Elite Military Cues and Public Opinion About the Use of Military Force

• Date: 01 January 2018
• Author: Kyle Dropp,Peter Feaver,James Golby
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X16687067
• Published date: 01 January 2018
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Elite Military Cues and

Public Opinion About

the Use of Military Force

James Golby

1

, Peter Feaver

2

and Kyle Dropp

3

Abstract

Do military endorsements influence Americans’ political and foreign policy views?

We find that senior military officers have the ability to nudge public attitudes under

certain conditions. Through a series of large, survey-based experiments, with nearly

12,000 completed interviews from national samples, we find that participants

respond to survey questions in predictable ways depending on whether they have

been prompted with information about the views of senior military leaders on the

very same questions. When told that senior military leaders oppose particular

interventions abroad, public opposition to that intervention increases; endorse-

ments of support boost public support but by a smaller magnitude. Subsequent

causal mediation analysis suggests that military opinion influences public opinion

primarily through its impact on a mission’s perceived legitimacy and, to a lesser

degree, it’s perceived likelihood of success.

Keywords

public policy, civil–military relations, political science, psychology, strategy

Does military opinion shape American public opinion and, if so, how? When the

American public learns about how military leaders think about an issue squarely

within the zone of military expertise—for instance, a proposed military

1

Triangle Institute for Security Studies, Alexandria, VA, USA

2

Morning Consult, Washington, DC, USA

3

Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, USA

Corresponding Author:

Peter Feaver, Duke University, Box 90204, Durham, NC 27708.

Email: peter.feaver@duke.edu

Armed Forces & Society

2018, Vol. 44(1) 44-71

ªThe Author(s) 2017

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X16687067

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intervention—does that have an impact on how the public itself thinks about the

military intervention? If the public does respond to cues about military views, does

that mean that the military has the whip hand over civilian political leaders in

debates over the use of force? Senior military leaders determined to oppose a

proposed intervention could use their influence over public opinion by leaking

strategically to reduce political support for the proposal while those supportive of

an intervention could take similar actions to box political leaders into taking a

decision they otherwise might not. If these military signals do shape public opinion,

what are the ways consistent with healthy civil–military relations for this process to

play out? This article explores proprietary survey data to answer these questions and

thereby set the table for a new promising line of research in American civil–military

relations: how military opinion affects civilian opinion and vice versa.

Traditional models of public opinion treat Americans as cognitive misers (Holsti,

2004; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1993; Zaller, 1992). Too busy to pay close

attention to foreign policy, many Americans rely on cue-givers in forming opinions

about proposed courses of action in foreign policy. We study how one particular type

of cue-giver, senior U.S. military leaders, operates within such a system. Through a

series of survey experiments, with nearly 12,000 original interviews on national

samples, we seek to determine whether and how cues from military endorsers might

influence the attitudes of individual Americans on proposed uses of force.

By statute and tradition, the U.S. military identifies itself as an apolitical body.

Yet, senior military officers are often involved in public debates, either intentionally

or inadvertently, about how and when to use military force. The media regularly

reports on military attitudes about proposed uses of force, so policy makers see

military advice as relevant not just for determining the wisdom of certain courses

of action but also for affecting the degree of political support. In some recent cases,

the views of senior military officers were a prominent piece of information available

in the public debate: General Martin Dempsey expressing doubt about intervention

in Syria (2013), General Stanley McChrystal expressing skepticism about a light-

footprint military option that the White House reportedly favored in Afghanistan

(2011), General David Petraeus vigorously defending President George W. Bush’s

surge in Iraq (2007), General Eric Shinseki expressing concerns about troop deploy-

ment levels in Iraq in a Senate testimony (2003), General Wesley Clark supporting

air strikes in the Balkans (1999), and General Colin Powell opposing air strikes in

Bosnia (1992).

Despite the relative prominence of the military in these political and policy

settings, there is limited res earch on how military attitudes might influence the

attitudes of the general public. The literature analyzing public attitudes toward

presidents and foreign policy is, of course, vast. There is also a small but growing

literature on military attitudes toward political and policy questions (Avant & Leboi-

vic, 2000; Choi & Patrick, 2004; Feaver & Gelpi, 2004; Feaver & Kohn, 2001;

Gibson & Snider, 1999; Klinger & Chatagnier, 2014; Urben, 2010, 2014). And there

is a rich literature on the role of military in the internal policy-making process or on

Golby et al. 45