Drinking-and-Driving in America: A Test of Behavioral Assumptions Underlying Public Policy

• Author: Lilliard E. Richardson,David J. Houston
• Date: 01 March 2004
• Published date: 01 March 2004
• DOI: 10.1177/106591290405700105
• Subject Matter: Articles

While the present political environment has grown

less supportive of economic regulation or poli-

cies that distribute economic wealth, policies

regulating individual behavior still abound. Whether to pro-

mote public health or social order, public policies designed

to discourage undesired individual behavior frequently

frame such behavior as “sinful.” Research on morality poli-

cies and the politics that surround them has focused on

such issues as the death penalty (Mooney and Lee 1999),

alcohol and illegal drug use (Meier 1994), and cigarettes

(Meier and Licari 1997a).

Two questions are at the core of research on morality

policy. First, what types of policies are likely to be adopted

to discourage sinful behavior? Second, are these policies

effective at modifying undesired behavior? The work of

Schneider and Ingram (1990, 1993), as well as Meier

(1999), provides a conceptual foundation to guide research

addressing these questions. For instance, Schneider and

Ingram (1993) argue that socially construct ing those

engaged in undesired behavior as “deviants” is likely to

result in the adoption of punitive tools that employ sanc-

tions. Similarly, Meier (1999) contends that morality politics

likely lead to coercive tools that impose increased costs on

sin through law enforcement. Furthermore, he concludes

that these anti-sin policies are likely to fail because the

behavioral assumptions they are built on are inappropriate

for the primary target of these policies—the frequent sinner.

We consider policies aimed at reducing the incidence of

drinking-and-driving as another example of morality policy.

First, we consider the social construction of the drink-driver

t a rget group and how it is an example of morality politics.

Second, we examine the assumptions of deterrence theory that

underlie the punitive tools frequently adopted to discourage

drink-driving and suggest an alternative set of behavioral

assumptions to guide policy. Third, using data from a national

s u rvey of 4,008 individuals that focused on attitudes and

behaviors related to drinking-and-driving we examine the

assumptions of deterrent policies as they relate to non-drink-

drivers, occasional drink-drivers, and frequent drink-drivers.

This individual-level analysis is useful for understanding the

e ffectiveness of punitive tools because these policies are

designed to modify behavior by increasing individual perc e p-

tions of costs associated with drinking-and-driving.

EFFORTS TO DETER THE DRINKING DRIVER

It is estimated that the involvement of alcohol accounted

for more than 300,000 injuries and nearly 16,000 fatalities

(or 38 percent of all fatalities) in 1996 alone (Royal 2000)

and that alcohol is the single largest contributing factor in

fatal crashes (Evans 1991). Over the last few decades, states

have increased legislative efforts to address the problem of

drinking-and-driving and its tragic consequences, and they

have employed numerous policy tools to reduce this risky

behavior. These tools have included education campaigns,

designated driver programs, and increased rehabilitation

efforts, but most of the attention has been on the increased

use of sanctions, such as license revocation, mandatory jail

time, and mandatory minimum fines. The politics sur-

rounding drinking-and-driving explain the increased use of

punitive policies instead of preventive measures.

In policy debates, drinking drivers typically are por-

trayed as social deviants. The focus is on the individual not

the societal conditions that may contribute to the behavior.

It is a fight against “drunk driving,” not “drinking-and-driv-

ing.” Drinking drivers are portrayed as the “killer-drunk”

who is morally flawed and has committed more than an

ordinary traffic offense (Gusfield 1981; Homel 1988). They

are repeat-offenders who engage in sinful behavior that

poses a threat to us all, not upstanding individuals who

happen to make a bad decision. These individuals are

53

Drinking-and-Driving in America:

A Test of Behavioral Assumptions Underlying Public Policy

DAVID J. HOUSTON, UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, KNOXVILLE

LILLIARD E. RICHARDSON, JR., UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, COLUMBIA

Since the 1980s, states have increasingly used sanctions to deter people from drinking-and-driving, but the

effectiveness of these policies is questionable. The use of sanctions as policy tools rests on deterrence theory,

but little is known about the appropriateness of its behavioral assumptions for the group targeted by policy—

the drinking-driver. Employing a national survey of 4,008 respondents, we use logistic regression analysis to

examine perceptions of punishment costs, the importance of individual versus societal costs, and policy pref-

erences related to drink-driving. It was found that the perceptions of the punishment costs of drinking-and-

driving are not consistent with basic hypotheses of deterrence theory. The results suggest that policies based

on deterrence theory are likely to be least effective for the main target of these policies (frequent drink-driv-

ers) and are likely to be unnecessary for non-drink-drivers. An alternative set of behavioral assumptions is pro-

vided that more closely fit the results obtained.

Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 1 (March 2004): pp. 53-64