The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison.

• Author: Morris, Clair E.
• Position: Review

Edited by Mark Harrison.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xxiii, 307. $49.95.

If you are an economic historian, or if you teach defense economics, you will wish to make haste and get a copy of this book on your shelf. Although not without flaws, it is nevertheless the best work yet on the economics of World War II. The methodology is superb and will show aspiring economic historians how to accomplish their tasks in a meaningful way. The questions that are asked, the quantitative analyses and measurements used, and the conclusions reached are all highly credible. This book sets the standard for all future work that will be done on the topic.

The book is the result of an international workgroup of economic historians who met several times at various universities during the 1990s to coordinate and focus their attention on WWII. Thus, there are seven chapters, one on each of the six great powers (the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the USSR) involved in the conflict, and an overview chapter by the editor that sets the tone for the entire work. Harrison begins this overview by establishing the common approach taken by each of the authors who confront two issues: What was the contribution of economics to the victory or defeat of each of the great powers, and what was the impact of the war on long-run economic trends and postwar institutions. His examination of the resources (land, labor, and capital) that each power had available and the institutions that existed to mobilize these resources is quite revealing. The Allied powers were weak and poorly mobilized coming out of the depression of the 1930s with the result that the Axis powers had an early economic advantage. The tide began turning in 1942, and by 1943, the ultimate outcome was easily predictable. Economics determined that outcome, Harrison contends, and he provides the analysis to support his contention. Population, GDP, per capita income, existing weaponry and the rate of producing more, resource flexibility, and the technology embodied in a nation's resources all come under scrutiny. An interesting aside, long noted, is the fact that the victors were gracious and generous, and the losers, who indeed suffered grievous destruction to their economic capacity, had much more impressive economic performance in the postwar period than the winners.

Stephen Broadberry of the University of Warwick and Peter Howlett of the London School of...