Empirical Determinants of Bicameral Sequence in State Legislatures

• Author: JAMES R. ROGERS
• Date: 01 February 2005
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.3162/036298005X201437
• Published date: 01 February 2005

29Bicameral Sequence in State Legislatures

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, XXX, 1, February 2005 29

JAMES R. ROGERS

Texas A&M University

Empirical Determinants

of Bicameral Sequence

in State Legislatures

In a previous article (Rogers 1998), I showed that the bicameral chamber that

originates enacted legislation tends to realize policy outcomes closer to the preference

of its median legislator than does the chamber that votes second on legislation. All

things being equal, this “first-mover advantage” implies that each chamber could be

expected to originate roughly half of all enacted legislation. But all other things are not

equal in U.S. state bicameral legislatures. Drawing on an expanded dataset, I innovate

and test a number of additional hypotheses related to bicameral voting sequence. My

results account for the effects of constitutional, institutional, and electoral variables

on bicameral sequence.

In a previous paper (Rogers 1998), I developed a game theoretic

model of bicameral sequence in an environment with informational

uncertainty. I then tested three hypotheses deduced from this model

using a state-level dataset. This paper derives a broader set of

hypotheses related to sequence as a strategic choice between bicameral

chambers. I test these additional hypotheses with an expanded state-

level dataset. In Part I, I briefly explain the idea that, because of a

“first-mover advantage” in bicameral voting, voting sequence is a

strategic variable between bicameral chambers. In Part II, I discuss 11

empirically testable hypotheses deduced from the strategic theory of

bicameral voting sequence. Three hypotheses replicate those I tested

in 1998. In Part III, I describe the state-level dataset used to test these

hypotheses, and I identify variables that affect the proportion of legis-

lation enacted by bicameral chambers. Part IV is a discussion of the

results, and Part V concludes.

I. Bicameral Sequence and the First-Mover Advantage

In a simple spatial setup with no uncertainty, the bicameral chamber

that originates legislation will typically realize policy outcomes closer to

the preference of its median member than will the chamber that votes