Ensuring a legacy: solidifying the Bush Doctrine.

• Author: Holmes, Kim R.

AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, President George W. Bush set forth on a revolutionary approach to U.S. foreign policy. There was a tremendous sense of urgency and an assumption that the old way of doing things had not worked. The strategy of pursuing stability and of slowly working problems through the half-measured process of multilateral diplomacy had not prevented a direct attack on American soil. New strategies and measures were needed to deal with a drastically new and different world. The president moved determinedly to topple the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, to aggressively challenge the rogue regimes of Iran and North Korea, to shift the focus of alliance policies toward Japan and Central and Eastern European countries, to expand the range of military, law enforcement and diplomatic activities to fight the war on terrorism, and finally to adopt his now-famous freedom and democracy agenda aimed (in large measure) at the Middle East.

Many in the Bush Administration thought their various strategies in support of the "long war" on terrorism, including the freedom agenda and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's "transformational diplomacy", would usher in a sea change not only in U.S. policy but in international affairs--not unlike the role of the Truman presidency in establishing a new framework for U.S. foreign policy and the containment policy that endured under Eisenhower and indeed for decades and brought victory in the Cold War.

Now, with two years remaining in his presidency, the administration faces the question of whether it can institutionalize its new approach to foreign policy.

President Bush sorely upset the international apple cart, and while many were happy with the disruption, many others were equally unhappy not only that their equilibrium was thrown off balance, but also that it was Bush, and not them, pushing the cart.

It should come as no surprise that this attempt to reorder international affairs has been met with resistance. The major wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been much more difficult than anticipated, producing a politically toxic antiwar movement in the United States and a breakdown of the bipartisan consensus that emerged after September 11. Moreover, the reassertion of U.S. power in the world rearranged the international playing field. Old rogues like Saddam Hussein and the Taliban are gone but dangerous insurgencies arose in their places. Osama bin Laden is in hiding, but his movement morphed into largely self-contained cells and organizations. Some allies like Japan and Pakistan came closer to the United States while others like Germany and France distanced themselves. Rival states like Russia and China became more assertive in challenging U.S. dominance. North Korea set to launching nuclear devices to attract U.S. attention. Hostile states like Iran and Venezuela jockeyed for position to lead a new international movement against America, globalization and Western notions of freedom.

So what must President Bush do to ensure his legacy in foreign affairs? It is clear that he must be perceived as being in control of America's destiny in Iraq. Moreover, as he continues to confront North Korea and Iran over their nuclear programs, he must put in place either a solution to the problem or the foundation of a strategy to deter them if they become nuclear powers. Success in these areas would do wonders to strengthen the perception of American strength and leadership, attenuating some of the push back on America around the world.

Beyond these immediate problems, the president must devise a better way to win the war of ideas involved in the fight against terrorism--and he must anchor his approach by consolidating and extending the gains made in advancing the freedom agenda and dealing with the backlash against it in the Middle East, Latin America and Europe.

The Iraq Conundrum

WASHINGTON HAS been awash in rumors and plans to save Iraq, including proposals advanced by the Iraq Study Group and in this magazine. Most--such as partitioning, setting up a strongman, creating a regional conference or contact group, setting a timetable for withdrawal--seem predicated on the assumption that any option is preferable to the cur rent one. But this is not true. As bad as the situation is in Iraq, it is remarkable how little analysis is made of these alternatives, particularly since it is not all that difficult to explain how these other approaches could quickly and dramatically make the situation in Iraq much worse and endanger American security even more.

For example, partitioning Iraq would likely unleash massacres and bloodletting on a scale not seen since the Indian subcontinent was partitioned in the 1940s. A so-called strongman would likely spark a full-blown civil war, making the current low-burning sectarian fighting seem positively tame in comparison. A regional conference...