Economics - Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns?

• Author: Colander, David C.

Many economic methodologists like to dabble in epistemological and philosophical questions. The allure of these questions is similar to the allure of math to economic theorists; it lets one use impressive language that non-specialists can't understand, so that even if one doesn't have a whole lot to say one can still come across as a "deep thinker." This dabbling works fine until a specialist enters the fray and ups the ante, increasing the specialized language of the discussion, and changing the nature of the questions being posed. After that happens, one must either become a philosopher, mathematician, or a passive observer in the debate. Alexander Rosenberg's book, Economics--Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns?, is a book designed to make passive observers of many economic methodologists. In it Rosenberg, a philosopher, considers the same themes he did in his earlier book, Microeconomic Laws: A Philosophical Approach, and covers much the same ground. His main focus is on cognitive status (I don't know what that is, but it must be important, since a philosopher is talking about it) and theory assessment--making judgments about whether theories are good or bad. In the book he considers the work of a number of economic methodologists, usually coming to the conclusion that while they have a piece of the truth, they have it confused or twisted, though sometimes he argues that they have it downright wrong. I'm not the one to judge whether he, or they, are right. His general theme is that general equilibrium theory (which he assumes constitutes the essence of neoclassical economics) fits into epistemology as a subsection of social contract theory, or alternatively as a branch of applied mathematics. Whichever of the two it fits into, it is not an empirical science. For much of what currently goes under the name of economics, I concur with his general thesis, perhaps because it nicely fits in (I think) with the arguments I've been making in my dabbling in methodology. His twist on this theme is that economists should not be ashamed of being a part of applied mathematics and a subsection of the social contract branch of philosophy. There are some deep thinkers in these fields and some practical use may some day come of their work. But he argues that if that's what economists are, they should be judged by their standards--and those standards are much higher than the standards currently used in much of the economics profession...