ever met or is ever likely to meet&dquo; its terms (1956: 71).
Elsewhere he wrote that its core standard, substantive equality, &dquo;may well
be among the most Utopian of all human goals&dquo; (1958: 465).
The relationship of the ideal to the real is complex. Dahl emphasizes
that &dquo;What is an optimal system for making [democratic] decisions is
not what
we
ordinarily think of as ’idea. In fact the optimal is almost
always different from the ideal&dquo; (1970: 48). While falling short of any
particular standard, the optimum &dquo;will be better than anyone’s ideal
government put into practice&dquo; (p. 52; also 79, 94). Dahl has never faulted
polyarchies for not fully meeting his criteria for democracy.
Dahl’s normative theoretical framework has remained remarkably con-
stant over the years. What has changed is his assessment of how ade-
quately contemporary polyarchies approach his normative ideal. Initially

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449
Dahl was optimistic. In his earliest major work on democracy, which he
wrote with Charles Lindblom, Dahl noted that (Dahl and Lindblom 1953:
41) &dquo;democracy is a goal, not an achievement. The major sociopolitical
process for approximating (although not achieving) democracy we shall
call polyarchy.... If democracy is one of our goals, it follows that we
should also value polyarchy as a means.&dquo;
In 1967 he saw that &dquo;no failure in American society has been as en-
during, as profound, as visible, as corrosive, as dangerous, and as tragic
as our refusal to enable black Americans to share in equal measure with
white Americans the realities of the American dream&dquo; (Dahl 1967: 968).
Nevertheless, &dquo;on the whole&dquo; Dahl believed polyarchies to be &dquo;extraor-
dinarily benign units of government. Historically and comparatively, all
the alternatives to representative government in the nation-state seem
to me
...
markedly inferior by comparison and often malignant, vicious,
and anti-human&dquo; (1967: 956; 1970: 109).
Dahl’s earlier optimism as to the ability of polyarchy to approximate
democracy as he conceived it has waned. His most recent work occa-
sionally reads more like his critics of the sixties than his earlier more op-
timistic assessments of Western democracies. Thus, in his and Lindblom’s
new Preface to their 1976 edition of Politics, Economics and Welfare
they observe: &dquo;An evident feature of the consensus prevailing in all the
polyarchies is that it endorses attitudes, values, institutions and policies
of more benefit to the already favored groups in the society than to the
less favored&dquo; (1976: xxxviii).
Further (p. xl), &dquo;In the United States more money, energy, and or-
ganizational strength is thrown into obstructing equality than into achiev-
ing it, more into constraining our liberties than into enlarging them, and
more into maintaining the corporate domain as a private preserve than
into making its public acts public.&dquo;
Dahl still supports polyarchies over alternative forms of government,
but with a major change in emphasis. He now favors them more because
they are less bad than the alternatives rather than that they are a positive
good in themselves (1977: 12-13).
It is often said that procedural justice, and thus procedural democracy,
does not guarantee substantive justice. This is true. It is said further, how-
ever, that as a consequence substantive justice should take priority over
procedural justice and therefore over procedural democracy. This is partly
right but mainly wrong. It is partly right because procedures should be
judged by the ends they serve. Procedures that do not tend toward good
ends cannot be judged good procedures. But the criticism is mainly wrong
in implying that other solutions, particularly solutions that accept the
claims of a putative governing elite, are more likely to lead to substantive
justice. This is rarely a better short-run solution and practically always
worse in the long run.
Today Dahl writes as a committed democrat who has lost faith in
democratic practice. A part of this loss of faith, I suggest, is due to the
normative framework which he uses to evaluate contemporary poly-

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450
archies. This standard inevitably places him in a bind because it is fun-
damentally antagonistic to any form of procedural democracy.
&dquo;STRONG&dquo; SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY AS A STANDARD FOR DEMOCRACY
Robert Dahl’s major theoretical concern in his normative model of
democracy is substantive political equality. Formal political equality is
of secondary importance: it is necessary but not sufficient for a...