Doing Politics Differently: Middle-Class Youth and Politics in Contemporary Lima

• DOI: 10.1177/0094582X19854095
• Date: 01 September 2019
• Author: Franka Winter
• Published date: 01 September 2019
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X19854095

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 228, Vol. 46 No. 5, September 2019, 73–89

DOI: 10.1177/0094582X19854095

© 2019 Latin American Perspectives

73

Doing Politics Differently

Middle-Class Youth and Politics in Contemporary Lima

by

Franka Winter

Two recent studies of the political identities, discourses, utopias, and practices of young

middle-class people in contemporary Lima indicate that, contrary to a common narrative

of “antipolitics,” they had a critical rather than a negative relationship with politics.

While they largely rejected traditional political institutions and identities, they had strong

political values and ideals and many ideas for change. They were looking for a different

way of doing politics rather than a retreat from it and pursued this through a diverse range

of political practices. However, these discourses and practices had certain limitations, in

particular with respect to their ability to forge strong alliances and bring about substantial

change.

Dos estudios recientes sobre las identidades políticas, discursos, utopías y prácticas de

jóvenes de clase media en Lima contemporánea indican que, contrariamente a una nar-

rativa común de “antipolítica”, tenían una relación crítica más que negativa con la

política. Si bien rechazaron en gran medida las instituciones e identidades políticas tradi-

cionales, tenían fuertes valores e ideales políticos y muchas ideas para el cambio. Estaban

buscando una forma diferente de hacer política en vez de retirarse de ella y la persiguieron

a través de una amplia gama de prácticas políticas. Sin embargo, estos discursos y prácti-

cas tenían ciertas limitaciones, en particular con respecto a su capacidad para forjar alian-

zas sólidas y lograr cambios sustanciales.

Keywords: Middle class, Youth, Politics, Activism, Peru

During the 1980s and early 1990s, Peru experienced a prolonged and devas-

tating internal armed conflict between the state and two guerrilla movements

(Shining Path and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) and a severe

economic crisis. In response to these problems, in 1992 then-President Alberto

Fujimori dissolved Congress and suspended the constitution, proceeding to

rule by decree. Both armed conflict and economic crisis decreased significantly

under Fujimori, affording him high levels of popular support that persist in

parts of the population today. However, his government was also characterized

by authoritarianism, repression of opposition forces, and high levels of corrup-

tion across all spheres of public life. Repression targeted both popular move-

ments and more middle-class agents such as academics, journalists, and

activists.

Franka Winter is an independent researcher. She undertook the research featured in this article as

a Government of Ireland Postdoctoral Fellow in Maynooth University Sociology Department.

854095LAPXXX10.1177/0094582X19854095Latin American PerspectivesWinter / Middle-Class Youth And Politics In Lima

research-article2019

74 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

Fujimori’s regime ended in 2000, when he fled the country following a cor-

ruption scandal. He was later convicted of crimes related to corruption and

human rights abuses and is currently serving a long prison sentence. However,

his “movement” has experienced a revival under his daughter Keiko, and her

repeated but so far unsuccessful presidential candidacy has prompted both

excitement and intense protest among Peruvians.

Since the democratic transition in 2000, Peru has experienced an astonishing

economic boom. Poverty levels have decreased, and the middle class is grow-

ing fast, comprising between 40 and 50 percent of the country’s population

(Jaramillo and Zambrano, 2013). According to the Latinobarómetro, which has

been measuring public opinion on the continent for 20 years, these numbers

largely match Peruvians’ self-perception: in 2015 38 percent of them described

themselves as “middle-class” (Latinobarómetro, 2015). To the visitor, this socio-

economic change is most visible in the mushrooming of swish high-rise apart-

ment buildings, hip coffee shops, and glamorous shopping malls. No longer

limited to a handful of districts in “Modern Lima,” these material signs of

(albeit mostly precarious) prosperity now define the cityscape across the capi-

tal and other cities around the country.

Politically, however, posttransition Peru has been less of a success. During

Alan García’s government (2006–2011), a toxic mixture of neoliberal macroeco-

nomic policies with an authoritarian approach to dissent resulted in escalating

social conflicts, repeatedly prompting political violence (Drinot, 2011; Hughes,

2010). While Ollanta Humala promised to take a more inclusive approach, he

failed to deliver significant change, and many of his former supporters soon

turned away from him. Political institutions and the state are also reeling. The

Latinobarómetro has long highlighted the low and diminishing levels of trust

in Peruvian democratic institutions. Since the transition, the percentage of

respondents who had “little” or “no” trust in political parties, Congress, or the

government was extremely high almost every year, oscillating between 70 and

90 percent.

This widespread disdain for traditional political institutions is often blamed

on history, in particular the Fujimori regime. While Fujimori himself was

elected as an “outsider” using antiestablishment rhetoric, his government cer-

tainly did nothing to reverse the already poor situation but instead actively

promoted a culture of “antipolitics” (Degregori, 2000). An already reeling party

system was further dismantled, corrupted, and discredited by political scan-

dals, producing an image of professional politicians as lacking morals and con-

victions. Furthermore, Fujimori’s crackdown on the political opposition

weakened social movements and civil society in general (Burt, 2006). Mateus

Borea and Monard Rivas (2012: 2, my translation) observe that “this is where .

. . ‘the decade of antipolitics’ began, based on an antiparty discourse that ended

up darkening and weakening the political system, opening the doors for out-

siders and technocrats to run the country.” More recently, Alan García’s gov-

ernment was accused of corruption, and his authoritarian response to social

conflicts angered many.

As a result of these experiences, it is often argued that the middle classes in

particular assumed an antipolitical and antistate position and largely retreated