Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity and the Demand for Advocacy

• Date: 01 March 2005
• Author: Timothy M. La Pira,Beth L. Leech,Nicholas A. Semanko,Frank R. Baumgartner
• DOI: 10.1177/106591290505800102
• Published date: 01 March 2005
• Subject Matter: Articles

PRQ_March05_I 3/24/05 9:15 AM Page 19
Drawing Lobbyists to Washington:
Government Activity and the Demand for Advocacy
BETH L. LEECH, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
TIMOTHY M. LA PIRA, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY
NICHOLAS A. SEMANKO, BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Using an agenda-setting approach, we show the interaction between the growth of groups and the growth of
government. A pooled time-series analysis of more than 45,000 lobby registration reports from 1996 to 2000
and measures of government activity from the Policy Agendas Project indicates that groups become active in
Washington, D.C., in large part because of pre-existing levels of government activity in the issue-areas that con-
cern them. The growth in the range and number of activities of government has created incentives for organ-
izations of all kinds to mobilize, whether they are supporters or opponents of new government programs. We
find that levels of government attention in an issue-area explain the level of interest-group lobbying more con-
sistently than does government spending or the number of business firms in that area. We conclude with a dis-
cussion of the need for theories of group mobilization to include attention to the demand-creating actions of
government itself.
The growth and proliferation of interest groups in the protect (e.g., Campbell 2003). Whether they are supporters
United States has long been considered a major cause
or opponents of new government programs, groups clearly
of growth in the size and scope of the U.S. govern-
co-evolve with government in a dynamic progression that
ment. Scholars taking a historical approach have linked the
leads each to affect the other.
rise of social movements in the Progressive Era to govern-
Within this reciprocal process, a puzzle remains. How
ment expansion (Tichenor and Harris 2002/2003), while
and why do certain issues and certain issue-areas become the
across the discipline, public choice theorists have pointed to
focus of interest-group attention and lobbying? Baumgartner
rent-seeking by interest groups as a driving force behind
and Leech (2001) have shown that among interest groups in
government regulation and spending (e.g., Buchanan and
Washington, the majority of the lobbying is focused on a
Tullock 1962). The myriad social movements over the past
small fraction of the issues. What causes that mobilization?
four decades have led to new programs affecting women,
The exigencies of collective action suggest that it is unlikely
minorities, consumers, and the environment, while profes-
that groups could be driving this process alone, but that in
sional communities have successfully convinced govern-
fact growth in the interest-group population must depend on
ment to get more involved in health care, education, trans-
the growth of government itself. Although interest-group
portation, and other areas. Groups are, or should be, central
entrepreneurs may be instrumental in suggesting new policy
to any explanation of the growth of government. The
alternatives, in most cases government actors must act on
reverse is also true. Groups have mobilized in Washington
those suggestions if the lobbying community in that policy
in response to the growth of activities of government. As
domain is to grow beyond a select few.
government has grown more active in a greater range of
In this article we provide detailed evidence to document
areas of public policy, organized interests have followed.
this close relationship between government activity and
Government can provide the incentive for new groups to
interest-group communities, and we work to further specify
arise and for existing groups to mobilize around a particu-
the relationship.1 The theory we develop draws on ideas
lar set of issues. Governmental patrons have provided start-
from theories of collective action, social movement mobi-
up funds for new groups (Walker 1983, 1991; Smith and
lization, and population ecology. Our focus is the role of the
Lipsky 1993, Cigler and Nownes 1995), while governmen-
political environment—and in particular, government
tal programs have provided something worth organizing to
1 Since this article was first drafted, two of us in other work have
NOTE: We would like to thank Jeff Berry, Marie Hojnacki, Bryan Jones,
approached this question by tracing the growth of the group system over
David Kimball, David Lowery, and Christine Mahoney for their
long periods of time and relating that to the growth of government
comments on various versions of this article. The analysis pre-
(Baumgartner, Leech, and Mahoney 2003). To date, few have studied the
sented here was made possible through work from many of our
interrelations between group and government growth, though Gray and
previous projects, and we gratefully acknowledge the support of
Lowery have begun to pay serious attention to this issue (see Lowery et
National Science Foundation grants SBR-0111224, SBR-011161,
al. 2004, Gray et al. forthcoming). They find a significant relation
SBR-9905195, and SBR-9631232, as well as a grant from the Rut-
between the number of groups mobilized to lobby state governments
gers Research Council.
and the level of activity of the state governments in a range of issue-areas.
In sum, an emerging body of literature is beginning to address these
Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 1 (March 2005): pp. 19-30
questions, but the literature is in its infancy.
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POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY
attention or lack thereof—in encouraging or discouraging
It is at the intersection of public policy and the wants and
interest group mobilization. We predict that levels of lobby-
values of private actors that we discover interests. What
ing will increase as government activity increases, but we
we call the interests of the groups are not simply valued
expect these processes to be issue-specific. Certainly there
conditions or goals, such as material riches, moral well-
are aggregate effects as well, and we will discuss some of
being, or symbolic satisfaction. It is only as these are
these in our conclusions, but our main focus is on a com-
affected, potentially or in fact, by public policy, by the
parison across different issue-areas. Government involve-
actions of authoritative public officials, that the valued
ment in regulation of transportation should not be expected
ends are transformed into political interests that can be
to increase lobbying on trade policy; and proposals to end
sought or opposed by interest groups.
tariffs on textiles should not be expected to raise the level of
lobbying on welfare policy. In essence, a governmental deci-
If “interests” are created by the actions of government, then
sion to become involved in an issue area sets the agenda for
interest-group mobilization must be affected as well. As
existing and potential organized interests, who are thus
government becomes more active in a particular area, so too
encouraged to come to the capital to defend their interests
will the interest groups that correspond to that area. That is,
and advocate particular solutions to perceived problems.
we should expect government activity to affect lobbying
This, essentially, is the demand side of why interest groups
activity. If it does not—or if it does so for some types of
become active in particular areas of public policy.
interests but not for others—then representation is threat-
ened. For this reason, studying populations of interest
GROUPS, INTERESTS, AND MOBILIZATION
groups and their policy context is equally as important as
studying individual groups and their resources.
While internal characteristics of organizations are clearly
Gray and Lowery (1996) explicitly focus attention on
important factors in mobilization (e.g., Olson 1971), an
these processes by adopting the ESA—energy, stability,
emerging consensus within the study of political behavior at
area—theory from population ecology. They argue that the
many levels encourages us to look at the interaction between
number of interest groups in a population will depend not
those internal characteristics and the external political con-
only on the number of potential members and other
text in which individuals and organizations find themselves.
resources organizations have (the area), but also on the
Huckfeldt and Sprague (1987) pioneered the inclusion of
interests created by potential government goods, services,
community as a variable in voting behavior studies. The
and regulations (the energy). This energy term corresponds
social movement literature has turned its attention away
closely with the concept of political environment or politi-
from grievances and resources and toward such issues as
cal context that we use in this study.
political opportunities and framing structures (McAdam,
Most studies of collective action have focused on the initial
McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Gray and Lowery’s (1996) popu-
formation of groups, but the problems of mobilization do not
lation ecology approach to interest-group populations
end after an organization is formed. No organization has
shifted the focus to the energy, stability, and area within an
unlimited resources, and no organization wants to expend
interest-group environment, while a series of scholars has
effort on a hopeless cause. Thousands of bills are introduced
begun considering the issue context in which particular
each year, yet only a handful become the...