Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women's Opportunity for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies

AuthorWilma Rule
Published date01 September 1987
Date01 September 1987
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/106591298704000307
Subject MatterArticles
ELECTORAL
SYSTEMS,
CONTEXTUAL
FACTORS
AND
WOMEN’S
OPPORTUNITY
FOR
ELECTION
TO
PARLIAMENT
IN
TWENTY-THREE
DEMOCRACIES
WILMA
RULE
Markleeville,
California
HE
PURPOSE
of
this
article
is
to
ascertain
which
electoral
arrange-
ments,
parties,
and
socioeconomic
conditions
offer
the
most
-JL
opportunity
for
women’s
election
to
parliament.
Another
objective
is
to
explicate
the
relationship
between
electoral
systems
and
other
contex-
tual
variables
as
they
relate
to
women’s
parliamentary
recruitment
in
var-
ious
countries.
Thirdly,
we
seek
to
determine
which
countries
among
twenty-three
democracies
in
our
sample
allow
the
greatest
to
the
least
po-
litical
opportunity
for
women.
PART
I.
ANALYSIS
OF
SIGNFICANT
PREDICTORS
The
Variables
Studied
and
the
Hypothesized
Relationships
Numerous
researchers
have
observed
a
positive
relationship
between
proportional
representation
(PR)
and
women’s
opportunity
for
election
to
parliament
(Duverger
1955;
Currell 1974;
Bogdanor
1984).
However,
with
few
exceptions
(Rule
1981, 1984,
and
Norris
1985)
there
has
been
no
sys-
tematic
empirical
verification
of
this
hypothesis,
nor
has
there
been
an
at-
tempt
to
control
for
other
political
and
socio-contextual
factors.
In
addition,
except
for
Norris
(1985)
there
has
been
no
systematic
study
of
the
effect
of
different
PR,
majoritarian
and
plurality
systems
on
women’s
election
to
parliament.
Moreover,
the
impact
of
district
magnitude
(M) -
the
number
of
representatives
per
district
-
on
women’s
recruitment
to
national legisla-
tures
has
not
been
investigated,
although
it
would
appear
to
be
a
fruitful
area
for
inquiry.
Previous
research
on
multimember
districts
and
women’s
s
election
to
U.S.
state
legislatures
show
a
positive
relationship’
(Clark
et
al.
1984;
Carroll
1985;
Rule
1986,
and
Darcy,
Welch
and
Clark
1987).
Received:
April
2,
1986
Revision
Received:
August
8,
1986
Accepted
for
Publication:
August
19,
1986
NOTE:
This
is
a
revised
version
of
a
paper
presented
at
the
World
Congress
of
the
Interna-
tional
Political
Science
Association,
Paris,
July
15-20,
1985.
I
wish
to
thank
the
anony-
mous
reviewers,
the
editor
and
Irving
Krauss
for
their
helpful
comments,
and
also
Robert
Ciscewski
for
research
assistance.
1
For
example,
of
the
twenty
U.S.
states
with
some
or
all
multimember
assembly
and
state
senate
districts
in
1984,
the
Pearsonian
correlation
with
the
percentages
of
women
in
both
houses
was
.29
significent
at
the
.02
level
(Rule
1986).
All
multimember
district
states
have
non-party
list
systems.
478
In
addition,
recent
work
on
district
magnitude
indicates
that
the
number
of
representatives
per
district
(M)
has
a
direct
effect
on
the
amount
of
turn-
over
in
parliament,
which
varies
from
18
percent
to
54
percent
in
thirteen
Western
countries
(Katz
1986,
Table
4.2).
The
smaller
the
M,
the
smaller
the
turnover
and
vice
versa
(Katz
1986:
97-101).
Significantly,
low
turno-
ver
has
been
pinpointed
as
a
major
reason
for
women’s
low
representation
in
the
U.S.
House
of
Representatives
(Anderson
and
Thorson
1984)
and
Britain’s
House
of
Commons
(Welch
1985).
Thus
women’s
underrepresen-
tation
in
both
these
countries’
national
legislatures
in
part
may
be a
func-
tion
of
the
single-member
district
(SMD)
majority/plurality
electoral
system.
The
bi-variate
relationship
between
district
magnitude
in
twenty-two
coun-
tries
and
the
percent
of
women
elected
to
parliament
in
1980-82
is
displayed
below
in
Figure
1.
(West
Germany
is
omitted
from
the
figure
because
of
its
hybrid
electoral
system.)
A
linear
relationship
in
Figure
1
is
shown
along
with
several
outliers
-
namely
New
Zealand,
Italy,
Austria,
Israel
and
The
Netherlands.
The
first
hypothesis
to
be
tested
statistically
is
that
the
greater
the
dis-
trict
magnitude,
the
greater
the
percent
of
women
in
parliament.
As
the
number
of
representatives
in
constituencies
increases,
the
percentage
of
the
vote
needed
for
election
diminishes
(the
general
formula
is
100/M
+ 1).

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