The Egyptian and Iranian ulama at the threshold of modern social change: what does and what does not account for the difference?

• Author: Moaddel, Mansoor

SINCE THE SIXTIES, AN ASTONISHING DEBATE has been in progress on the singularity of the Iranian religious experience in the course of the nineteenth century. With the outbreak of the ulama-led Iranian Revolution of 1977-79, the debate has gained added significance.(1) It is noted that the politics of the Shi'i ulama in Iran in the nineteenth century (and thereafter) displays a contrast with the politics of the Sunni ulama in other Middle Eastern countries. The Iranian ulama have enjoyed a power and influence in society unrivaled by their counterparts in other Muslim countries, played an influential role in the politics of this period, and occasionally participated in movements against the incumbent monarch. This is quite intriguing because in other areas of the Middle East, such as Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, ulama influence began to decline in the same period.

This essay attempts to explain this contrast, using the existing historical evidence. The article begins by summarizing the existing explanations of ulama politics in Iran offered by area specialists and historians. It then attempts to provide a structural-historical explanation for the difference between the Egyptian and Iranian ulama. By comparing Iran with Egypt, this study also attempts to contribute to the existing debate on the relationship between religion and politics in social history and historical sociology.

EXPLAINING ULAMA POLITICS

Although none have used comparative historical investigation, the leading scholars' explanations of ulama politics in nineteenth century Iran contain accounts of its contrast with the politics of the Sunni ulama in other Middle Eastern countries. These explanations are constructed either in terms of the difference between the political theory of Shi'ism and Sunnism or the institutional autonomy of the Shi'i ulama within the context of the state's weakness in Iran and its strength in other places. The first group argues that there is no theological basis in Shi'ism for the accommodation between the ulama and any worldly polity. This ideological precedent, which seemingly renders all temporal rulers illegitimate, is thought to be the underlying cause of the oppositional role of the Shi'i ulama, while its absence in Sunni teachings has deprived the Sunni ulama of a strong ideological basis to oppose the state.(2) Keddie, on the other hand, argues that "the ulama declined in those states, like Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, where the central government was able to strengthen itself significantly .... In Iran, there is a rise in ulama power, which is directly related to a governmental 'power vacuum'."(3) A new institutional development in Shi'ism in the late eighteenth century, the rise of the Usuli school and the decline of the Akhbari provided a strong organizational ideology for ulama political action, further enhancing their power and influence in society. The Usuli claimed for the ulama primacy in interpreting law and demanded that all believers pick a living mujtahid to follow and to abide by his judgments. The Akhbaris, in contrast, rejected the permissibility of religious scholars using their reason to enact certain judgments. Thus the Usuli doctrine, says Keddie, "gave the living mujtahids a power beyond anything claimed by the Sunni ulama, and gave to their rulings a sanction beyond anything merely decreed by the state."(4)

The theoretical and historical problems in these interpretations have been presented elsewhere.(5) As an alternative, this paper suggests a structural-historical explanation of the contrast in ulama politics in Egypt and Iran. This approach involves posing the problem of ulama political action within the broader context of the interaction between the state and various social classes as well as the varying patterns of alliance between these actors. Class dynamics and capacity for collective actions may provide clues for understanding the contrasting cases of Iran and Egypt.

Religious opposition requires social resources to grow and be maintained. The availability of social resources in turn depends on the nature of the triadic relationships between class, state, and ulama. Class interests, organizations, and class alliance constitute an important basis for the maintenance of religious opposition. Class provides audiences and material resources for the ulama and at the same time limits their actions. Likewise, state policies may affect class formation/coalition, thus structuring the ulama's capability for collective action. An expanding state bureaucratic structure may destroy the traditional occupational roles while providing new positions for cultural production including religious activities.

To be sure, social historians have noted the connection between the ulama and various social classes. In the case of Egypt, for example, Crecelius(6) and Marsot(7) observe that many Egyptian ulama were involved in commerce or enjoyed the rents of commercial holdings, urban dwellings, or landed property. And in the case of Iran, while Algar tends to overemphasize ulama religious authority, many other scholars have mentioned the connection between the ulama and various social classes.(8) Nevertheless, the substantive theoretical claim advanced in this essay goes far beyond a simple reiteration of the established fact. This is so because, first, historians have simply noted the ulamaclass connection. Class does not seem to play a central role in their explanation of the politics of religion. Second, this essay claims a causal connection between class and state dynamics, as two mutually interdependent variables, and the political behavior of various factions of the ulama. It is not that the ulama have some sort of elective affinity with certain social classes. It is rather understanding ulama politics presupposes a sufficient understanding of class politics. Finally, the patterns of class coalition and class-state alliance are considered consequential for the growth of ulama power in Iran and its decline in Egypt.

THE EGYPTIAN AND IRANIAN ULAMA

The fundamental similarities between the Egyptian and Iranian ulama should not be obscured by their ideological differences. The ulama were a group of learned religious scholars and jurists. Educated at the best institutions in Egypt and Iran, they embodied the religious elite. They attained positions carrying material wealth as well as social prestige and political power. The exact number of the ulama in both countries is unknown. For eighteenth century Egypt it was between roughly thirty and one-hundred persons,(9) and for Iran, the number of the ulama in the same period was much lower but it increased from less than a dozen at the beginning of the nineteenth century to several hundred by the end of the Qajar period.(10) The ulama were a small group, yet clearly a powerful one, and paradoxically one that despite its modest size was fragmented by rivalries and tensions.

As for wealth, some of the ulama constituted an important element in the landowning class and some were even engaged in trade and commercial activities. The Egyptian ulama were administrators. They managed the wealth of minors and orphans, of schools, mosques, hospitals, and above all managed the funds of charitable endowments, the awqaf (plural of waqf) which by the nineteenth century covered almost one-fifth of the total cultivable land, and which included perhaps a higher proportion of real estate and other forms of urban property. They were also involved in every form of commercial transaction since all sales, purchases, and transfers of property had to be authorized by a judge and in the presence of a witness.(11) One commentator even places the ulama on a level with the Mamluk elites:

At the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century the

"ulama" were among the chief multazims in Egypt. Like the Mamluk amirs,

they built luxurious palaces, surrounded themselves with servants and

hangers-on, employed officials, and took enormous interest in their property

and wealth.(12) The Iranian ulama also owned considerable landed property. The increase in ulama landownership was partly a Safavid legacy. According to Chardin:

The most notable change in the composition of the landowning class in Safavid time ... was the great increase in land held by members of the religious classes. Originally they probably held this land as mutavallis [administrators] of ouqaf or by way of hereditary grants or soyurghals. In due course much of this land became private property. In certain parts of the country, notably Azarbayjan and Isfahan, the religious classes have continued to form an important element in the landowning class.(13)

Pro-ulama practices of Qajar rulers further contributed to the ulama's wealth. Another source of ulama income was in the form of religious taxes [khoms va zakat] and donations largely from merchants, retail traders and craftsmen, and payments they earned for performing various functions related to general economic affairs.(14)

The political power of the ulama matched their wealth. The ulama of both countries were an integral part of their respective traditional government. They controlled traditional educational institutions and the shar'ia courts (which covered the areas of civil law and disputes). The Egyptian ulama, says Crecelius,

were actually an integral part of traditional government in Egypt and formed exceptionally close political and social ties with their Ottoman-Mamluk rulers. These ties of cooperation and friendship created patterns that can only be described as patron-client relationships. The native ulama were participants in the government of the foreign military-bureaucratic elites, not outsiders, and their own influence and wealth, the well-being of their entire corps, and the influence of Islam in general depended upon the close relations the ulama were able to maintain with their powerful rulers.(15) Floor also makes a similar...