Dostoyevsky and the Defense of Compassion

• Author: Max Lykins
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/10659129211046579
• Published date: 01 December 2022
• Date: 01 December 2022

Article

PoliticalResearchQuarterly

2022,Vol.75(4)1131–1142

©TheAuthor(s)2021

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DOI:10.1177/10659129211046579

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DostoyevskyandtheDefenseof

Compassion

MaxLykins

1



Abstract

Iscrueltyaproblemforpolitics?ForHannahArendt,theanswerwasno.Onherview,acompassionateresponse

towardspersonssufferingcrueltyisbestavoidedbecausecompassioncanonlybecomepoliticalbytransformingin-

communicableindividualpainintoabstractsuffering.AtcrucialmomentsinherargumentinOnRevolution,shecitesthe

greatRussiannovelistFyodorDostoyevskyasanally.However,IarguethatArendtmisrepresentsDostoyevsky.

Throughacriticalexaminationofhismaturenovels,Ishowhowsufferingiscommunicableandcompassionispoliticalfor

Dostoyevsky.Byattendingtothisthemeinhiswritings,IarguethatDostoyevskyshedslightontheproblemofcrueltyin

awaythatArendt’sframeworkcannot.ThissuggeststhatheismoreathomewiththeoristslikeJudithShklarwho“put

crueltyfirst”thanwithArendt,althoughinfavoringcompassionIarguethathedepartsfromShklar’sliberalismoffear

andoffersamoreconstructive,hopefulpoliticalvision.

Keywords

cruelty,compassion,Dostoyevsky,Arendt

Introduction

Iscrueltyaproblemforpolitics?Ifso,howshouldwe

reacttoit?ThepoliticaltheoristJudithShklarfamously

arguedthatcrueltywasapoliticalproblem,andthatits

ubiquityinthehumanexperiencejustifiedliberalism.Her

“liberalismoffear”isgroundedinawarinessforthe

potentialofstateagentstoinflictcrueltyoncitizens,

especiallymarginalizedpopulations(Shklar1984,1–10).

OnShklar’sview,crueltyisanomnipresenthumanex-

periencewhoseimmediacycutsacrosscultural,linguistic,

andgeographicboundaries.

1

Thefearofsufferingneeds

nojustificationorextendedreflection,allowingliberalsto

avoidrelativism,imperialism,anddisputedpositiveas-

sumptionsofthegood.

Thereisalongtraditionofclaimingthatsufferingis

inherentlyrepulsivetohumans.AdamSmithnotesthat

humanshaveanaturalfeltaversiontoseeingsuffering

(1,85–86).TheRomanhistorianTacitusobservesthat

“duringtimesofmisfortunethereissoftnessinthehuman

soul”(Tacitus2008,4.68).TheGreekhistorianPolybius’s

observationsofOlympicboxingledhimtopositthatthere

isanaturalhumaninclinationtowardtheunderdog

(Polybius1962,27.9).

2

Theseclaimspresupposethatsufferingiscommuni-

cable.Thatis,sufferingpersonscangiveanaccountof

theirpainandobserverscanrecognizesufferingandreact

accordingly.Shklararguesthatsufferingpromptsfear,

wheretheotherssuggest,slightlydifferently,thatit

promptscompassionorsympathy.Eitherway,suffering

anditsattendantemotions

3

arepoliticallysalientbecause

itispossibletocommunicateaboutthem.Ifthisistrue,

thencrueltyisapoliticalproblem:bydeliberatelycon-

traveninganatural,other-regardingimpulse,crueltyde-

stroyscommunityandthepossibilityofpolitics.

Compassion—theaversiontoanindividual’ssuffering

andtheefforttorelieveit—is,therefore,alsopolitically

relevant,andevennecessaryformaintainingcommunity.

However,ifsufferingisentirelyprivate,thenitcannot

bepoliticalandthereisnoneedorobligationtoreacttoit

specifically.ThisisHannahArendt’sposition,aslaidout

inTheHumanCondition:

…themostintensefeelingweknowof…theexperienceof

greatbodilypain,isatthesametimethemostprivateand

1

UniversityofMichigan,AnnArbor,MI,USA

CorrespondingAuthor:

MaxLykins,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,UniversityofMichigan,

5700HavenHall,AnnArborMI,48109,USA.

Email:lykins@umich.edu