Election Accomplished: Democracies and the Timing of Peacekeeper Drawdowns

• Published date: 01 March 2024
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129231190614
• Author: Burak Giray,J. Tyson Chatagnier
• Date: 01 March 2024
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Political Research Quarterly

2024, Vol. 77(1) 3–16

© The Author(s) 2023

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DOI: 10.1177/10659129231190614

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Election Accomplished: Democracies and

the Timing of Peacekeeper Drawdowns

Burak Giray

1

and J. Tyson Chatagnier

2



Abstract

Peacekeepers play a vital role in enforcing agreements and promoting stability after a civil war, but participation is

costly. While troop-contributing countries may appreciate the material and diplomatic benef‌its that come with

performing this task, they also want to minimize the associated costs and potential downsides of the mission. We

examine troop contributions in post-civil war peacekeeping missions, determining which countries are most prone to

withdrawal and when. Drawing from a domestic audience cost perspective, we argue that those countries that are

most exposed to political risk from scandals or f‌iascoes are most apt to f‌lee, viewing post-war elections as identif‌iable

exit points. Using data on more than 50 peacekeeping operations between 1996 and 2017, we analyze troop

contribution dynamics for over 155 different countries to determine whether and when post-war elections p rompt

peacekeepers to exit. We f‌ind evidence that democratic states are more likely either to withdraw completely from UN

missions or to reduce their contributions by removing peacekeepers from the front lines in the wake of host country

elections.

Keywords

peacekeeping, democracy, elections, United Nations, audience costs

In September 1993, a year and a half afterits initiation and

with the endorsement of great power participants like the

United States,the United Nations (UN) off‌iciallybrought to

a close its f‌irst post-Cold War peacebuilding effort: the

United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UN-

TAC).The mission was deemed a success,as it had resulted

in democratic elections 4 months earlier, and troop-

contributing countries (TCCs) quickly departed. Yet, in

spite of the mostly-successful elections, problemsremained

within the country. Neither of the major warring parties—

the Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian People’s Party

(CPP)—expressed a willingness to disarm fully, and “[t]he

originalconditions...necessaryforfreeandfairelections

to take place were not met”(Martin 1997, p. 1). Indeed,

within4 years, Cambodia wouldonce again be plunged into

chaos, with CPP co-premier Hun Sen ousting his co-leader

in a bloody coup. Given the instability within the country,

the withdrawal could not have been in the best interest of

Cambodia. So why were the countries contributing to the

peacekeeping mission willing to pull out so soon?

Due to the timing andhigh-prof‌ile nature of the mission,

UNTAC initially received signif‌icant buy in from major

democratic countries, including the United States. How-

ever, by early 1993, the success of UNTAC had become

contentious and leaders fretted about the danger of failure,

“[b]elieving that UNTAC would break up by the end of

1993”(Fleitz and Fleitz Jr 2002, p. 127). This was par-

ticularly problematic as the UN had no clear exit strategy

for Cambodia. To remedy this situation, UN off‌icials and

the newly-inaugurated ClintonAdministration—which was

eager to avoid anyforeign policy f‌iascoes in itsf‌irst year—

put together a plan to use early elections as an excuse to

withdrawbefore failure could occur. The electionsprovided

cover to members of the Security Council, and gave “the

UN and the UnitedStates the opportunityto declare victory

before chaos returned”(p. 129).

Although the United Nations’“No exit without

strategy”report of 2001 has altered the standards for

current UN missions—they now can terminate only after

the completion of the mandate—we argue that the

1

Centre for International Security, Hertie School, Berlin, Germany

2

Department of Political Science, University of Houston, Houston, TX

Corresponding Author:

Burak Giray, Centre for International Security, Hertie School,

Friedrichstraße 180 –10117 Berlin, Germany.

Email: b.giray@hertie-school.org