Does the End Justify the Means? the Clumsy and Circuitous Logic of Blood Test Admissibility in Criminal Prosecutions in State v. Cormier

• Jurisdiction: United States,Federal,Maine
• Citation: Vol. 61 No. 1
• Publication year: 2009

§ 61 Me. L. Rev. 241. Does the end justify the means? the clumsy and circuitous logic of blood test admissibility in criminal prosecutions in STATE V. CORMIER

Maine Law Review

Vol. 61 - Issue 1

Kyle T. MacDonald(fn*)

I. Introduction

In State v. Cormier(fn1) the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, was asked to determine whether a Maine statute(fn2) requiring law enforcement officers to test the blood of all drivers for intoxicants following a fatal motor vehicle collision violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution(fn3) when the operation of the statute allows for the admission of those blood test results in a future criminal trial of the driver.(fn4) In determining that the procedures of title 29-A, section 2522 of the Maine Revised Statutes are not violative of the Fourth Amendment, the Law Court effectively confirmed that the State's interest in obtaining information regarding the intoxication of drivers in fatal collisions(fn5) without a warrant outweighs the privacy interest of the individual. Further, the Law Court established that those test results are certainly admissible in a criminal proceeding against a driver when the State demonstrates that either before, during, or after the administration of the mandatory blood test, information came to light to establish probable cause that the operator involved in the accident was intoxicated.(fn6) As a result, the Cormier court concluded that section 2522 survives constitutional scrutiny.(fn7)

This case required the Law Court to squarely apply its Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence to Maine's professedly "unique"(fn8) statute for the first time.(fn9) In so doing, the Law Court was forced to wrestle with the contours of the power of law enforcement personnel to conduct individual searches within the bounds of constitutional purposes. The primary reasoning articulated by the majority in reaching this determination was that if the statutory requirements of the probable cause determination were met, the "built-[in]"'(fn10) protections of Maine's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would preclude such a search from being unreasonable.(fn11) The majority found further support for the constitutionality of section 2522 by reasoning that the State's interest and "special needs," separate from the general purpose of law enforcement, justify an exception to the warrant requirement.(fn12) Conversely, the dissent asserted that the majority had flatly circumvented constitutionality by allowing for "after-the-fact" evidence to establish probable cause and, in so doing, effectively sanctioned an unwarranted intrusion on individual privacy.(fn13) Thus, a new question emerges: By authorizing warrantless, suspicionless, and nonconsensual searches and seizures of blood following fatal vehicular accidents on the basis of state data collection and after-acquired probable cause evidence, did the Law Court apply the best possible logic to reach its conclusion?

This Note first examines the framework of both federal and state Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, with specific attention given to the carved-out "special needs" exception to the warrant requirement. Part 11 will also discuss the road to Cormier in the Maine courts. Part 111 outlines the statutory history and legislative intent surrounding the promulgation of section 2522 and briefly explores the rationale underlying its creation. Part IV will discuss the facts and arguments before the Law Court in Cormier and the subsequent majority and dissenting opinions. Arguing that the Law Court erred when it sustained the constitutionality of section 2522 on the grounds that it did, Part V of this Note will address the consequences of Cormier and how the legislature should amend section 2522 to avoid future constitutional challenges while preserving the legislature's intent to protect Maine drivers and to collect data to further that purpose. Next, this Note argues that the result of the majority could be defensible on other "less clumsy" grounds, and questions why the Law Court took such strenuous yet logically faulty measures to reach its chosen result. Finally, this Note asserts a dual conclusion. First, the faulty reasoning of the Cormier court has allowed Maine to slide into unconstitutional territory where probable cause merely plays an inferior role to the State's true interest in collecting evidence to be used in criminal prosecutions for drunk driving-related crimes. Second, the State arguably does have a heightened interest in the public at large by ascribing fault to drunk drivers, which outweighs individual privacy. However, the majority blundered when it failed to execute the most effective reasoning possible.

II. An Examination of Federal and State Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence

A. Search and Seizure

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution(fn14) and article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution(fn15) were both designed to protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons, houses, papers, and possessions. The phrase "search and seizure" is one of the most recognizable clauses in the United States Constitution. Rather than a blackletter rule of a law, however, the phrase is considered more an expression of a philosophy crafted in reaction to harsh British procedures prior to the Revolution.(fn16) The clause was written into the Constitution by its drafters who hoped to assure that the State would always respect the "sanctity of the people and the effects they hold dear."(fn17)

To determine the reasonableness of a search, the United States Supreme Court formulated a test that balances the level of intrusion against the degree that the search promotes legitimate government interests.(fn18) Traditionally, a search was considered reasonable if it was executed pursuant to a search warrant that was issued by an independent magistrate upon a showing of probable cause.(fn19) This warrant procedure was espoused because it allows a disinterested person whose judgment is not swayed by competing law enforcement goals to make the critical decision of whether there is probable cause to search.(fn20) At the least, a valid warrant declares that there is an acceptable reason for intrusion into one's privacy, because a disinterested party made a determination that there was probable cause for the intrusion. The purpose of requiring a search warrant and probable cause is to guarantee a substantial probability that the invasions involved in the search will be justified by the discovery of incriminating evidence.(fn21) As such, warrant requirements are excused only for important and recognized exceptions developed through state and federal case law.

B. The Special Needs Exception: A Trilogy of Supreme Court Cases

In the process of refining investigatory criminal procedure, the courts developed and recognized a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement. Most exceptions, however, require a showing of probable cause before a search is allowed.(fn22) Courts have been willing to dispense with both the warrant and probable cause requirements when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable."(fn23) The Court fashioned this special needs balancing test because "the traditional requirement of a warrant based on probable cause is not well-suited to searches for purposes as varied as enforcing school discipline, public safety, and administrative efficiency."(fn24) However, the special needs searches are not without some limit: they cannot be for criminal law enforcement and subsequent prosecutorial evidentiary purposes.(fn25) Thus, if the State can articulate a compelling interest that outweighs the individual's privacy expectations, and the State's interest is for purposes other than criminal law enforcement, courts may rely upon the special needs exception to affirm the constitutionality of a search. Consequently, some searches are no longer presumed to be unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion.(fn26)

In 1966, the seminal case of Schmerber v. California(fn27) held that a warrant was not required to perform a blood test on a suspected drunk driver when the search was incident to the driver's arrest.(fn28) In Schmerber, the petitioner had been arrested in the hospital while receiving treatment for injuries he sustained in the accident involving the automobile he had been driving, and a blood test was taken at the direction of a police officer. In upholding the search, the Supreme Court reasoned that "the officer ... might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence.'"(fn29) As such, the Court found that the exigency of the situation and the governmental interest in comibating drunk driving outweighed the individual's privacy interests.(fn30) Schmerber came to stand for the proposition that a warrantless blood test used to detect a driver's intoxication would be constitutional so long as there was probable cause to arrest the driver for drunk driving. In other words, collection of blood alcohol evidence was deemed permissible in the name of public safety so long as some simultaneous probable cause existed to indicate that the driver was intoxicated.

As the epidemic of drug and alcohol use...