Electoral Reform and Parliamentary Debates

• Author: Martin G. Søyland,Bjørn Høyland
• Date: 01 November 2019
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12237
• Published date: 01 November 2019

593

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 44, 4, November 2019

DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12237

BJØRN HØYLA ND

MARTIN G. SØYLAND

University of Oslo

Electoral Reform and

Parliamentary Debates

The early twentieth century saw many democracies adopt proportional

representative systems. The textbook explanation, pioneered by Rokkan, empha-

size between-party electoral competition; the rise of the Socialist vote share made

Bourgeois parties prefer PR systems to maximize their seat share. While appeal-

ing, this account is not entirely compelling. Consequently, scholars are investi-

gating within-party explanations of support for such reforms. Particularly, Cox,

Fiva, and Smith show how list PR enable party leaders to discipline members

and build cohesive parties. Relying on roll-call votes across the Norwegian 1919

electoral reform from two-round single-member plurality to closed-list PR, they

show that the internal party cohesion increased following the reform. We investi-

gate how the Norwegian electoral reform changed the content of parliamentary

speeches. Comparing speeches from MPs present both before and after the re-

form, we show how parties become more cohesive in parliamentary debates under

list PR than they were under the single-member-district system.

The early twentieth ce ntury saw many young democrac ies

changing their electoral systems f rom single-member plur ality

systems to proportional representative system s. The textbook

explanation for this change, pioneere d by Rokkan (1970) em-

phasizes b etween-party electoral competition. In p articular, the

rise of the Socia list vote share made frag mented Bourgeois par-

ties prefer PR systems to mi nimi ze their seat share loss in the

aftermath of the i ntroduction of universal su ffrage. Boix (1999)

provides a formaliz ation and an empiric al test of this arg u-

ment (see also Boix 2010). While the argument is elegant, it has

been criti cized on both empi rical and conc eptional grounds.

Empirical ly, Blais, Dobrzzynska, and I ndridason (2004) fail to

find any systematic relationship betwee n the “Socialist th reat”

and switching to propor tional representation, while Leem ann

and Mares (2014), investigating distric t-, rather than countr y-level

effects, inde ed find that d istrict-level vul nerability and dead-vote

© 2019 Washington University in St. L ouis

594 Bjørn Høyland and Martin G. Søyland

disproportionality explain the adoption of PR. Calvo (2009, 256)

argues that in c ountries such as Austr ia, Germany, Italy, the

Netherlands, and Norway, countries Rokkan (1970) use to argue

the “Socialist t hreat,” PR reforms were actually suppor ted by the

Social Democ ratic parties. Moreover, in those countr ies the re-

form improved the seat shares won by the Soc ial Democratic par-

ties rather than helpi ng the old elite maximizi ng their seat shares.

Moreover, the two-round election systems in plac e in many of

these countries provided the divide d bourgeois bloc able op-

portunity for betwe en-coordination after the fir st round (Blais,

Dobrzzynska , and Indridason 2 004; Calvo 2009), although Fiva

and Smith (2017a) point to geographical chal lenges to mobiliz-

ing and coordinati ng the party vote the local c andidate redraws.

Nevertheless, Fiva and Hi x (2018) demonstrate that within-g roup

voter coordination fell in Norway in the aftermath of the reform

to PR.

The reduced i ncentive to cater for voter coordination in PR

systems has impl ications for within-par ty dynamic s. As a result,

legislative scholars have star ted to investigate within-par ty effects

of electoral systems more generally and the ef fects of electoral re-

forms on legislative behavior in p articular (for an overview of this

literature, se e Andre, Depauw, and Shugart 2014). When studying

the effect of electora l systems on legislative b ehavior, a key dis-

tinction is made b etween candid ate- and party- centered system s

(Carey 2007; Hix 2002, 2004). In the former system, voters c an

choose their most preferr ed candidates , while in the latter, voters

are only provided a mean ingful choice b etween parties. In candi-

date-ce ntered systems, leg islators vote less in line with the party

(Carey 2007; Cox, Fiva, and Smith 2019; Depauw and Marti n

2009), focus more on their constituencie s (Høyland, Hobolt, and

Hix 2017; McLay and Vowles 2007), and run more p ersonal cam-

paigns (Catalina c 2016, 2017). Such behavior is mai nly attributed

to individual candidates’ inc entive to influence their ele ctoral

prospects inde pendently of the party leader ship. Of particular rel-

evance to us, Cox, Fiva, and Smith (2019) investigate how list PR

grants part y leaders control of the nominat ion process which i n

turn enable them to discipline t heir members and bui ld cohesive

parties. Relying on roll-call votes before and aft er the Norwegian

1919 electoral reform from two-round si ngle-member plura lity to

closed-list PR, they show that party le aders preferred t he reform

to a larger degree th an rank-and-file membe rs and that the inter-

nal party cohe sion increase d following the reform.