Equal Protection

• Author: Jessica Mitten, Leanne Aban, Lilia Abecassis, Gabriela Garcia-Bou, Carter Man, Jessica Pacwa, Talia Plofsky, Tate Schneider, Katie Wiese, Shelby Young, and Yiruo Zhang
• Pages: 267-324

EQUAL PROTECTION

EDITED BY JESSICA MITTEN, LEANNE ABAN, LILIA ABECASSIS,

GABRIELA GARCIA-BOU, CARTER MAN, JESSICA PACWA, TALIA PLOFSKY,

TATE SCHNEIDER, KATIE WIESE, SHELBY YOUNG, AND YIRUO ZHANG

I. INTRODUCTION .......................................... 268

II. OVERVIEW ............................................ 269

A. “SIMILARLY SITUATED” REQUIREMENT ..................... 270

B. STANDARDS OF REVIEW ............................... 270

1. Strict Scrutiny. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

a. Suspect Classifications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271

b. Fundamental Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

2. Intermediate Scrutiny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

3. Rational Basis Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

4. Alternative Formulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

III. SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS ............................... 278

A. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS ...................... 278

1. Intermediate Scrutiny Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

a. Discriminatory Purpose Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282

b. Important Governmental Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

c. Substantial Relationship Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . 286

2. Areas of Contention in Sex-Based Equal Protection

Jurisprudence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

a. Sex Classifications Based on Gender Stereotypes . . . . 287

b. Sex Classifications Based on Gender Identity . . . . . . . 288

c. Sex Classifications as a Remedial Measure . . . . . . . . 291

3. Abbreviated Move Towards a Higher Standard of Review 293

a. United States v. Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

b. Nguyen v. INS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295

c. Sessions v. Morales-Santana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296

4. Equal Protection and Reproductive Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . 297

5. Equal Protection and Domestic Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298

6. Equal Pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301

B. STANDARDS OF REVIEW UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS.......... 301

IV. SEXUAL ORIENTATION-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS................... 305

A. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS ...................... 305

1. The Rational Basis Review Standard Established in

Romer v. Evans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

2. Lawrence v. Texas: The Supreme Court’s Post-Romer

Analysis of a Sexual Orientation-Based Equal Protection

Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312

267

3. The Courts of Appeals’ and District Courts’ Application

of Romer to Sexual Orientation-Based Discrimination

Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312

a. Special Rights . . . ........................... 312

b. Employment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313

c. Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314

d. Same-Sex Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315

B. STANDARDS OF REVIEW UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS.......... 316

V. CONCLUSION ........................................... 323

I. INTRODUCTION

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reads,

“[N]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-

tion of the laws,”

1

is an invaluable tool for groups that experience discrimination.

In addition to binding the states, it also applies to the federal government through

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

2

To establish an Equal

Protection violation, a plaintiff must prove purposeful discrimination directed at

an identifiable or suspect class. Classes are defined by an individual’s characteris-

tics—for example, sex, sexual orientation, or race—and those classes determine

the level of scrutiny received under the Equal Protection Clause.

3

Part II of this article provides an overview of the principles of constitutional

equal protection, discusses the three levels of judicial scrutiny and their corre-

sponding triggers, and briefly addresses potential alternatives. Part III considers

sex-based classifications under the federal and state constitutions. It first

1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

2. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law . . . .”); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 744 (2013) (holding that Fifth

Amendment rights are made “all the more specific and all the better understood and preserved” through

application of the Fourteenth Amendment); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 215–17,

224 (1995) (holding that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause must be analyzed under the same

standards as the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause to ensure congruence between the state

and federal governments); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that

segregation in District of Columbia public schools without a reasonable relation to a proper

governmental objective violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); Ibrahim v. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 997 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that a foreign national who had a “significant

voluntary connection” with the United States had a right to assert a Fifth Amendment claim); Collier v.

Barnhart, 473 F.3d 444, 448 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2

(1975)) (holding that the “approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been

precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment”).

3. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Schs. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007)

(holding that classifications based on race are reviewed under strict scrutiny); Collier, 473 F.3d at 449

(“Because petitioner has not demonstrated invidious sex discrimination, we analyze the 20/40 Rule

under rational basis review.”); Nathaniel Persily, The Meaning of Equal Protection: Then, Now, and

Tomorrow, 31 GP SOLO 13, 14 (2014) (explaining how a class-based approach to Equal Protection

involves identifying, protecting, and scrutinizing differing treatment of certain groups of people, such as

women and African Americans, whereas a classification approach focuses on the “bases for

discrimination” and urges scrutiny of the Equal Protection rationale being employed).

268 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF GENDER AND THE LAW [Vol. XXIII:267

describes the federal intermediate scrutiny test and details common and conten-

tious areas of the law. It also addresses the extent to which United States v.

Virginia,

4

Nguyen v. INS,

5

and Sessions v. Morales-Santana

6

altered the frame-

work for analyzing sex-based classifications. Part III next discusses the standards

of review that states apply in sex-based discrimination claims.

Part IV addresses discrimination based on sexual orientation under both the

Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. This section begins with an

overview of Romer v. Evans,

7

which established the applicability of rational basis

review for sexual orientation-based classifications.

8

The section then covers

Lawrence v. Texas—a landmark case in which the Supreme Court determined

that homosexual people’s right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives

them the right to engage in sexual conduct without interference from the govern-

ment.

9

Next, the section looks at how district and circuit courts have used the

Romer standard

10

to limit the rights granted in that decision,

11

and summarizes

the pre-Obergefell circuit split on same-sex marriage and the resulting Supreme

Court decisions expanding the right to marry to all same-sex couples in the 2013

Windsor decision

12

and the 2015 Obergefell decision.

13

Finally, Part IV explores

state constitutions’ varying levels of scrutiny of sexual orientation classifications.

II. OVERVIEW

This part first explains the threshold similarly situated requirement. It then

details the three standards of review: strict scrutiny, based on either suspect clas-

sifications or fundamental rights; intermediate scrutiny; and rational basis review.

It ends with a brief discussion of alternative formulations.

4. 518 U.S. 515, 535 (1996).

5. 533 U.S. 53, 60–61 (2001).

6. 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689 (2017).

7. 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).

8. Id. at 631–32 (applying rational basis review and holding that a more stringent standard is not

required because sexual orientation is not a suspect class).

9. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down a Texas statute criminalizing sodomy between

individuals of the same sex and overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986), which

upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy); see also Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 862 (9th Cir.

2007) ( “The Supreme Court has a long history of recognizing unenumerated fundamental rights as

protected by substantive due process.”).

10. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–32 (establishing rational basis review for sexual orientation).

11. See, e.g., Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 296 (6th

Cir. 1997) (distinguishing Romer on the grounds that Romer dealt with a denial of equal rights while the

Cincinnati amendment, which vacated laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,

dealt with special rights and preferential treatment).

12. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 744 (2013).

13. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).

2022] EQUAL PROTECTION 269