Economic Development Strategies and Communal Violence in Africa

• Author: John F. McCauley
• Published date: 01 February 2013
• Date: 01 February 2013
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012453034
• Subject Matter: Articles

Comparative Political Studies

46(2) 182 –211

© The Author(s) 2013

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DOI: 10.1177/0010414012453034

http://cps.sagepub.com

453034CPS46210.1177/00104140124530

34McCauleyComparative Political Studies

© The Author(s) 2013

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1University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA

Corresponding Author:

John F. McCauley, Department of Government & Politics, University of Maryland, 3140 Tydings

Hall, College Park, MD 20742, USA

Email: mccauley@umd.edu

Economic Development

Strategies and

Communal Violence

in Africa: The Cases of

Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana

John F. McCauley1

Abstract

This article explores the relationship between economic development strat-

egies and conflict outcomes in Africa, using a comparison of Côte d’Ivoire

and Ghana. Findings suggest that development strategies that create con-

testation for resources along identity group lines, absent provisions for co-

opting disenfranchised groups, increase the likelihood of communal violence,

whereas development plans that transcend ascriptive social identities bear

the greatest chance of generating long-term peace, irrespective of their

short-term economic success. The author complements the comparative

case study with evidence of intracase variation in Ghana and with original

micro-level data collected in 2009.

Keywords

economic development, conflict, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, ascriptive identity,

overlapping cleavages

Communal violence is often rooted in contests over scarce resources, but the

underlying mechanisms remain debated. One perspective suggests that the

McCauley 183

instrumental interests of group members can make violence a worthwhile

endeavor (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). A second perspective holds that dis-

putes over resources are a function of social and demographic patterns that

create polarization (Montalvo & Reynal-Queral, 2005) or dominance

(Cederman & Girardin, 2007). Undertheorized in that debate, however, is

the role that political choice plays in shaping access to those resources and

opportunities, thereby affecting patterns of contestation that can persist over

a long time frame.

The goal of this article is to evaluate the impact of one important political

choice—early economic development strategies—on long-term prospects for

peace and conflict in Africa. How might the choices that African political

leaders make to promote growth foster peace or increase the likelihood of

conflict much later? The findings, in keeping with a literature on overlapping

cleavages and horizontal inequalities (Stewart, 2008), suggest that economic

development strategies that generate resource contestation along social iden-

tity lines can create a foundation for conflict and communal violence, whereas

development plans that transcend ascriptive social identities bode well for

long-term peace.

This article focuses on Africa for three reasons. First, most states in sub-

Saharan Africa gained independence during approximately the same time

period, around 1960, allowing for a neat comparison of cases with 50 years

of postindependence hindsight. That time frame is long enough to evaluate

persistent social patterns but also short enough and with a stark enough ori-

gin to evaluate the impact of economic development policies as distinct

from significant historical differences. Second, national economic develop-

ment strategies were central to the identity of independent African states.

Reginald Green, writing in 1965, noted that “African states—even those

with distinctly conservative governments—see national social and economic

planning as a logical historical development from the national independence

effort, now to be channeled into the rapid improvement of standards of life”

(Green, 1965, p. 249). Thus, not only is the time frame suitable, but the

implementation of clear economic development policies also makes African

states an appropriate unit of analysis for this study. Finally, nearly half of

African states have experienced communal conflict since 1990 (Marshall,

2005), suggesting both urgency in understanding the roots of that violence

and also ample variation in outcomes.

Undoubtedly, myriad intervening factors can affect social and political rela-

tions over a 50-year period. The argument developed in this article is not that

early economic development strategy represents the primary explanation for

variation in peace and conflict since proximate political factors better explain