Domestic sources of Uzbekistan's foreign policy, 1991 to the present.

• Author: Kazemi, Leila
• Position: The Andrew Wellington Cordier Essay

While Karimov's policies have appealed to recent U.S. administrations, the recognition that Uzbekistan's stability is merely an illusion may jeopardize U.S.-Uzbek relations in the future.

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While systemic theories often serve as the starting point for examining interstate relations, the orientation and practice of Uzbekistan's foreign policy since the nation achieved independence in 1991 highlight the importance of sub-systemic factors in explaining these relations. In fact, forces at the domestic level have profoundly impacted the development of Uzbek foreign policy over the last decade. An examination of Islam Karimov's three-pillar approach to handling the state-building enterprise and the political, economic and social transitions accompanying independence demonstrate the role of domestic forces. (1) Karimov's pursuit of sovereignty, domestic political stability and economic reform have provided the basis for a wide and shifting set of cooperative and conflictual relationships with the outside world. These relationships cannot be readily explained by traditional systems-level theories of international relations.

This article will explore and analyze each of the three pillars of Karimov's approach and provide examples of the foreign policy orientations and specific outcomes these have generated. It will be shown that domestic factors are central to understanding Uzbekistan's foreign policy, especially the variations and seeming contradictions among its policies. For example, while the pursuit of sovereignty is often associated with Uzbekistan's attempts to undertake a foreign policy of "de-linkage" from Russia and court an array of allies outside the former Soviet Union, the government's approaches to political and economic reform have necessitated the maintenance of some aspects of linkage to Russia. This has created impediments to the country's ability to pursue relations with countries not in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As noted above, the theoretical framework of this paper is based on an analysis of the domestic-level factors impacting Uzbekistan's foreign policy. While this is certainly not a novel approach to the study of international relations, it nonetheless conflicts with the hegemony of systems-level theories, particularly neorealism, in the study of international relations. As Celeste Wallander points out, evidence from the first post-Soviet decade highlights the importance of understanding domestic-level variables and "the causal impact of power, institutions, interests and ideas within states" on foreign policy, particularly in attempting to understand variation within this realm. (2) The following analysis will take up this cause and draw on empirical examples that show the utility of such an approach in explaining the forces pulling and pushing Uzbekistan's foreign policy in various directions across time, actors and issue areas.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE BIRTH OF FIVE (SOMEWHAT) INDEPENDENT STATES IN CENTRAL ASIA

"Very few states in the world have had as little advance warning prior to independence as did the five new states of Central Asia, which were effectively chucked out of the USSR" on 8 December 1991. (3) Thus, propelled reluctantly into independence, the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan found themselves in uncharted waters, lacking traditions of statehood and facing challenges of ethnic and national identification. Because their current boundaries were artificially imposed during Stalin's rule in order to make cooperation among the republics difficult (the borders actually appear to have been set in such a way as to foster tension among the republics), these states had not previously existed as independent members of the modern international state system. (4) The challenges they faced with independence broadly fell into two related categories: those associated with the process of state-building in all of the post-Soviet states, albeit to different degrees; and those emanating from the Soviet legacy in the region.

For most of the 20th century, these republics were mere components of a larger state within which they were politically, economically and administratively integrated. Upon independence, their inexperienced governments faced the daunting task of building autonomous states where none previously existed, while managing unprecedented economic, political and social transformations.

Legacies from the Soviet era were central elements of the dynamics facing the nascent states of Central Asia. All five states had been dependent on the Soviet distribution network for both goods and transfers, and thus carried the Soviet-era legacy of being economically pigeonholed as exporters of raw minerals and agricultural products rather than industrial producers. (5) As a result, Central Asia's economic development lagged behind the rest of the former Soviet Union. In addition, the energy grids and transportation networks that the new states inherited were designed to serve the larger Soviet enterprise and consequently were not conducive to autonomous control over the region's new states. Thus the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz found themselves dependent on Uzbek gas, while the entire region was dependent on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan for much-needed water supplies. A series of key transportation routes, that show little respect for national boundaries, also remain. (6)

These factors not only stymied the development of the Central Asian states on the threshold of independence, but have allied their fates (although to varying degrees), leaving them vulnerable to the problems and predilections of their neighbors within the region. Proceeding from this understanding of the historical and regional context of Uzbek independence, this article will examine developments of Uzbek policy over the last decade.

ISLAM KARIMOV AND THE THREE PILLARS GOVERNING CHANGE

At independence, all of the Central Asian presidents moved swiftly to consolidate their power and gain control over the processes of change facing their regimes. Few did so with as much success as Islam Karimov, prompting Annette Bohr to note: "President Karimov has become the driving force behind every aspect of policy formation in independent Uzbekistan." (7) The three main "pillars" underpinning his strategy to manage Uzbekistan's independence have been the establishment and protection of Uzbekistan's sovereignty, the creation of domestic political stability and a gradualist approach to economic reform aimed at insulating Uzbek society from potentially destabilizing short-term socioeconomic dislocations associated with more rapid liberalization. (8) These pillars are a reflection of the Uzbek leadership generating them and contrast with the approaches taken by other Central Asian leaders. This highlights the personal nature of politics in Central Asia and underscores the importance of examining sub-state variables to understand foreign policy in Uzbekistan.

The Pursuit of Sovereignty

Although sovereignty is not a domestic variable per se, how it is interpreted and pursued by policy makers closely ties it to domestic variables and merits brief discussion with regard to Uzbekistan. In practical terms, Karimov has interpreted the pursuit of sovereignty for Uzbekistan as a three-pronged endeavor involving emergence from the shadow of Russian influence, diversification of relations with the outside world and the establishment of strong military structures for security and defense. (9)

After independence, Karimov developed an aversion to any mechanisms designed to sustain Russian influence in Central Asia. He continues to resist Russian-led integration efforts within the CIS and maintains categorical objections to Russian attempts to design supranational structures within the CIS framework. Uzbekistan's entry into "every possible international structure that can serve as a counterweight to the CIS, including the Central Asia Community, the Economic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace and, most recently, GUAM" also reflects Karimov's efforts to limit Russian influence in the region. (10) Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, Uzbekistan has been forced to preserve ties...