Electoral Integrity, the Concession of Power, and the Disciplining Role of Protests

• Published date: 01 January 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231158055
• Author: Chanelle Duley,Prasanna Gai
• Date: 01 January 2024
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Journal of Conf‌lict Resolution

2024, Vol. 68(1) 138–165

© The Author(s) 2023

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DOI: 10.1177/00220027231158055

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Electoral Integrity, the

Concession of Power, and the

Disciplining Role of Protests

Chanelle Duley

1

and Prasanna Gai

1

Abstract

Coordination on mass protest plays an important disciplining role in ensuring com-

pliance with electoral rules, with elections serving as a public signal of the incumbent’s

popularity. But the link between the informativeness of the election and the en-

forceability of electoral rules hinges crucially on the veracity of the electoral process.

We model how doubt about electoral integrity inf‌luences compliance with electoral

rules. Our analysis explains why electoral rules in advanced democracies are less

resilient, and incumbents less willing to step aside, than suggested by the standard

model of electoral turnover. We clarify how incumbent behaviour responds to changes

in the cost of protest, and external overtures that make stepping down more attractive.

Our f‌indings contribute to the debate on the role of equilibrium multiplicity in models

of mass uprisings.

Keywords

electoral integrity, mass protest, global games, rank beliefs

JEL classif‌ication

D72, D74, D83

1

Department of Economics, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

Corresponding Author:

Chanelle Duley, Department of Economics, University of Auckland, Sir Owen Glenn Building, 12 Grafton

Road, Auckland 1010, New Zealand.

Email: chanelle.duley@auckland.ac.nz

Introduction

Motivation

Although the peaceful transfer of power following an election result is a hallmark of

democracy, there are many instances where losing incumbents refuse to depart

gracefully and try to hold on to their positions. The refusal by President Trump to cede

off‌ice following the 2020 US Presidential election is, perhaps, the most egregious

example. But other leaders around the world have similarly rejected democratic

election results, stepping down only after widespread condemnation and protest by

citizens.

1

Ex post coordination on mass protest plays an important disciplining role in ensuring

ex ante compliance with electoral rules by incumbent politicians (Fearon 2011).

2

Such

protest is most effective when election results are highly informative. By serving as a

public signal of the incumbent’s popularity and ensuring approximate common

knowledge amongst citizens, the election result serves as a focal point, allowing

citizens to coordinate well enough to punish leaders that violate electoral rules (Little

et al. 2015).

3

It implies that in well-functioning democracies, where elections are a

precise indicator of the incumbent’s popularity, the transfer of power is smooth. In less

mature democracies, where election results are a noisy measure of sentiment, in-

cumbents may be less likely to cede off‌ice.

But the link between the informativeness of the election result and the enforceability

of electoral rules depends crucially on the perceived f‌idelity of the electoral process. If

there is mistrust in electoral institutions, concerns about voting arrangements, or

meddling by foreign powers, then citizens may doubt the integrity of the electoral

process. Uncertainty about the true data-generating process behind the election result

impinges on their ability to coordinate on protest. Citizens become unsure about the

true popularity of the incumbent and about what others believe. With less common

knowledge about where her sentiment sits in relation to others’sentiments, a citizen is

less able to accurately predict the size of protests. By diminishing citizens’ability to

threaten costly, large-scale protests, doubts over electoral probity embolden an in-

cumbent to subvert electoral rules.

In this paper, we extend the electoral turnover model of Little et al. (2015) to

allow for electoral process uncertainty. Drawing on the recent “second-generation”

global game framework of Morris and Yildiz (2019), we assume “fat tails”in the

distribution of electoral results. The presence of fat tails increases a citizen’s

strategic uncertainty. In this setting, rank beliefs provide the basis for protesting. A

citizen’s rank belief is the posterior probability she assigns to another citizen

observing a lower sentiment and, accordingly, ref‌lects the expected protest size if

she believes that her own sentiment is the median sentiment in the population. When

a citizen observes a large positive or negative sentiment, she ascribes the dis-

crepancy between her sentiment and the election result to a shock to fundamentals

(the electoral process). Her rank beliefs become diffuse, and she considers herself

Duley and Gai 139