Employment Age discrimination Comparator evidence.

Byline: Mass. Lawyers Weekly Staff

Where a U.S. District Court judge granted a defendant employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law in an age discrimination case, the judgment should be affirmed despite the plaintiff's challenge to (1) the judge's exclusion of evidence as to the discipline meted out to other employees and (2) the judge's determination that the plaintiff failed to present facts sufficient to take her case to the jury.

"Plaintiff-appellant Wanda E. Daumont-Coln (Daumont) asserts that she was fired from her position as a branch manager for defendant-appellee Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crdito de Caguas (the Credit Union) because of her age. The Credit Union demurs, asserting that Daumont was discharged because of a material breach of its rules of conduct. A jury trial ensued and, at the close of Daumont's evidence, the district court granted the Credit Union's motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). On appeal, Daumont challenges what she characterizes as the district court's misapplication of the law of the case doctrine, its exclusion of evidence as to the discipline meted out to other employees, and its determination that she failed to present facts sufficient to take her case to the jury.

"Daumont's asseverational array begins with a claim that the district court contradicted the law of the case doctrine when after denying the Credit Union's pretrial motions in limine and for summary judgment it excluded her proffered comparator evidence at trial and eventually granted the Credit Union's Rule 50(a) motion. Next, Daumont challenges those latter rulings on their merits.

"Here, Daumont avers that the district court applied the wrong legal standard, requiring her to show that the other employees' circumstances were 'almost identical' to her own. She also avers that the court's determination that the proffered evidence lacked probative value usurped what should have been a question of fact for the jury. And, finally, she argues that because the Credit Union's policies state that its disciplinary procedures are to be applied uniformly to all employees, the court abused its discretion in not weighing the other employees' actions against her own to gauge their 'comparative seriousness.'

"In our view, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Daumont's proffered comparator evidence. In this instance, the critical datum is that the district court, in making its exclusionary ruling...