UK emergency preparedness: a step in the right direction?

• Author: O'Brien, Geoff
• Position: PREVENTION, MITIGATION and PREPAREDNESS

In an increasingly dangerous and uncertain world, preparedness, at all levels, for a range of threats is a key aspect of effective emergency management and of public reassurance. Preparedness is a combination of structural and non-structural measures designed to reduce known risks but also to ensure effective responses to a range of threats. At the beginning of the millennium a series of events exposed the fragmented approach to UK emergency management and triggered a wide-scale review aimed at making the United Kingdom more resilient, that is, more able to withstand and cope with disruptive events. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States occurred during this review and affected the outcome, leading to an approach more focused on institutional resilience than promoting it at all levels of society. Yet the bombings of 7 July 2005 in London demonstrated that no matter how well prepared, it appears almost impossible to prevent such atrocities, particularly if the terrorists themselves have no interest in surviving the attack.

The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century saw the world enter a new era in terms of emergency preparedness. Though there are still many instances where the triggering agent for disaster can be predicted, such as the hurricane season, there are many instances when we have little or no warning. Climate change represents only one example of threats for which we have no experience upon which to draw and from which there can be no return to the earlier status quo. Rapid technological change, the increased risk of diseases spreading globally through air travel, the looming energy crisis, changing geopolitical trends and the threat of terrorism with no regard for life represent a new set of challenges for which we have to prepare. Arguably we now have to think creatively; new approaches to civil protection are needed. Ignoring the new realities is perilous and not engaging the wider public in the process of preparing for such possibilities is a denial of responsibility.

Terrorism, repugnant though it is, seems to have transfixed the government in the United Kingdom. There is now a danger that civil protection in Britain and other developed countries will simply focus on fortifying against such attacks. Such a focus could lead to the sacrifice of approaches that promote a more resilient society that is able to respond to, and cope with, a range of threats. This article evaluates the changes to civil protection in the United Kingdom. In doing so it identifies a clear institutional focus and posits that such an approach neglects to engage the public in the wider debate surrounding societal responses to the changing landscape of risk.

MANAGING RISKS IN AN ERA OF SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

Risk assessment and management involve both institutional preparedness and societal attitudes. Risk assessment underpins emergency preparedness and requires a clear understanding of both internal risks, such as the location and management of hazardous industrial facilities, and external risks, such as terrorism or human-induced climate change. Risk management characterizes systems that both mitigate risk and deal with consequences should an emergency occur. Societal attitudes, however, shape the ways we respond to information, including warnings of possible danger. Increasing skepticism or disbelief in official pronouncements undermines attempts to ensure the public is properly informed.

Profound changes took place during the 20th century that shaped the risk landscape and societal attitudes to risk. The United Kingdom saw great social and technological changes in the latter half of the 20th century: Individualism rose with the information revolution and the emergence of a highly educated and increasingly mobile information society, and was typified by the declaration by Margaret Thatcher that there was "no such thing as society." (1)

The corollary to this was the transfer of loyalties from institutions and structures to individual values or individualism in what Ulrich Beck terms reflexive modernity. (2) Beck, a German sociologist, argues that the Industrial Revolution, the first modernity, saw many radical changes in everyday life, yet it was still based on traditional social structures, particularly family and gender. The latter half of the 20th century, the second modernity, saw further changes, for example women entering the workplace, the shift from full-time to part-time employment, the erosion of lifetime job security in both blue-collar and white-collar occupations and changing family and social structures, which began to modernize the foundations of the first modernity, making it reflexive. This latter part of the 20th century thus became an era that called into question both the role and legitimacy of institutions and structures.

This increasing skepticism of officialdom is illustrated by the BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) epidemic. The first reported case in Britain occurred in 1986 and, despite warnings from the scientific community, the government failed to act or show concern about the possible transfer to humans. Tragically transfer did occur in a new variant form of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), details of which were leaked to the press in 1996. The intervening period between the first case of BSE and the first case of CID was punctuated by denials and reassurances by officials and politicians in response to growing public concern, described by Sheila Jasanoff as "civic dislocation." (3) The impact on the public was dramatic and trust in the UK government effectively vanished. Bruna De Marchi and Jerome Ravetz, in their analysis of the problems of risk and governance drawn from a number of case studies, characterize the situation in the following way:

For the deeper problems of governance, the BSE case is the watershed. Whatever the ambivalences in the governance of risk that were shown at Seveso (and other cases like Chernobyl), it was only with BSE that it became elementary prudence to adopt the motto "Don't believe it until it is [sic] been officially denied." (4) The resultant skepticism following the BSE crisis does raise a number of concerns for risk and governance. Risk is socially constructed and is inseparable from probability and uncertainty. It is the assessment of hazards and the possibilities that they might present. In an increasingly uncertain and rapidly changing world, nations such as the United Kingdom are vulnerable to distant events, ranging from economic crises on the other side of the world, diseases spread by air travelers and cyber attacks on global networks, to long term changes in the planetary climate system induced by anthropogenic activities. Managing these risks will be more difficult in a skeptical and questioning environment, given that many people are likely to have access to the same information from the media and World Wide Web as the policymakers and can thus develop their own independent risk assessment.

Shared Responsibilities and Evolving Risks

Since industrialization, society has become increasingly concerned with manufactured risks associated with the impact upon the world such as technological developments that lead to the emission of greenhouse gases and their impact on the climate. Yet we have no experience upon which to draw to deal with the consequences. (5) Thus, as society ties to cope with new circumstances in an increasingly skeptical world, the evidence of risk, and an understanding of its consequences, must be clear since risk management, in terms of governance, requires the agreement and coordination of many actors. When consequences are easily understood, for instance the dangers associated with automobiles, rules governing use such as speed restrictions are usually accepted, if not welcomed. In this instance there is a clear relationship between the different actors in the risk management chain, from the legislators enacting rules to the vehicle driver recognizing the reasonableness of the speed restriction. On the other hand, arbitrary or unreasonable rules are often ignored. Where there is uncertainty, distancing an actor in the risk management chain can lessen effectiveness, as in the BSE case, for instance, it led to the suspicion that the truth was not being fully disclosed. (6) This becomes ever more problematic as risks become globalized and the nation-state finds it has neither the resources nor the legislative and regulatory frameworks to deal with a problem.

As the world becomes increasingly more interconnected and interdependent, nation-states are reaching beyond their borders to find ways of collaborating to reduce risks. In the European Union (EU), this has worked well in instances where the treaties binding member states outline areas, or competencies, where legislation can be introduced to deal with a problem. For example the Seveso Directive regulates hazardous facilities across the EU. (7) Although the EU has successfully regulated hazards, such as transfer of toxic waste between member states and long-range transboundary air pollution, it only has competency to regulate for the environmental impacts of industrial hazards and large-scale project developments. The broader range of risks to civil protection, such as floods, fire, civil transportation accidents and health risks, remains the purview and responsibility of individual member states.

The problem becomes more difficult when tackling global problems such as climate change. Climate change, though a natural phenomenon, is being accelerated by anthropogenic activities. Though there is recognition throughout the international community of the threat that climate change poses, arriving at a solution is proving very difficult. (8) Though there has been a proliferation of international agreements or environmental regimes, studies into their effectiveness show that successful regimes, for example the...