Eighth Amendment - the constitutionality of the Alabama capital sentencing scheme.

• Author: Garvey, Karin E.
• Position: Supreme Court Review - Case Note

INTRODUCTION

In Harns v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Alabama capital sentencing scheme.(1) Chief among the provisions of the sentencing scheme is that the jury issues an advisory sentence which the sentencing judge must consider in imposing a sentence. Although the provision does not specify the weight a judge must give to the jury's advisory verdict,(2) the majority concluded that this provision does not violate the Eighth Amendment since it does not result in arbitrary or capricious sentences.(3)

This Note concludes that, contrary to the majority's assertions, Alabama's scheme violates the Eighth Amendment since it results in arbitrary and capricious sentences. This Note examines Alabama's scheme in light of (1) statements made by the Court in earlier death penalty cases regarding the constitutional requirements imposed by the Eighth Amendment, (2) sentencing processes in general, and (3) the consequences of Alabama's scheme. This Note argues that the standards imposed by the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by the Court mandate a scheme that provides more guidance to the sentencer than the Alabama scheme. This necessity, recognized in previous holdings and statements in dicta issued by the Court, is evident given the fact that a certain amount of arbitrariness already exists in any sentencing procedure as a result of the incalculable number of outside factors that can effect a judge's sentence. This Note further maintains that an examination of the differing standards employed by the Alabama trial court judges in their sentencing opinions is direct evidence of the arbitrary results of the Alabama sentencing scheme. Although the Court is not responsible for providing this guidance, the Court must serve as a watchdog to ensure that the individual states do provide it. Finally, this Note argues that the majority opinion avoided a thorough examination of precedent and of the realities of sentencing in Alabama by simply concluding that the Court does not have the power to legislate.

2. BACKGROUND

   1. THE ALABAMA SENTENCING SCHEME IN CAPITAL MURDER CASES

      The Alabama capital sentencing scheme is set forth in the Alabama Code.(4) The Code provides that defendants convicted of capital murder are entitled to a sentencing hearing before the trial jury.(5) At the sentencing hearing, the state must disprove, by a preponderance of the evidence, any mitigating factors proffered by the defendant, and the state must prove any statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.(6) The jury then evaluates the evidence. If ten of the twelve jurors agree that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, the jury recommends a death sentence; otherwise, the jury recommends life imprisonment with no possibility of parole.(7)

      The jury's recommended sentence and the jury's vote tally is then reported to the judge,(8) whereupon the judge is required to "consider" the jury's advisory sentence along with all of the evidence available.(9) The judge must then issue a written sentence which describes the defendant's crime and details the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.(10) Finally, the judge must impose a sentence.(11) The statute also provides for a mandatory appellate process if the defendant is sentenced to death.(12)

   2. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AND THE DEATH PENALTY

      The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution protects against cruel and unusual punishment.(13) This Eighth Amendment protection has been held applicable to the states by its incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.(14) The Supreme Court, in setting forth the goals of the Eighth Amendment, has stated that the "primary principle is that a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings."(15)

      The Eighth Amendment, prior to 1972, was never successfully used to challenge a capital punishment statute.(16) In fact, the Eighth Amendment frequently was not even mentioned in the Court's opinions in death penalty cases before 1972.(17) During this time, therefore, the states enacted and implemented their death penalty schemes with no guidance or control from the federal government.(18)

      In 1972, however, the Court expanded the scope of the Eighth Amendment in Furman v. Georgia(19) when it applied the Eighth Amendment in a constitutional challenge to state capital punishment schemes. Since then, the Court has consistently used the Eighth Amendment, with its prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, and the standards developed by the Court in Furman v. Georgia to evaluate capital sentencing schemes.(20) In Furman, three cases were reviewed by the Court simultaneously.(21) In each of the cases the defendant had been sentenced to death.(22) The Supreme Court granted certiorari so it could determine whether the sentencing schemes under which the defendants were sentenced to death were constitutional.(23) The Court held that a death sentence may not be imposed where the sentencing procedures in place create a substantial risk that the punishments will be inflicted arbitrarily and capriciously.(24) The Court deemed that such arbitrariness violated the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment.(25) As a result of the Furman decision, all existing death penalty statutes were declared unconstitutional by the Court(26) since the statutes were being selectively applied.(27)

      Following the Furman decision, states revised their capital sentencing schemes.(28) Various defendants challenged these revised sentencing schemes, arguing that they were unconstitutional under the new mandates set forth in Furman.(29) Importantly, in Proffitt v. Florida,(30) the Supreme Court declared that the death penalty is not per se cruel and unusual punishment.(31)

      For instance, in Gregg v. Georgia, the defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and two counts of armed robbery,(32) and was sentenced to death by the jury.(33) This sentence was upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court.(34) The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine the constitutionality of the Georgia capital sentencing scheme.(35) The Court stated, "[W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."(36)

      In Woodson v. North Carolina,(37) the Court addressed the constitutionality of the North Carolina capital sentencing scheme. The defendants in Woodson were found guilty of murder and armed robbery and were sentenced to death by the jury, as was required by state statute.(38) The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine whether a sentencing scheme which mandated the death penalty for a broad category of offenses--first degree murders, generally--constituted cruel and unusual punishment.(39) Reasoning that the scheme failed to take individual defendants and their individual circumstances into account and determining that there is a "need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case," the Court concluded that the North Carolina sentencing scheme violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.(40) Moreover, the Court stated that there was no way for the North Carolina sentencing scheme to keep a check on the arbitrary impositions of sentences.(41)

      The Supreme Court, in Gregg, Woodson, and the other cases addressing the constitutionality of the states' new sentencing schemes, continued to demand that states meet the standards the Court had put forth in Furman. That is, the Court required that the sentencing schemes, regardless of their specific provisions, not result in arbitrary and capricious sentences.(42)

   3. STATE SENTENCING SCHEMES

      Four states, Alabama,(43) Florida,(44) Indiana,(45) and Delaware,(46) have developed capital sentencing systems whereby the jury issues an advisory sentence, but the judge imposes the final sentence and, in doing so, can override the jury's advisory sentence.(47) The Supreme Court first analyzed the constitutionality of such sentencing systems under Florida's sentencing statute.(48) The specific provisions of the Florida capital sentencing scheme are similar to those in Alabama's scheme, but in Florida, further restrictions were placed on sentencing judges by the Florida Supreme Court(49) in Tedder v. State.(50) In Tedder, the Florida Supreme Court held that "in order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that no reasonable person could differ."(51) The Tedder court further provided that the sentencing judge must accord "great weight" to the jury's recommendation.(52) In Proffitt v. Florida,(53) the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Florida sentencing scheme.(54) The Supreme Court concluded that given the combination of the statutory provisions by the Florida Code and the common law provisions provided by Tedder, Florida's capital sentencing scheme did not result in arbitrary and capricious sentences and therefore was constitutional.(55)

      In subsequent cases readdressing the constitutionality of the Florida sentencing scheme, the Supreme Court continued to uphold and praise what has become known as the Tedder standard.(56) For example, in Parker v. Dugger,(57) the Court stated, "We have held specifically that the Florida Supreme Court's system of independent review of death sentences minimizes the risk of constitutional error, and have noted the 'crucial protection' afforded by such review in jury override cases."(58) In Spuziano v. Florida,(59) the Court declared that Florida could allow the jury to play an advisory role in sentencing, vesting sentencing authority in the judge.(60) The Court reasoned that the "Eighth...