Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering

• Author: Major Mark S. Martins
• Pages: 01

TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction

The Problem

Diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , . . . .

A. 77zePresmtMethod-Key lbms andDistimtions.. .

1. The JCSPeacetime ROE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. PLLrposes of ROE , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . , 3. Wartime Versus Peacetzme ROE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4. Necessity and Proportionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5. finctional Twes of Land Force ROE . . . . . . . . . .

6. TheSelf-DefenseBoilmyerplate,,

, , , . . . , , , . , . . . , , , , B Historical Background of the Present Method. . . . . . 1. Development ofROEfor Air Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Development ofROEforSeaborne Forces . . . . . . . 3. Deuelopment afROEforLandFarces . . . . . . . . . . .

C The "Les2slative"ModelsrROE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. ROEasLawPmblemsin Creation , . . . . . , . . . . .

2. ROEasLaw. Problems of Interpretation , . . . . . .

3 R0E~ww:ProbionsinEnforconent..

. . . . . . . .

4 R0EasLaw:ProblemsinLandFarceDDctrine . .

5. ROE as Law: Neglect of Cognitive andEnviron- , . , , , , , , , , , , . . , , , ,

CurativeApproach ......... . .......... ........ .

A. Refine lb-m andDistimtiom Emplayed in the Present Method . . , , , . , , , , . , , , , , , . , , ,

mental Dimmiom , .

PAGE

21 22

24 27 28 30 33 33 36 39 45 65 66 68 60 68

2 MILITARY LAW REVIEW (Vol. E. Acknowledge Hzstorical Lessons and T%mi.s , , , ,

C. Adopta "h.ainingModel"ofLandForceROE

V Specific Remedial Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A. Th"RA.P"Rules . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. h.ainzng scenarios .........................

C. ROE Alert Conditnom-"ROECONs" . . . . . . . . . . . D.

SkzndardFonnatsfor ROEAnne~~to

Plomond orders ...................................

E. OtherRecmnmendatiom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

VI Potential Concerns

7. Conclusion ...................................

   Appendix A. Functional Types of ROE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

   Appendu B. Common Task an Use of Force for Individual Soldier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

   Appendix C. Selected Problems in ROE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

   Appendix D. ROE Conditions.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

   Appendix E. Draft ROE Annex to Division OPLAN . . . . .

   In this artzcle, Major Mwtim emmines the dEffimll prob- lem. ofimparling rules of engagmnt (ROE) to individualsoldiers and marines He argues that the present method of imparting ROE relies too heavily on a "legiskztiw" model of controlling behavior As a result, the present nzethod &fem from a s d e s of defects, clllminating in ofaflure to account f o ~ the cognitive lzmits of humans under stress. Major .?4wtim comludes that commanders andjudge advocates con mnlnimiza these deJects by adopt-ing a "training mdel."Such a model would include a set ofstandzngruleson themeqffo.rceforsoldiers, aseriesof tiaining scenanos designed to reillfmee the standiw mles w o s s the spectmm of potential coqflict, and a for^ mat by which mi& may sumlonent the standing rules forparticular opmafions

   81 82

   85 86

   90 92

   118 123 143 i67

   RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

   FOR LAND FORCES:A MATTER OF TRAINING, NOT LAWYERING

   MAJOR MARK s. MARTINS'

   The Commission concludes that the. . . ROEcontrihted tu a mind-set that detractedfrom the readiness of the [U,S contingent of the Multinational Force1 to respond to the ferrarist thwat whichmaterializedon23 October 198-1. oepartment ofDeJme Commission on the Beirut International Airport terrorist actthat killed 241 marines and saibrsl

   Furthennore, this [courtmartial] strongly recomlnends

   to the convening authority , . . that rules of engagement, in general, were m t clearly stated to the soldiers, and specVically, that the use of warning shots by the Platoon Leader and Sguad Lea* to halt ,fleeing dvilianr' who were suspect only because they were running away, was contrary to standards of dve cam and shows negligence on thepart of the chainofcommand.

   United States Army courtlnartzal panel upon sentencing Specialist Jams A. Mo%':riS for negligent homicide @a Smnali duilianZ

   *Judge Advocate General's Corps. Urnred Stares Army PrerntD wlgned as an

   In~fmctoi, Infernafmnal and Operalional Law Uw8sion. The Judge Adweare Genersl's School, Krured States Amy. B S., 1083. Unlfed States Bllltary Academy. B A Han, Palif~ci,

   Phiiomphy, and Economies, 1st el-, LOS&, Oxford Univenlty J D , magM

   mm Lzzdn, 1000, Haward Law Schaol, LL M , 1804, The Judge Adrocate General's School, United Stater Amy Formerl) sulmed 81 an Infernallanal and Oweratlonal Law Attorney. &mor 'mal Caunsel, Chief af M a l Asslrtance. Chief of Admmilra-five Law, lOlsi Airborne Divldon (Aa A%~BYII],

   FOn Campbell, KenIuekX 1080-1883,

   Funded Le& Educarmn Progam. 1087-1000, Brigade S-4, A%3iStant Bngade 5-4.

   Platoon Leadey, 3rd Bngade, 826 Awborne Ulwelon, Fort BTW, North Carolma. 1085.87, Rhodes Seholamhlp 1883-1981. Previous wbhcafions Note, Fee n8 lhz W i d B h s Woiiers sf AlMneys' Fees I?? Indtatdual Ctml RwhU Acliom Stnoe

   Leadtng Cams, 103 HAW L. REI. 137, 200-3W 110881 (cue comment on Teame Y

   Lane, 488 US 288 (1088)). "ha art~cie

   IS based on a wnften di9Jertf8tmn that the author Jubmlffed to satisfy, In pan, the Mmfer of Laws deme rewirements for the 4Zd Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course

   'UEP'T OF DEFENSE, R~mm

   OF rac COMVISSIUI ov BElRm LmauAnaNAr AlRPDRI ~ R R O R I ~ ~ A C T , k ~ m Z 3 .

   1083,at 135(20Dee lO83)(unel~~f~edversionl jherelnaf- ICI DOU REPDml Vrnled Stare6 V. Mowns, No. 68 (Fan Carson & 4th Inf Ulv (Mech.1 1 JUlY

   I8831 (rencenee warkaheefl

   ". Jeff u , ioz HAW L REV 1278.08 ~ioagl, n ~ e svprame court 1988 ?km-

   I Introduction

   United States soldiers and marines face hard chams about what, when and where they can shoot As the two epigraphs sug gest, and as this article will mamtain. these same soldiers and marines often get little help from the rules of engagement (ROE) .3

   Over the past three decades. ground farce commanders and judge advocates have searched for an effective method of imparting ROE to subordinate commanders as well BS to individual soldiers and marines * The stakes are high in this search. Without an effective

   method, at least two dangers to military missions become more hminent. The first danger is that troops will respond tentatively to an attack, thereby permitting harm to themselves, to fellow saidien,6 or to some mission essential facility. The second, opposite, danger is that troops will stnke out too aggresmvely, thereby harming innocents.

   An exampie of the first danger occurred in Lebanon in 1983, when marine sentries-having been given contradictory ROE-responded tentatively to the approach of a truck bomb toward their barracks at the Beirut Airport An example of the second danger occurred in Somalia in 1993, when an Army soldier-who later would claim that he was firing a warning Shot as permitted by the ROE-killed an unarmed Somali civilian who was running away and posed no threat.7 An untimely over.tentative or over-aggressive result could turn a successful deployment into B political failure. In an age of instant global telecommunications, the achievement of strategic United States goals through military operations LS vulner. able both to killings of soldiers at the hands of terrorists and to killings of defenseless noncombatants at the hands of American soldiers.

   This article argues that ROE will provide optrnal guidance to

   The High Contracting Pmles at all times, and the Partier fa the eonficf

   10 time of armed confict. shall emwe that legal admen are ~ ~ ~ l l a b l e . when neeemary, to advise mllltary commanders 81 the appropriate level oniheapph~alionofrheConventionsandthiaPratocoland ontheapproonate ln~rmcfionfa be Oven to the armed forces m this Subleer.

   This Incident-the focus ofthe murt-m~rt1~1quoted m the second epi@ph--lb

   deicrlbed morefuUy inf%notes38-48, 217-218 and aceampanyinglea

   United States ground forces8 only after these forces refine their doctrinee and alter the tramng of individual soldiers The unpredictability of armed engagements and the inherent cognitive hmmtmns of humans under Stress define the role ROE can play m guiding individual soldiers toward appropnate decisions about when to fire That role, although potentially deciswe. 1s extremely narrow and must play itself out mostly before the shooting starts. For when the shooting starts, soldiers foilow those principles that repetitive or potent experiences have etched into their minds. If those principles conform both to tactical wisdom and to relevant legal constraints on the use of force. then the larger System of ROE governing the ground component in a particular deploYmentlO will best seme militan, objectives and national interests

   Accordmgly, this article formalizes the search for an effective method of irnpanlng ROE by seekmg the ideal placement of ROE within land force doctrine and training. The article's starting point ISa problem how can ROE best help individual troops avoid the extremes of over-tentative and undlsciplmed fire? Solring this problem demands careful analysis a5 well as a rational choice among options.)] The analysis should reveal the misconceptions that doc-

   trine and training have sometimes created while permitting senior decision-makers to optimize the diverse objectives that ROE further. This article seeks to furnish the needed analysis and recommend improvements while recognizing that no course of action will elimi. "ate all errors that might be made by those at the trigger or in the command post. f i e y e 1 charts the problem-salving method that this article will faiiow.12 Fiere 2 depicts the unsystematic approach it attempts to avoid 13

   Recent changes in Army doctrine, in national security strategy, and in the world at large have heightened attention to land force ROE because the changes mandate that modern land forces be highly flexible.'' Individual soldiers, as well as their units, must be capable of applying appropriate levels of...