Drug‐related violence and the decline in the number of Mexican cross‐border workers

• Author: Pedro P. Orraca‐Romano,Eunice D. Vargas‐Valle
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12649
• Date: 01 May 2020
• Published date: 01 May 2020

Rev Dev Econ. 2020;24:485–502. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/rode

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INTRODUCTION

From 2007 to 2012, the annual homicide and drug-related homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in

Mexico increased by 192.8% and 439.6%, respectively. During this period 121,613 homicides and

66,217 drug-related homicides were committed in the country.1

Victims of these homicides included

civilians, public officials, and criminals alike. Increases in violence were particularly evident in north-

ern Mexico, which accounted for most of the country’s drug-related homicides.

The increase in violent crime has proved very costly to Mexico. It negatively affected economic

activity (Enamorado, López-Calva & Rodríguez-Castelán, 2014; Fullerton & Walke, 2014); reduced

Received: 9 July 2018

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Revised: 6 January 2020

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Accepted: 13 January 2020

DOI: 10.1111/rode.12649

REGULAR ARTICLE

Drug-related violence and the decline in the number

of Mexican cross-border workers

Pedro P.Orraca-Romano1

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Eunice D.Vargas-Valle2

1Department of Economic Studies, El

Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Tijuana,

Mexico

2Department of Population Studies, El

Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Tijuana,

Mexico

Correspondence

Pedro P. Orraca-Romano, El Colegio de la

Frontera Norte, Carretera Escénica Tijuana

Ensenada Km. 18.5, San Antonio del Mar

22560, Tijuana, Baja California, México.

Email: porraca@colef.mx

Abstract

This study examines how variations in homicide rates in

Mexico are associated with the likelihood of participating

in cross-border work, that is, living in Mexico but working

in the U.S. Based on Mexican census data from 2000, 2010,

and 2015, and information on homicides, a series of ordinary

least squares models are estimated to analyze the relation-

ship between cross-border commuting and homicide rates at

the individual level. Fixed effects models are also estimated

to study this relationship at the municipal level. The re-

sults show that from 2000 to 2010 the increase in homicide

rates in northern border municipalities in Mexico reduced

the likelihood of being a cross-border worker, while from

2010 to 2015 the decrease in the homicide rate increased the

probability that workers engage in cross-border work. The

decline in the number of cross-border workers is likely in

part a result of the escalation in drug-related violence that

may have led them to change their country of residence.

KEYWORDS

cross-border workers, Mexico, migration, United States, violence

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ORRACA-ROMANO and VaRGaS-VaLLE

human capital investments among young adults (Brown & Velásquez, 2017) and cognitive abil-

ity among children (Nasir, 2016); worsened the educational outcomes of primary school students

(Caudillo & Torche, 2014); deteriorated the overall health and well-being of children and adults by

reducing birth weight (Brown, 2018) and life expectancy (Canudas-Romo et al., 2017) and by gener-

ating significant psychological stress (Michaelsen & Salardi, 2020); and displaced large segments of

the population (Arceo-Gómez, 2013; Rios, 2014; Orozco-Aleman & Gonzalez-Lozano, 2018), who

oftentimes sacrificed economic opportunities in the process (Atuesta & Paredes, 2015).

Within the literature that examines economic and social dynamics at the U.S.-Mexico borderlands,

a series of studies have focused on cross-border workers or commuters, that is, workers who live in

Mexico but are employed in the U.S. (Alegría, 2002; Orraca, 2015; Chávez, 2016; Vargas & Coubès,

2017). Like intra-urban commuters, cross-border workers travel to work each day; however, their

journey to work includes the crossing of an international boundary line, which separates them from

ordinary urban commuters (Herzog, 1990). Furthermore, unlike international migrants, cross-border

commuters do not change their country of residence and thus do not incur in the costs usually asso-

ciated with international migration. Instead, they leave Mexico only for a short period to go to work

in the U.S., and normally, after their workday ends, they once again commute back home to Mexico.2

The escalation in the levels of drug-related violence in Mexico during the late 2000s coincided

with a significant decline in the number of cross-border workers who lived in municipalities located

along the country’s northern border with the U.S. Specifically, in 2000, the number of cross-border

commuters stood at 72,219, a figure that by 2010 had decreased to 54,698. In subsequent years, when

violence levels diminished, the number of cross-border workers once again increased and in 2015

equaled 58,658.

Even though economic incentives to participate in the U.S. labor market while living in Mexico are

high, given that real-wage gaps between Mexico and the U.S. have widened since the introduction of

NAFTA in 1994, the number of cross-border workers declined after 2001, partly because of height-

ened security at the border and harsher anti-migration laws.

An interesting question is whether the increase in violent crime—and not only the economic conse-

quences of the Great Recession—also contributed to their decline. While some cross-border workers

may have changed their country of work, others may have changed their country of residence.

Although previous evidence has shown that homicide rates in municipalities in Mexico’s border

are positively associated with migration to southern states in the U.S. and the growth of small busi-

nesses in that region (Arceo-Gómez, 2013)—as further explained in Section 4—the cross-sectional

nature of the data used in this study does not permit examining individual-level transitions between

the Mexico and U.S. labor markets. Instead, it is observed for the different periods only if the re-

spondent is a cross-border worker or if he or she lives and works in Mexico, as well as the share of

cross-border workers in Mexico.

The present study contributes to the literature on cross-border work and violence, by using homi-

cides as an indicator of violence and the country of work as an indicator of cross-border commuting,

and examining whether homicide rates at the municipality of residence are related to the likelihood of

living in Mexico and working in the U.S. and to the proportion of workers in each municipality who

are cross-border commuters. It is hypothesized that a surge in homicides is associated with a decrease

in the number of Mexican-born cross-border workers. Even though existing data do not allow us to

know the reasons behind their decline, possible explanations are discussed.

This study contributes to the literature on two fronts. First, to the best of our knowledge, no studies

examine the relationship between violence in the country of residence and cross-border commuting.

Second, this is the first study since Alegría (2002) that analyzes the factors associated with participat-

ing in cross-border work in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. This is particularly relevant since Alegría