Economics and Austerity Relative to Veterans' Claims and the Veterans Appeal Process

AuthorDavid Kimball Stephenson
PositionJ.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 2013; B.A., University of California, Davis, 2009, Staff Sergeant (Retired) U.S. Air Force
Pages179-210
2012] VETERANS CLAIMS AND APPEAL PROCESS 179
ECONOMICS AND AUSTERITY RELATIVE TO VETERANS’
CLAIMS AND THE VETERANS APPEAL PROCESS
DAVID KIMBALL STEPHENSON*
I. Introduction
Providing for veterans who have selflessly served and dearly
sacrificed is firmly rooted in our nation’s history. Remembering the
importance of this concept, lest we forget or overlook the noblest of all
sacrifices, we must persevere to further the goals of a grateful nation in a
responsible way.
Veterans who served this country in any capacity are a special class
of individuals who earned the right to have an appellate system that is
efficient and responsive to their appeals for relief. In this regard, the
government has continuously modified the veterans’ claims and appellate
system to promote responsiveness and efficiency in the veterans’ claims
system. One such modification occurred in 1988 when judicial review
was inserted in the veterans’ claims process.1 Despite the noble attempts
to improve upon the veterans’ claims system, significant delays in claim
adjudication persist to this day.2 The purpose of this article is to
illustrate with current empirical data and historical research that
increased efficiency in the existing veterans’ claims process can be
achieved by implementing a reasonable claim time limit to address the
delays in claim adjudication. In addition to increased efficiency, this
time limit would generate fiscal savings that would be preferable to
savings generated from blanket cuts to federal spending and veterans’
benefits.
To address the possibility of implementing a time limit in veterans
claims, Part II-A discusses the legislative evolution of veterans’
* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 2013; B.A.,
University of California, Davis, 2009, Staff Sergeant (Retired) U.S. Air Force.
1 See Veterans Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988)
[hereinafter VJRA].
2 See, e.g., U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 10-213, VETERANS DIS ABILITY
BENEFITS: FURTHER EVALUATION OF ONGOING INITIATIVES COULD HELP IDENTIFY
EFFECTIVE APPROACHES FOR IMPROVING CLAIMS PROCESSING [hereinafter GAO 10-23]
(2010); The Impact of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom on the
United States Department of Veterans Affairs: Hearing before the Subcomm. of the H.
Comm. of Veterans Affairs, 110th Cong. 48 (2007) [hereinafter Impact of War on VA]
(statement of Professor Linda Bilmes, Harvard Univ.).
180 MILITARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 211
disability compensation law in relation to our evolving national
economy. Part II-B discusses different legal theories that have evolved to
govern the adjudication of veterans’ disability compensation appeals.
Part II-C connects the legal and legislative evolution by providing a brief
structural overview of the current veterans’ benefit-appellate system. Part
III discusses a few of the appellate and structural changes the Veteran’s
Administration (VA) has made to address problem areas within its
disability and compensation claims system. Part IV briefly describes the
demographic characteristics of veterans who appealed their claims to the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) in fiscal year (FY) 2010.
Part V argues for the implementation of a statute of repose in our
veterans’ disability claim process to address the shortcomings of the
current structure. Clearly, any change in the veterans’ appellate process
could have vast fiscal implications.3 However, it is our collective
obligation as Americans to explore the premises underlying the structure
of the veterans’ benefits and appellate system in order to promote
efficiency, responsibility, and predictability in this unique system.
II: The Legislative Evolution of Veterans’ Disability Pensions
In 1781, George Washington wrote, “We ought not to look back,
unless it is to derive useful lessons from past errors and for the purpose
of profiting by dear bought experience.”4 A system that originally began
as a simple, straight-forward approach to administer veterans’ disability
compensation has since morphed into a complex administrative
organism.5 Consequently, the evolving legislative scheme that governs
the current veterans’ disability appellate system has had many intricate
developments.6 To address this historical complexity, it is necessary to
3 See, e.g., VA PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FY 2010, at I-92
[hereinafter VA PAR 2010], available at http://www.va.gov/budget/report/archive/FY-
2010-VAPerformanceAccountabilityReport.zip (noting the increased net cost of a billion
dollars as a result of implementing Agent Orange benefits).
4 Letter from George Washington, to John Armstrong (Mar. 26, 1781) (The George
Washington Papers at the Library of Congress), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/r?ammem/mgw:@field(DOCID+@lit(gw210400.
5 Linda Bilmes, Soldiers Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan: The Long-term Costs of
providing Veterans Medical Care and Disability Benefits 6 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of
Gov., Harvard Univ., Working Paper RWP07-001), available at http://web.hks.harvard.
edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=4329 (describing the disability
compensation process as lengthy and complicated).
6 See WILLIAM H. GLASSON, THE HISTORY OF MILITARY PENSION LEGISLATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 10 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1900). From the founding of the
2012] VETERANS CLAIMS AND APPEAL PROCESS 181
discuss three areas: the legislative evolution that has led to the modern
day VA disability compensation and appellate system; the evolution of
various legal theories that govern the adjudication of veterans’ claims;
and a brief overview of the current disability claims system.
A. The Legislative Evolution of Veterans’ Disability Pensions
The roots of the modern day veterans’ disability system can be traced
back to antiquity, when Greece provided pensions to soldiers who could
prove permanent injury.7 Similar legislation enacted in Elizabethan
England provided pensions to veterans who served after March 1588, the
year the English defeated the Spanish Armada.8 In the United States, this
tradition dates back to 1636, when Plymouth Colony declared that any
soldier maimed in defense of the Colony would be “maintained
competently” for life at the expense of the public treasury.9 In 1776, the
Continental Congress continued this commitment to veterans by
announcing it would provide disability compensation to soldiers injured
in the struggle for American independence.10 Although benevolent, these
pieces of legislation provided little substantive guidance on how to
evaluate or adjudicate a veteran’s disability claim.11
In 1792, Congress began providing substance to this issue by passing
the Invalid Pension Act of 1792 (the 1792 Act), which promised lifetime
disability compensation payments to veterans injured in the defense of
nation until the mid-20th century, veterans’ disability pensions were divided into service
pensions and disability pensions, with the latter being known as “invalid pensions.” See
id. Because the term “invalid pension” is no longer used, this article will refer to such
pensions as a “disability compensation” when possible to limit confusion.
7 Douglass C. McMurtrie, The Historical Development of Public Provisions for the
Disabled Soldier, 26 INTERSTATE MED. J., Feb. 1919, at 109.
8 An Acte for the Relief of Souldiours, 35 Eliz., c.4 (1588).
9 Records of the Colony of New Plymouth in New England, vol. 11 [Laws 1623–1682],
13, 106, 182. See Daniel Vickers, Competency and Competition: Economic Culture in
Early America, 47 WM. & MARY Q., Jan. 1990, at 3, 3–10 (equating the colonial notion of
competent maintenance to subsistence).
10 Worthington C. Ford et al., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789 (1914)
(edited from the Original Records in the Library of Congress, vol. 5, at 702–05)
(Washington: GPO, 1904–37).
11 See ROBERT MAYO & FERDINAND MOULTON, ARMY AND NAVY PENSION LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1–2 (Lucas Brothers, 2d ed. 1854) (detailing the early procedures used to
adjudicate colonial claims for disability compensation).

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