Economic Shocks, Mobilization, and Regional Elite Splits

• Author: Pau Vall-Prat
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221089641
• Published date: 01 February 2023
• Date: 01 February 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Comparative Political Studies

2023, Vol. 56(2) 193–227

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/00104140221089641

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Economic Shocks,

Mobilization, and

Regional Elite Splits

Pau Vall-Prat

1



Abstract

What are the origins of elite splits? Why do regional elites break away from

central elites and develop regional parties? This paper contends that intra-elite

differences are more likely to be politicized when an economic shock ex-

acerbates pre-existing asymmetric economic preferences and disadvantaged

elites can mobilize the electorate on the basis of identity. I employ

constituency-level data from Catalonia spanning the late 19th and early 20th

century to test which factors inf‌luenced regional elite decisions to form a

regional elite political party. To understand elite divisions, I exploit a historical

exogenous trade shock and its asymmetric impact within Catalonia, and the

availability of identity-based mobilization agents. The results show that re-

gional elite splits took place in areas more affected by the 1898 colonial trade

shock and where elites had larger mobilization capacity.

Keywords

elite split, regional elites, economic geography, historical trade shock, political

mobilization, JEL Codes, D72, F14, N33, N93

“We already pay too much in Spanish, let us at least protest in Catalan.”

Anonymous Tax Striker (1899). Cited in de Camps i Arboix (1961, p. 20)

1

Departament de Ciència Pol´

ıtica, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain

Corresponding Author:

Pau Vall-Prat, Universitat de Barcelona, Av. Diagonal, 684, Facultat de Dret. Barcelona, 08034,

Spain.

Email: pau.vall@ub.edu

Introduction

When do elites remain united and which processes and preconditions lead to

elite splits? Why do some regional elites remain loyal to central peers while

other regional elites prefer confrontation through the creation of a new po-

litical party? Classical accounts have focused on modernization processes and

the existence of cultural or linguistic characteristics to explain political di-

visions (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). From this perspective, political (and elite)

divisions have usually been taken for granted as an inescapable consequence

of social and economic preconditions. However, the cleavage theory is not

able to explain when and why certain elites decide to support an elite split.

In this paper, I propose a theoretical framework describing under which

conditions regional elites break away from central elites by creating a new

regional political party. As such, I answer a classical Rokkanian question

(Rokkan, 1970) employing a novel historical trade shock approach that allows

to test the mechanisms driving elite splits. Through this approach, I show the

micro-level mechanisms behind the political division of elites.

1

Elite divisions and competition are essential to understand the conf‌igu-

ration of political institutions and party systems, and divisions generate long-

lasting consequences (e.g., Ansell & Samuels, 2014;Beramendi et al., 2019).

Hence, it is important to dig deeper to better understand the conditions under

which certain regional elites choose to break away from central elites. This

paper contributes to the literature by clarifying the factors that lead to elite

divisions. My main claim is that elites split along (and politicize) a political

cleavage when they suffer economic grievances, and they have the capacity to

mobilize likely supporters. If both conditions are met, we can expect an elite

division to take place. Grievances can foster popular demand for an auton-

omous political party, and through appealing to these grievances party elites

who control mobilization tools can maximize electoral support. Thus, mo-

bilization capabilities are not only relevant to understand democratization

(Ziblatt, 2017), but also to understand the origins of elite divisions.

This article focuses on the origins of elite splits along the center-periphery

conf‌lict dimension. The rise of center-periphery cleavages has been thor-

oughly explored by Rokkan and Urwin (1982), who considered their

emergence a consequence, on the one hand, of divergent economic devel-

opment and, on the other hand, of distinct identities. It is undeniable that

economic geography and economic asymmetries lead to political differences

and territorial tensions (Rickard, 2020) and drive decentralization demands

and even secessionism (Sorens, 2012). The materialization of center-

periphery elite splits does not automatically occur in contexts with diverg-

ing economic conditions or identities, but are related to grievances (Mor,

2022). Regional elites in territories that would later herald their difference,

194 Comparative Political Studies 56(2)

usually stood together with central elites during initial steps of economic

divergence.

To better understand the timing of political decisions, recent literature has

focused on trade shocks as plausibly exogenous factors inf‌luencing political

dynamics (Colantone & Stanig, 2018). A sudden—and geographically

uneven—change in economic conditions produces different patterns of po-

litical behavior among voters, but also among elites, and it can pave the way

for the rise of new political actors (Rodrik, 2018). However, without the

capacity to mobilize large segments of the electorate, economic grievances

might not suff‌ice to explain the emergence of a center-periphery cleavage.

Political mobilization is a key factor that determines the rise of new parties

(Kalyvas, 1996;Boix, 2009) and political entrepreneurs ponder all available

possibilities before engaging in party formation (Tavits, 2008).

I test under what conditions center-periphery elite divisions materialize

focusing on the case of Catalonia. During the 19th century, Catalonia was the

most industrialized region in a mostly rural Spain (Nadal et al., 1988), and it

was, in addition, a region with a distinct language and a past record of self-

governing institutions. The preconditions for the emergence of a center-

periphery cleavage were already in place in the 19th century, why then did

Catalan elites remain politically aligned with Spanish elites until the early 20th

century?

Catalonia is a suitable case to explore the origins of elite divisions because

of its internal heterogeneity in the extent and the types of industrialization

(Carreras, 2019). The leading textile sector grew extensively during the 19th

century and the availability of a Spanish colonial market contributed deci-

sively to this development. The loss of the oversea colonial territories in 1898

was a traumatic critical juncture that compelled Spanish elites to rethink the

international role of Spain as well as its political institutions ( ´

Alvarez Junco,

2002). Moreover, the colonial defeat had large economic repercussions

(Maluquer de Motes, 1999) and it represented an important economic shock to

the Catalan economy and its industrial elites. The colonial shock was not only

exogenous, but its impact was also heterogeneous across regions and in-

dustrial sectors across Catalonia (Harrison, 1974). Moreover, while Catalan

identity was being revived by an intellectual intelligentsia in some areas, this

revival effort was less prevalent in other areas.

In this paper, I employ a novel dataset that combines data on electoral

returns, industrialization, exports, mobilization tools, and other socioeco-

nomic indicators. My dependent variable captures whether regional elite

candidates stood for off‌ice at the constituency level. To account for economic

grievances, I measure constituencies’exposure to the colonial trade shock

using an indicator similar to the shift-share instrument developed by Autor

et al. (2013). I proxy political mobilization capabilities of regional elites

Vall-Prat 195