Editor's Introduction Corporations as Semi‐Sovereign Powers

Date01 March 2018
Published date01 March 2018
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/ajes.12224
The AMERICAN JOURNAL of
ECONOMICS and SOCIOLOGY
Published Q U A R T E R L Y in the interest of constructive
synthesis in the social sciences, under grants from the FRANCIS
NEILSON FUND and the ROBERT SCHALKENBACH FOUNDATION.
Founded in 1941
Volume 77 March 2018 Number 2
Editor’s Introduction
Corporations as Semi-Sovereign Powers
Introduction
Modern business corporations have existed for slightly over a cen-
tury. In that short time, they have become a defining feature of the
economy. Of particular importance are the companies called multi-
national corporations (MNCs) or transnational corporations (TNCs)
that have affiliates in numerous countries and no loyalty to any of
them. By concentrating investment capital, they are able to control
a large portion of the world’s commerce and dominate decision-
making by national and local governments on key economic
issues,suchastaxes,tariffs,andsocialspending.Asaresult,large-
scale corporations have transformed not only economies but entire
societies. They have also magnified power differentials in econom-
ics and politics. Those are some of the topics that authors in this
issue examine.
In terms of sheer numbers, only a few corporations play a signifi-
cant role in shaping economics and politics. In the United States,
many small businesses with fewer than 500 employees each are
organized as corporations for legal and tax purposes (US-SBA 2012).
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, No. 2 (March, 2018).
DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12224
V
C2018 American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.
Those 5.5 million small corporations, which represent about 99.5
percent of all U.S. corporations, do not have the capacity to
bias economic and political decisions. Thus, when the term
“corporation” is used here, it generally refers to the other 0.5 per-
cent of them that do have inordinate influence on politics and
society.
The problem of corporate power arises generally from the size of
the 19,464 largest companies that employ 53 percent of the employ-
ees in the United States and provide 59 percent of the payroll (U.S.
Census Bureau 2017). Not all of those giant companies are incorpo-
rated, but most are. Similar large-scale, limited liability companies
dominate the economies of other nations as well. Many of them are
multinational, which means the parent company is located in one
country and its subsidiaries in others. Their loyalties are purely to
shareholders, not to the communities in which they operate. Most
domestically-owned corporations outside the United States and the
United Kingdom are directly controlled by wealthy families that are
the top stockholders. In France, for example, after excluding for-
eign- or state-owned companies from the list of the top 500 indus-
trial companies, families control 59 percent of them (Murphy 2005).
Hiding in Plain Sight
The signs of corporate power and influence are strangely invisible in
the public record. In the United States, the Securities and Exchange
Commission collects some basic financial information from individual
corporations, as does the Internal Revenue Service. But no agency
compiles any information for comparative purposes that would enable
citizens to observe at a glance where the greatest concentrations of
capital are. That work is carried out only by private companies, such
as Forbes and Fortune magazines. It is noteworthy that the data on
U.S. employment in the previous paragraph do not explicitly distin-
guish between corporations and other large businesses. That may not
be important in itself, but it provides a means for quibbling over the
statistical outliers—the privately held companies with large assets,
sales, or payrolls. The fact that size and corporate control are not
The American Journal of Economics and Sociology206
exactly synonymous then may serve as the basis for questioning any
critique of corporations.
The reluctance of the U.S. government to publish corporate data
was not always the case. In the Tariff Act of 1909, “corporate income
returns [were made] available for public inspection,” and in 1924,
both corporate and individual income tax payments by wealthy indi-
viduals also became of public record (Yin 2012: 35, 37). The New
York Times (1925a, 1925b) published long lists of taxpayers and the
amount of their tax payments, but the door to such public informa-
tion was closed by Congress in 1926 and never opened again. If
one judged the size and influence of the top 500 corporations in the
United States now by how carefully they are monitored by public
agencies, one might conclude that they are about as significant as
hair salons or daycare centers. In this way, the public remains
largely uninformed about the activities of some of the most power-
ful institutions in the world.
The Demise of Competition
The rise in importance of large-scale business corporations has
changed the economic and political landscape. In terms of purely
economic factors, corporations dominate many national and regional
markets. Bunting and Barbour (1971: 318) describe the rapid growth
of corporations from 1896 to 1905, when they gained control of 40
percent of U.S. industrial capital: “Nearly all were promoted as devi-
ces to gain large dividends through the elimination of competition,
the consolidation of inefficient organizations, and the exercise of
large-scale economies.” As that statement indicates, the original pur-
pose of establishing the modern business corporation was to avoid
competition by consolidating existing businesses into giant enter-
prises in order to form oligopolies. Before 1890, various methods
were used by businesses to control prices: holding companies,
trusts, and cartels. Each proved problematic because cartel members
defected. The simple solution, when the law finally allowed it, was
the limited liability corporation, which could pool risk, shield invest-
ors from liability, gain the privileges of personhood, and expand
indefinitely through mergers, acquisitions, and the proliferation of
Editor’s Introduction 207

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