Economic Evaluations, Procedural Fairness, and Satisfaction with Democracy

AuthorPedro C. Magalhães
Published date01 September 2016
Date01 September 2016
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916652238
Subject MatterArticles
/tmp/tmp-18Hk9U4aPbsKe5/input 652238PRQXXX10.1177/1065912916652238Political Research QuarterlyMagalhães
research-article2016
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2016, Vol. 69(3) 522 –534
Economic Evaluations, Procedural
© 2016 University of Utah
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Fairness, and Satisfaction with
DOI: 10.1177/1065912916652238
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Democracy
Pedro C. Magalhães1
Abstract
Although public support for political authorities, institutions, and even regimes is affected by the delivery of positive
economic outcomes, we know that judgments on authorities are also made on the basis of several other aspects
that fall into the general theme of “procedural fairness.” So far, most of the literature examining satisfaction with
democracy has, from this point of view, focused on the direct effects of both economic and procedural fairness
indicators or evaluations. This study takes as its starting point a large number of studies in social psychology showing
that procedural fairness moderates the effects of outcome favorability in the explanation of citizens’ reactions to
authorities. It expands those findings to the macro-political level, using representative samples of European populations
in twenty-nine countries. It reveals that the general depiction of satisfaction with the way democracies work in
practice as a fundamentally “performance-driven attitude” needs to qualified: economic evaluations matter, but they
do not matter in the same way in all contexts and for all people, with procedural fairness playing a relevant moderating
role in this respect.
Keywords
procedural fairness, satisfaction with democracy, political support, economic evaluations
Introduction
more salient issue for people as they evaluate their
democracies than in more affluent societies (Lühiste
We know that political support is largely driven by the
2014; Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010). A second
ability of authorities to deliver favorable outcomes. Take,
aspect to consider is related to how institutions affect the
for example, people’s “satisfaction with the way democ-
“clarity of responsibility” (Powell and Whitten 1993) for
racy works” in their country, one of the most frequently
economic outcomes. Political support should be most
used indicators of political support in cross-national sur-
strongly driven by economic performance in those sys-
veys, tapping “the level of support for how the demo-
tems where political power is more concentrated in fewer
cratic regime works in practice” (Linde and Ekman
hands, leading people to more clearly assign responsibil-
2003). Clearly, when the aggregate economy falters, or at
ity for outcomes (Criado and Herreros 2007). In this
least for those individuals who perceive it to be faltering,
paper, we focus on a third potential mechanism behind
“satisfaction with democracy” also suffers (Clarke, Dutt,
the variability in the strength of the relationship between
and Kornberg 1993; Klingemann 1999). The recent eco-
economic outcomes and satisfaction with democratic per-
nomic crisis in Europe and the decline in levels of satis-
formance: the role of procedural fairness.
faction with regime performance it brought to the most
Procedural fairness is not a new idea in the study of
affected countries (Alonso 2013) are a reminder that eco-
political support, far from it. Socio-psychological theories
nomic evaluations have “a strong and highly significant
of justice have long told us that authorities, above and
effect . . . on support for national democracy,” emerging,
beyond their ability to deliver favorable outcomes, are also
in some studies, as its strongest individual-level predictor
evaluated by the latter on the basis of the perceived fairness
(Armingeon and Guthmann 2014, 439).
However, there are reasons to believe that such effect
1University of Lisbon, Portugal
of economic evaluations should not be the same in all
contexts and for all people. A first aspect to consider is
Corresponding Author:
Pedro C. Magalhães, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon,
related to the material conditions that prevail in each soci-
Av. Professor Aníbal de Bettencourt, 9 1600-189 Lisbon, Portugal.
ety. In poorer countries, the economy is likely to be a
Email: pedro.magalhaes@ics.ul.pt

Magalhães
523
of decision-making procedures (Lind and Tyler 1988;
support”—directed to “the perceived decisions, policies,
Thibaut and Walker 1975). And we know that such findings
actions, utterances or the general style of . . . authorities”
seem to apply not only to the study of workplaces, schools,
(Easton 1975, 437)—and “diffuse support”—“evaluations
or courts, but also to political institutions and even regimes,
of what an object is or represents . . ., the general meaning
as social psychologists (Tyler 1984) and political scientists
it has for a person” (Easton 1975, 445). From this point of
have been reminding us for some time (Rose, Mishler, and
view, “satisfaction with democracy” taps a dimension of
Haerpfer 1998). What has been less remarked, however, is
support that does not concern aspects such as the funda-
the possibility that the influence of both economic evalua-
mental allegiance to a political community or to regime
tions and procedural fairness on popular views about demo-
principles. However, it does not seem to be so short-term
cratic performance is not merely additive; it should also be
or narrowly focused as support for particular political
seen as interactive. In other words, the extent to which indi-
institutions, parties, or actors (Dalton 2004; Norris
viduals evaluate the performance of their democracies on
1999).1 Instead, although potentially “contaminated” by
the basis of economic outcomes may also depend on the
whether individuals are “winners” or “losers” in the elec-
extent to which they perceive the regime to adhere to fun-
toral process, “satisfaction with democracy” taps a spe-
damentally fair decision-making procedures. The notion
cific and relevant dimension of political support: “the
that outcomes should matter more in the absence of fair
level of support for the way the democratic regime works
procedures is grounded on several different theoretical
in practice” (Linde and Ekman 2003).
perspectives in social psychology, and has been exhaus-
In the study of this dimension of political support, a
tively tested in both observational and experimental stud-
central idea that has taken hold is that citizens’ satisfac-
ies (see Brockner 2002; Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996,
tion with the way democracies work is strongly affected
2005). However, as far as we know, such hypothesis has
by their perception of the favorability of economic out-
never been tested in the macro-context of political regimes
comes. This finding has been replicated in many survey-
using large-scale cross-national surveys with representa-
based studies until today, resisting exhaustive batteries of
tive samples of whole populations. That is precisely the
statistical controls and testing in many different regions
objective of this study.
of the world (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014; Bratton,
In the next section, we develop the main theoretical
Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Chu et al. 2008;
arguments. Data from Round 6 of the European Social
Gunther, Montero, and Torcal 2007; Lagos 2003).2 In
Survey (ESS) are used to test them. Applied to twenty-nine
fact, it has been used to stress the fundamental message
European countries in 2012 and 2013, ESS Round 6 pro-
that, in the study of political support, satisfaction with
vides a rather unique opportunity for this purpose. It
democracy should be seen as a “performance driven-atti-
includes not only conventional measures of subjective per-
tude” (Mattes and Bratton 2007, 201; see also Bratton
ceptions of the economy and other potentially relevant cor-
and Mattes 2001; Gunther, Montero, and Torcal 2007;
relates of satisfaction with democracy, but also a specific
Huang, Chang, and Chu 2008).
rotating module on the meaning and evaluation of
However, economic evaluations do not seem to have
“Democracy,” where individuals rated the importance
the same relationship with regime support in all contexts
given to a number of different “democratic attributes” and
and for all people. Rohrschneider and Loveless (2010),
evaluated the extent to which they apply to their own polit-
studying popular levels of satisfaction with the perfor-
ical system. Although this ESS module was not designed
mance of “European democracy,” show that “economic
with this particular purpose in mind, several items do pro-
evaluations are less relevant in nations with high national
vide direct or indirect measures of aspects in the relation-
affluence” (Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010, 1038).
ship between individuals and authorities that are known to
They attribute this to the working of a “macro salience”
determine perceptions of procedural fairness: neutrality,
model, through which economic considerations become
standing, and trust. Using this dataset, this study employs
more relevant for individuals living in contexts where
multilevel modeling to determine whether, in the explana-
material conditions are worse. Similarly, Lühiste (2014)
tion of satisfaction with democracy, an interaction between
finds “an interaction between economic affluence at the
outcome favorability and procedural fairness does emerge.
national...

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