Elite Selection in Single-Party Autocracies: Minimizing Protests and Counterproductive State Violence to Maintain Social Stability

• Published date: 01 June 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129221091576
• Author: Siniša Mirić,Anna O. Pechenkina
• Date: 01 June 2023

https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129221091576

Political Research Quarterly

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DOI: 10.1177/10659129221091576

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Introduction

Social scientists have long debated how polities select

their ruling elites. In polities without competitive elec-

tions, single-party autocracies use official promotion to

recruit top officials, while hegemonic (or dominant) par-

ties select candidates for semi-competitive elections.

What determines which officials receive a career

advancement?

Authoritarian elites face two obstacles of governance:

the problem of authoritarian control (managing popular

discontent to preclude mass uprisings), and the problem

of authoritarian power-sharing (managing the ruling

elites’ discontent to proof against a coup) (Svolik 2012).

Single- and hegemonic-party systems tend to outlive

other autocracies, because intra-party competition

resolves said problems by mobilizing mass support and

by brokering bargains among factions (Magaloni and

Kricheli 2010). Advancing officials based on their record

of maintaining social stability, we argue, helps select

those agents who competently resolve the problem of

authoritarian control.

This paper asks who is selected for promotion at the

highest level in the context of China. Taking our lead

from qualitative accounts of how the Communist Party

(CCP, Party) judges the performance of provincial offi-

cials (Edin 2003, Whiting 2004) and building on the

vast literature on popular unrest in China (e.g., Chen

2012, Lorentzen 2013, O’Brien 2008), we argue that

provincial party leaders need to meet political targets to

receive a promotion; these targets are evaluated based

on leaders’ skill of maintaining social stability by mini-

mizing labor protests (used interchangeably with

“strikes” in the paper) and resolving labor protests

peacefully. Strikes skyrocketed in the 2000s and

1091576PRQXXX10.1177/10659129221091576Political Research QuarterlyMirić and Pechenkina

research-article2022

1Emory University, Decatur, GA, USA

2Utah State University, Logan, UT, USA

†Names appear alphabetically, authorship is equal.

Corresponding Author:

Anna O. Pechenkina, Political Science, Utah State University, 0725

Old Main Hill, Logan, UT 84322-1400, USA.

Email: apechenkina@gmail.com

Elite Selection in Single-Party

Autocracies: Minimizing Protests and

Counterproductive State Violence to

Maintain Social Stability

Siniša Mirić1† and Anna O. Pechenkina2†

Abstract

Why are some but not other officials selected for promotion in single-party regimes? Understanding inner-elite

dynamics of these regimes is important for explaining their resilience. Recent evidence suggests that these polities

prioritize patronage connections over competence, when deciding who receives advancement at the top echelons of

power hierarchy. By contrast, this paper proposes that, besides patronage, competence (demonstrated as an official’s

ability to maintain social stability) also contributes to the promotion of top officials. While it is widely acknowledged

that social stability is a key concern for autocracies, prior quantitative research on career outcomes of single-party

elites has largely ignored this criterion for promotion. We argue that evaluating officials based on their ability to

minimize protests demonstrates another dimension of competence (in addition to economic growth) that is designed

to address the problem of authoritarian control, that is, managing popular discontent. We test this argument in the

context of China, using a sample of 116 party secretaries in 2003–2017 who faced a total of 10,085 labor protests.

Our findings are consistent with this argument.

Keywords

authoritarian politics, China, CCP, promotion, social stability, protests, labor strikes, protests in autocracies

2023, Vol. 76(2) 607–621

Article